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INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this study is to review the period between
the election of Lincoln and the beginning of the Civil War,
especially in regard to the influence Fort Sumter was to play
in the actual commencement of hostilities.
EVen in the colonial days there had been a reluctance to
enter into a strong central Union, although such a Union had
been

requi~ed

by the strongest necessity of self-interest and

self-preservation.

The old Articles of Confederation had

demonstrated the reluctance on the part of the States to yield
their sovereignty to a central Government.

Although the new

Constitution of 1789 had remedied the governmental weaknesses
of the old Articles of Confederation, the States still held
to the idea of separate and independent sovereignty.

The idea

that a State had the right to withdraw from the Union, upon
what might be considered just cause, was by no means an
exclusively Southern doctrine.

The importance given such

doctrine by John C. Calhoun in the nullification crisis of
1832, and the recourse to it by the South to meet the antislavery challenge of the Northern abolitionists, had tended
to make the right of secession a Southern doctrine.
After many threats by the South that secession would be
resorted to to protect the ffpeculiar institution ff of slavery,
and after the untiring efforts of Southern radicals since 1850
in propagandizing the secession movement, the opportunity came
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"chain of steel".

The election ot Lincoln, the candidate ot

the anti-slavery North, although perfectly 1ega1and regular,

(

'i

in 1860 to test whether the Union was a "rope of sand" or a

I

I

was seized upon as cause for secession by the pro-slavery
South.

It mattered little that Lincoln and the Republicans

would be powerless to harm the "peouliar institution" with a

r.,

Demooratio Congress.

i'

and cold reason.

't

the eleotion ot Lincoln and his inauguration, six other

i

cotton States followed.

,,. ,

Revolutions are not amenable to 10gio

South Carolina was to lead the secession parade.

Between

As each State seceded it took over,

it it had the power, the Federal property and forts within
its limits.

By March 4, 1861, all the Federal torts in the

South had been taken except Fort Sumter and two or three more.
It seems strange that while all the other forts were taken
with little or no excitement, the question of South Carolina's

,
t

taking over Fort Sumter was to be accompanied by such resl'stanoe
on the part of the Federal Government, and was finally to bring
on aotua1 hostilities.
Both Buohanan and Lincoln were reluctant 'to believe'that
the secession movement was in dead earnest.

They hoped to the

e.nd that some remedy short of 'war might be found.

States were

permitted to leave the Union by their own declaration an4
enter into a Southern Confederacy.

Seemingly they were inde-

pendent, although a recognition of independenoe had been remote
fromthe thoughts of both Buchanan and Lincoln.

No outstanding

coercive measures had been directed against the seceding States
by either Buchanan or Lincoln.

Both Presidents had :feared the

3

effect of coercion on the doubtful border slave States# which
still clung uneasily to the Union.

How long was the Federal

Government to remain inactive and conciliatory?
It was the question of holding or surrendering Fort Sumter,
in Charleston harbor, which was to bring an end to·the period
t.

of inaction and the hope for a peaceful restoration of the
Union.

It will be the purpose of this study to trace the story

of Fort Sumter under Presidents Buchanan and Lincoln# and to
show how it brought about the beginning of the Civil War.

"
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CHAPTER I
.BUCHANAN FACES THE SECESSION MOVEMENT
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CHAPTER I

\

BUCHANAN FACES THE SECESSION MOVEMENT

~,

It is perhaps unfortunate, with respect to James Buchanan's
place in history, that he was elected in 1856.

In that year,

before he had secured the nomination, he had written to a friend
words that events were to make prophetic.

Said Buchanan:

I had hoped for the nomination in 1844, again in 1848, and
even in 1852, but now I would hesitate to take it. Before
many years the Abolitionists will bring war up£n the land.
It may come during the next Presidential term.
,

The opposition party and its anti-slavery principles over which
Buchanan triUmphed were to help drive him into a close affiliation with the extreme pro-slavery wing of the Southern Democratic

!(

party.

In 1856 the new Republican party, whose fundamental

program was opposition to the further spread of slavery, entered

(

its first oandidate for the Presidency, John C. Fremont.

\

imposing total of votes polled by the Republicans inspired fear

The

among the ranks of the pro-slavery elements of the South
especially, and the new party became a menace and a challenge
to the South.

It was but natural that Buchanan should consider

himself the champion of the pro-slavery elements of the Democratic
party and the South.

He owed his election to these groups and

his personal leanings were already on the pro-slavery side.
As early as 1851 Buchanan, in a letter to Isaac Toucey,
in which he discussed his chances for the Presidency, presaged
his eventual championship of the pro-slavery cause.

Said

Buchanan in 1851:
1. Auchampaugh, Philip Gerald, James Buchanan and His Cabinet
on the Eve of Secession, p. 30. Privately P~inted, Lancaster
Press, Lancaster, Pa., 1926.

?
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I was never a favorite in New England and I presume that
my opinions on th~ slavery question have rendered me less
so than formerly.
But in 1856 the anti-slavery movement had spread beyond the
New England borders, increasing Buchanan's chances of being
"less a favorite than formerly".

In 1856 Buchanan had said

privately and publicly that his mission would be to destroy
sectionalism everywhere, and bring baok the good old times.
To his mind, and to many of those of conservative leanings,
'-':>,"--

his election had saved the Union¥

To support this view, Horace

Greeley has left the story-of a convention of Southern Governors
at Raleigh, N. C., in October, 1856, called at the invitation
of Governor Wise of Virginia.

The gathering was kept secret at

the time, but it was afterward proclaimed by Governor Wise that,
had Fremont been elected, he would have marched at the head of
twenty thousand men to Washington, and taken possession of the
Capitol, preventing by force Fremont's inauguration at that
place. 4
It may be that the election of Buchanan in 1856 prevented
a secession movement then, but the accentuation of the slavery
issued during his administration was to have the opposite effect.
During his administration he was to alienate further the antislavery North by his Kansas policy, and even to drive from him
the majority of Northern Democrats when he split with Douglas.
Douglas broke with Buchanan because of the latter's extremely
pro-slavery policy in Kansas.

Thus, when secession came upon

him, Buchanan had unfortunately set the stage for Northern

2.

rifSmP.

19

3.uc
paugh,~. oi t., p. 31
4. areeley, Horace, The American Conflict, p. 329, Hartford,
Conn., The O. D. Case .Co., 1864.
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suspicion and condemnation of his every action in his sincere
desire to save the Union and avert civil war.

Strangely

enough, the pro-slavery advances made during Buchanan's
"

administration were not to W07k to the disadvantage of the
I..

nascent anti-slavery Republican party, but to the discomfiture
of the Democratic party of which Buchanan was the leader.
The intensification of the issue had caused the Democratic
party to disintegrate into two factions, instead of welding
the party into ami11tant phalanx to meet the menace of the
anti-slavery Republicans.

The moderate pro-slavery Northern

group was led by Stephen A. Douglas, the extreme pro-slaverr
Souhhern wing by John C. Breckinridge.

The Southern Union group,

largely recruited from the ranks of the former American party,
was led by John Bell of Tennessee.

Abraham Lincoln was nomi-

nated over the most outstanding leader of the Republican party,
William H. Seward, to lead the new party in what might be called
the most important election ot our history, that ot 1860.

The

Democrats, in their split over the slavery issue, had given
the Republicans a decided advantage.

Because of these condi-

tions, Lincoln was to become a minority President.
Now what role was Buchanan to play in this momentous
election of 1860?

It was not to be expected that he would

throw his support to Douglas, who had injured his prestige and
that of the party by his defection over the Kansas issue.

It

was only consistent with his nast record and pro-Southern
sympathies that he should throw his influence on the side ot
the Breckinridge or extreme Southern pro-slavery party.l
5. Curtis, George Ticknor, Life of James Buchanan, Vol. 2,
p. 289, New York, Harper a:tiCT""13ro"'-Cliefis, ""1883.

In a

T
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\
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campaign speech from the White House Buchanan declared that
neither of the Democratic conventions was regular, and therefore every Democrat was at liberty to vote as he thought
proper, but that for himself he preferred the Breckinridge
ticket.

One plank of that platform called for the "immediate

annexation of Cuba" as a means of protecting the Southern'

,

I

I

r
y

interests in the national government. 6
President Buchanan's attitude as between the North and

'

South was illustrated in the above speech.

He said, speaking

of the right of the South to carry slavery into the territories,

t
{

1,
I

which right had been affirmed by the Dred Scott decision:
The people of the Southern States can never abandon this
great principle of State equality in the Union without selfdegradation. Never without an acknowledgment that they are
inferior in this respect to their sister States. Whilst it
is vital to them to preserve their equality, the Northern
States surrender nothing by admitting this principle. In
doing this they only yield obedience to the Constitution
of their country as expounded by the Supreme Court of the
United States. While for the North it is comparatively a
mere abstraction, with the sout~ it is a question of co-equal
State sovereignty in the Union.
While President Buchanan was thus defending the cause of
the South in her grievances against the North, Governor
W. H. Gist of South Carolina, on October 25, 1860, was
addressing a circular letter to several governors of the cotton
States, feeling them out as to the probable action of their
States in the event of Lincoln's election, and hinting for
some definite promise of support if South Carolina should
6. Nicolay and Hay, Abraham Lincoln, A Hi sto r7, vol. 2, p. 282
New York, The Century Co., 1~04.
-- -7. Curtis, ££. ~ vol. 2, p. 293.
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secede alone. 8

Said Governor Gist, "If no other state takes

the lead, South Carolina will secede (in my opinion) alone,
if she has any assurance that she will soon be followed by
another or other States".9

'< ".:

Even earlier, on the 9th of

August6 1860 6 W. W. Boyce 6 a member of Congress fram South
Carolina 6 in a speech at Winsboro, was saying that if Lincoln
was elected, he thought that the Southern States should with-

I (,
I<

draw from the Union, as many as would 6 and if no other 6 South
Carolina alone. lO From all the actions and utterances of

<

the leading politicians in the State, as well as from the
reactions of the people, there could be little doubt that
Lincoln's election would set the stage for the 1mmediate secession of South Carolina. ll South Carolina was the logical
State to take the lead in the movement of secession.

Calhoun's

doctrines, producing the Nullification Ordinance of 1832, had
prepared the minds of the people for seceSSion, and when the
slavery crisis of 1850 was at its height, South Carolina was
ready for secession.

Now the smouldering fires of secessionism,

allayed by the Compromise of 1850, were blown to white heat
by the threat of Victory of an anti-slavery
party.
,
From the nomination of Lincoln until his election on
November 6 6 1860'6 the central theme of discussion in the
political circles of South Carolina had been the policy to be
8. Nicolay and Ray, ~.~. vol. 2, pp. 306, 307
9 • .!.2!£, p. 307
10. Crawford, Samuel Wylie 6 The Genesis of the Civil War, p. 14
11. Rhodes, James Ford, History of the Unltea States, 1~50-l896,
vol. 3, p. 2, New York, The Macmillan Co., 1920.

".
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pursued by the State in the event of Lincoln's success.
Captain Abner Doubleday, stationed at Fort Moultrie in
Charleston harbor, has said that Charleston, at that period,
was far from being a pleasant place for a loyal man.

Almost

every.public assemblage was tinctured with treasonable
sentiments, and toasts against the flag were always warmly
applauded.
,

(

As early as July there was much talk of secession,

accompanied with constant drilling, and threats of taking the
forts in Charleston harbor as soon as a spearation should occur1 2

)

(

i

Radical propaganda had actually made the Southern masses believe
that the election of Lincoln would bring the appointment of
such men as John Brown and Hinton Helper to United States offices
in the South, and that every official bureau would become a

(

hot-bed of conspiracy, and a hatching-place of negro insurrectionst 3
After the news of Lincoln's election was known, a South Carolina
diarist recorded the remark of a.common citizen at a railway
station, to the effect that, "Now that the Black Republicans
have the power I suppose they will Brown us all".14
Therefore it is not surprising that on the evening of
November 6, the day of the election, the crowd that had gathered
in Charleston to await eagerly the news of the result, broke
forth in cheers for a Southern Confederacy.15 The seriousness
of the situation, and the firmness of purpose rumong the leaders
of that city was emphasized on November 7, by the refusal of
12. Doubleday, Abner, Reminiscences of Forts Sumter and Moultrie,
p. 14, New York, Harper and Brothers, 1876.
13. Burgess, John W., The Civil War and the Constitution, vol. 1,
p. 10.

14. Randall, J. G., The Civil War and Reconstruction, p. 184
New York, D. C. Heath and Co., 1937.
15. Rhodes, 2£. 2!!. vol. 3, p. 2.
l.

Q

T
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the Grand Jury or the United States District Court to per£or.m
the duties or their office. 16 On the same day, the Hon.

3' .

A. G. Magrath, the Judge or the court, rose in his place and
(

rormal1y resigned his of rice with the £ollowing serious
I.

('

<

I(

".

pronouncement:
For the last time I have, as a judge of the United States,
administered the laws or the United States within the limits
of South Carolina. So £ar as I am concerned the Temple or
of JUstice, raised under the Constitution of the United
States, is now closed. Ir it shall never again be opened,
I thank God that its doors have been closed before its
altar has been desecrated with sacrifices to tyranny.17
On the 5th of November, 1860, the day berore the election,
the South Carolina Legislature had met, earlier than usual in
order to be ready to take steps ror ruture action in the
event o£ Lincoln's e1ection. 18 On the 12th or November the
Legislature passed an aot oa11ing ror a convention or the
people to vote on secession, appointing the 6th day of December
for the election or the delegates to it, and the 17th or
November £or the meeting or the -convention. 19 Threats of
disunion had been heard ever since the very beginning or the
Federal Government, through the period of Jerfersonian expansion and the War of 1812, the nu111.f'ioation episode or 1832,
and the slavery orises or 1850 and 1856.

Now they were on

their way toward realization through the instrumentality of'
16. Crawford, 2£. £!!. p. 12
17. Crawford, 22. cit. p. 13
18. Burgess, 22. oIt; p. 78
19. l2!£, pp. 78,~.

12
the State of South Carolina. 20

The paramount question of

the hour was naturally how the national peril was to be
averted, and in partioular, how President Buohanan, his Cabinet
and Congress would propose to deal with it.
Buchanan's position was indeed unenviable.

He not only

sympathized with the South generally, but also had at least
one ardent seoessionist in his Cabinet.
members were pro-slavery in sentiment.

All the Cabinet
As originally oon-

stituted, the Cabinet had been made up of tour Southern men and
three Northern men.

From the South Buchanan had seleoted

Howell Cobb of Georgia for the Treasury, John B. Floyd of
Virginia for Secretary of War, Jacob Thompson of Mississippi
tor the Interior, and Aaron V. Brown of Tennessee for Postmaster-General •. ~ F~om the North there were Lewis Cass of M.z"eJ,ij!K;
Secre.td y~

#1:/

Sidf~

I

:z $8ilC.

rouce'1

Dr CaNNet!.{ ,.(!~ fe~yeftt,., ofW,~

Navy, and Jeremiah S. Black ot Pennsylvania, Attorney-General. 2l

This membership had remained the same up to the seoession orisis,
except for the re1;!loval by death of the Postmaster-General,
Brown.

In Brown's place Buchanan had appointed a Kentuckian,

Joseph Holt. 22
Cobb, the Secretary of the Treasury, had been working for
the secession of his State, Georgia, before he resigned his
post, and even betore South Carolina passed her ordinance ot
secession.

There is some truth in the oharge that Buchanan

had profited by the secession movement as a pOlit1~1ari, and

,I

I

1
I

20. Nicolay and Hay, .2l!. £!i. vol. 2, pp'. 296, 297.
21. Blaine, James G., Twenty Years of Congress, 1861, 1881,
volume 1, p. 124, Norwich, Conn., The Henry Bill Publishing
Co., 1884.
22. Buchanan, James, Mr. Buchanan's Administration on the Eve
of The Rebellion. p. 110, New York, D. Appleton Co., 1866.

..
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when disunion actually oame, he was powerless to oppose it,
because he was disarmed by. his own words and acts.

The

disunionists were his partisans, friends and counselors. 23
It is also true that there was not in President Buchanan's
Cabinet a single sympathizer with the Northern anti-slavery
attitude, that all were pro-Southern before the question of
reinforcing the forts in Charleston harbor became an issue,
and a minority were outright advocates of secession 'as the
only Southern remedy.24

In the early sta,as of the South

Carolina rebellion President Buchanan was regularly calling
in, for conference and advice, the Assistant-Secretary of
Stata, W. H. Trescot, the only South Carolinian really close
to the administration. 25
On November 7, lS60, an administration newspaper, the
"Constitution", which was receiving the Government patronage,
declared in an editorial:
We can understand the effect that will be produced in
every Southern mind when he reads the news that he is now
called on to decide for himself, his children, and his
children's children, whether he will submit tamely to the
rule of one elected on account of his hostility to him and
his, or whether he will make a struggle to defend his rights,
his inheritanoe and his honor. 26
On reading this editorial, Horatio King, then First Assistant
Postmaster-General, was so infuriated that on the same day he
addressed a letter to President Buchanan, deploring the spirit
23. Nicolay and Hay, 2R. ill. vol. 2, p. 336.
24. Tyler's Quarterly Historical and Genealogical Magazine,
XV, 1933 p. 90. No author given. Article: "Secession and
Coercionb • (Attorney-General Black's Correspondence).
25. Hunt, Gaillard, ed., If Narrative and Letter of William
Henry Trescot", American Historical ReView, XIII, 1905,pp. 531,532.
26. Quoted by Horation !lng, in his Turning on the Ligqt, p. 25
Philadelphia, J. B. Lippincott Co., 1895.
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of this editorial, protesting against men holding office
~der

the administration parading the streets of Washington

with disunion cockades on their hats, and calling on the
President to use his power to check the "dread spirit ot
disunion here in our midst".27
A letter from Mr. King to John A. Dix, later Buchanan's
Secretary of the Treasury, gives such evidence of the fears
entertained by loyal Union Democrats of Buchanan's course
of action, that the following extract will be quoted:
I have good reason to believe that the President is beset
by secessionists, who are almost exclusively occupying his
attention; and it is tMportant that the true friends of the
Union should do all in their power to strengthen his hands.
Why will you not write or come to see him, and get all the
strong men of your city to do the same? I cannot call
names, but rest assured what I tell you is true. The course
of the "Constitution" is infamous, but the President, I
presume, has no means of controlling it. Pray let him hear
from you all in a most decided manner on this subj~ct. Let
him know how much the paper and suspioions of disunion
influences near him are injuring h1m. 28
Whatever may be said of President Buchanan's methods and
motives in his efforts to check the tide of disunion, there
is little doubt that he was believed to be dominated 1n his
course at the outset by pro-Southern and disunionist advisers.
This was not only the belief of the victorious Republicans
of the North, but in as emphatic degree that of the South. 29
Floyd,

B~chanan's

Secretary of War until he broke with the

President on the issue of the reinforcement of the federal
forts in Charleston harbor, has left a rather apt analysis ot
Buchanan's support of the South, modified by his Northern
27. Ibid, p. 25.
28. King, Horatio, ~. cit. p. 25
29. Channing, Edwara; A~story of the United States, vol. 6,
p. 281, New York, The Macmillan Co e , 1936.
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background.

The New York Herald, January 17, 1861, carried

a speech wh1ch Floyd made after h1s res1gnat1on from the
Cabinet, 1n wh1ch he spoke of Buchanan thus:
Let me come aga1n to the support 1n justice of what I
be11eve to be that good old man. Was there s1nce God made
this earth a man ever placed in so difficult a position
as the President of the United States was placed in? Had
he not been true to you? Had his administration not been
faithful to the South? Had it not been honest and faithful
to the whole Union, because it was dist1nctly and fearlessly
constitutional? I do not come here to censure, gentlemen,
but I will say, because it is due to the truth of h1story,
that in that terrific conflict 1n wh1ch he was engaged, he
was not as well susta1ned b7 the South as he deserved to be.
Perhaps 1t was 1ntended that this present catastrophe
should be prec1p1tated upon the country. If they had taken
a different course this doubtless would not have come. But
it is not 1n human nature to be as true to another as to the
mother that· gave you suck. Mr. Buchanan could not cO~B to
the support of the South as a son of the South would.
Now the most 1mmed1ate specific problem to be dealt w1th
in the 1nc1pient stages of the South Caro11na secess10n
movement, w1th reference both to the success of the movement
on the part of South Caro11na, and the abi11ty of the nat10nal
government to cope with 1t, was that of the nat10nal property
in Charleston and Charleston harbor.

The nat10nal property

with1n the terr1torial l1mits of South Caro11na consisted of
the forts 1n the harbor and a large arsenal w1th1n the c1ty
lim1ts, not to ment10n the post-off1ce and customs house 1n
the c1ty.

There were three forts, Castle P1nckney, Moultr1e,

and Sumter.

These had been ceded to the United states by
South Carolina 1n 1805. 31 Next to the success of secession
itself, the possess1on of these forts by the State, and the
pre~ntion

of their being strengthened by reinforcements on

30. Auchampaugh, 2£. ill. p. 19
31. Crawford, 2£. £!i. p. 2

,.~@(.
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the part of the nat1.onal government, was the most anxlous
concern of the South Carolina authorltles. 32 And the
questlon of these same forts was to be also the chief cause of
anxiety to Buchanan for the remainder of his term of Office.
On November 7, the day after Lincoln's election, Buchanan
called in his Secretary of War to find out the truth of
falslty of a

to the effect that the forts had been
assaulted and carried by the South Carolinians. 33 On November
rumo~

26, W. H. Trescot, in a letter to Governor Gist of South
Carolina, stated that the President feared the forts were in
danger of an assault by the South Carolinians, even before
the passage of the ordinance of secession, and Governor Gist,
in his reply of November 29', declared that he had found great
difficulty in restraining the people of Charleston from
34
seizing the forts.
Thus, at the beginning of the rebellion,
the status of the forts in Charleston harbor was a chief
concern to both parties in the conflict.
One of the first instances of the President's attention
being called to the desirability of strengthening the garrisons
of the Southern forts was in the memorandum of General Scott.
On October 29, several days before the election of Lincoln,
General Scott, Chlef of Staff of the army, addressed to the
President a paper entitled "Vlews suggested by the imminent
danger of a disruption of the Union by the secession of one or
more of the Southern States~35

In these views, in addition to

,.'
32.

~, p. 31
33. Auchampaugh, .Q.E. ill. p. 130
34. Crawford, 22. ~. pp. 30, 31.

35. Buchanan, James, Mr. Buchanan's Administration on the Eve
of The Rebellion, pp. 287, 288, 289, 290, New York, ~.
Appleton Co., 1866.

17
a rather strange opinion that rather than have a civil war
all its horrors, it might be preferable to let the Union be
divided into about four confederacies, General Scott went on
to say that all the Southarn forts in danger of Southern
aggression should be so garrisoned as to "make any'attempt to
take anyone of them, by surprise or coup de main, ridiculous".36
"From the impracticable nature of the 'views', and their strange
and inconsistent character", said Buchanan, "the President
dismissed them from his mind without further consideration".
In defense of his action the President argued that from
Scott's own estimate there were only five companies, or about
four hundred men available for reinforcement, and to have
distributed these among nine forts would have been a confession
of weakness instead of strength.

That it would have done

J

nothing to prevent secession, but much to provoke it.

Besides

J

he had no power, under the laws, to add to this force by
calling forth the militia or accepting the services of volun-

'I

teers.

Most of the small regular army was beyond reach on
the remote frontiers. 37 Buchanan's explanation of his action

on General Scott's proposal gives us the key to his policy
at that time.

Said Buchanan:

Under these circumstances it became the plain duty ot
the President,destitute as he was of military force, not
only to refrain from any act which might provoke or
encourage the cotton States into secession, but to smooth
the way for such a compromise as had in times' past happily
averted danger from the Union. There was gggd reason to
hope that· this might still be accomplished.
35.

~,

p. 289.

37. Curtis, ~. £!!. vol. 2, p. 313
38. Buchanan, ~. ill. p. 104
39. BUchanan, 2£. ~. p. 300
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Even if he had had at his 1nnnediate disposal sufficient troops
to garrison the Southern torts, as he did have enough to
garrison those in Charleston, he would not at this time have
sent 'them.

H~

firmly believed that an inorease in the troops

at the forts would be viewed by the South as an attempt at
coercion and lead other cotton States to call seoession oonventions. 40
There was evidenoe of the danger of encouraging other
cotton States into secession by the President's adoption of
an aggressive policy.

On October 5, 1860, Governor Gist of

South Carolina addressed a letter to several Governors of
cotton States, asking them for their views as to the aotion
of their States in the event of a Black Republican victory.41
The majority of replies stated that, above all else, an
attempt at coercion would be resisted; that such coercion
would probably result in concerted action of the cotton States. 42
Buchanan's confidenoe that another compromise could be made is
~1'
,i

i

justified by Rhodes, who believes that if Crittenden's compromise bad been submitted to the people, it would have been

)

accepted by both the North and South. 43

Yet,.a few weeks

later, the policy pursued by Buchanan at this time was condemned
by his Secretary of State as the ttfatal error tt of the administratlon. 44
Floyd, the Secretary of War, has left a record of what must

40. Curtis, 22. ~. vol. 2, p. 300.
41.' Nicolay and Hay, 2£. cit. vol. 2, pp. 306-314.
42. Ibid
43. RnOdes, ~. cit. vol. 3, pp. 149, 150.
44. Black, C. F.;-Essa~s and Speeches of J. S. Blac!, p. 15
New York, D. Appleton 0., 1885.
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have been the first Cabinet meeting called by Buchanan after
the election of Lincoln.

The President called the meeting on

November 9, and said that the business before the Cabinet
was the most important since his induction into office.

The

President asked the opinion of the Cabinet on his suggestion
t~t

a general convention of the States should be called, for

the purpose of effecting a compromise of the #angry disputes"
between the North and South. 45 According to Floyd, the
President said that if this were done, and the North should
refuse a compromise, the South would be justified before the
whole world for refusing to remain in a Confederacy where
.j

her rights were so shamefully violated.

Buchanan recognized

the "alar.ming condition" of the country, and promised that he
would not "shrink from his duty".
were for a convention.

The majority of the Cabinet

Cass, the Secretary of State, deplored

Southern injuries, favored a convention and coercionj secession
he held illegal.

Black, then the Attorney-General, was for a

convention, coercion, and reinforcements to Charleston.

Cobb,

the Secretary of the Treasury, was hopeless upon the future
of the Union.

Holt, then Postmaster-General, did not advise

a convention, because in case it failed he thought it would
accelerate secession.
for a convention.

Thompson, Secretary of Interior, was

He was opposed to coercion, which he be-

lieved would drive his State to direct action.

Toucey,

Secretary of the Navy,' was for a convention, and believed that
retaliatory State measures would bring the Northern fanatics to
45. Auchampaugb.,

~.

ill.. p. 131

;q; 44 $ &$
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their senses.

Floyd described himself as opposed to secession

and rashness.
.)

He believed the Republicans would be powerless
to do anything and was tor a convention. 46 This statement of

Cabinet opinions agrees substantially with that of the
Assistant Secretary of State, W. H. Trescot, who wrote his
record in February, 1861, only a few weeks after his resignation. 47
A probable error in Floyd's account is the view of Black on
coercion. At this time Black did not believe that coercion was
legal. 48 He was in favor of a convention. 49
Throughout November Buchanan was busy preparing his annual
message to the Congress which was to assemble in the early
part of December..

,
,

i

"

t

I

1
.1

On

November 17, he asked his Attorney-

General, J. S. Black, for an answer to the following questions:
1. In case of a conflict between the authorities of any
State and those of the United States, can there be
any doubt that the laws of the Federal Government, if
constitutionally passed, are supreme?
2. What is the extent of my official power to collect the
duties on imports at a port where the revenue laws are
resisted by a force which drives the collector ira..
the custom house?
.
3. What right have I to defend the public ~roperty (for
instance, a fort, arsenal and navy yard), in case it
should be assaulted?
4. What are the legal means at my disposal for executing
those laws of the United States which are usually
administered through the courts and their officers?

I

~

f

5. Can a military force be used for any purpose whatever
under the Acts of 1795 and 1807, within the limits of
a State where there are no judges, marshals or other
civil officers?50
46. Ibi(l.

47. Hunt, Gaillard, ed., "Narrative and Letter of William
Henry Trescot," ~. ~., pp. 532, 533, 534.
48. See Black's aavice to Buchanan, Nov. 20, 1860, Curtis,
cit. vol. 2, p. 324.
49." Auchampaugh, .2£. ill., p. 131
50. Curtis, 2£. £!i. vol. 2, p. 319.

~.
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From these questions. it can be seen that the President was
extremely cautious in undertaking auyactlon that might be
considered aggressive.
The

Attorney-Gener~

gave the President his answers to

the live questions in a rather long document, on November 20. 51
This opinion has been called by one historian of the period
one of the most unfortunate state papers of our hIstory and
the basis of the PresIdent's ,ven more unfortunate message of
December 4. 52

It was in line with Buchanan's belief that the

Federal Government had no right to coerce or make war on a
state, and that the problem of dealing with a seceded State
I

f

was one for Congress to solve.

It was also in line with the

President's policy of inaction.

Said the Attorney-General:

}

t
\

J.
<,

f

I
f

-

If one of the States should declare her independence,
your action cannot depend upon the rIghtfulness of the
cause Upon which such declaration is based. Whether the
retirement ot the State trom the Union be the exercise
of a right reserved in the Constitution, or a revolutionary movement, it is certain that you have not in either
case the authority to recognize her independence or to
absolve her from her Federal obligations. Congress, or
the other States in convention assembled, must take such
measures as may be necessary and proper. In such an
event, I see no course for you but to go straight onward
in the ~th you have hitherto trodden - that is,- execute
the laws~cto the extent of the defensive means placed in
your hands, and act generally upon the assumption that
the present constitutional relations between the States
and the Federal Government contInue to exist, until a
new code of things shall be establish,d.either by law or
force. 53
The last question, concerning the use of military force
in the limits of a State where there wer no federal officers,
caused the President the greatest concern.

S. W. Crawford,

in a conversation with Judge Black in 1883, was told that
next to Major Anderson's transfer of his troops from Moultrie
51. ~, pp. 319 - 324.
52. Burgess, 2£. cit. vol. 1, p. 80
53. Curtis, 22. cit., vol. 2, p. 323.
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~"

to Sumter, Federal Judge Magrath's resignation of his office

Ie.

.
'

aaused the President more anxiety than any other event that

'"

occurred. 54

In the opin10n of the Attorney-General, the

President, under the laws of 1795 and 1807, could callout
the militia only in aid of the courts and marshals, and there
must be courts and marshals to aid.

As most of the Federal

officers had already resigned, the problem was to consider
what could be done if there were no courts to issue judicial
process, and no ministerial off1cers to execute it.

The

Attorney-General certainly did not give the President any
encouragement for aggressive action when he wrote 1n the
I)

following language:

,
I

1

I
I

In that event (lack of Federal of.flcers), troops would
certainly be out 0'1' place, and their use wholly illegal.
If they are sent to aid the courts and marshals, there
must be courts and marshals to be aided. Without the
exercise of those functions which belong exclusively to
the civil service, the laws cannot be executed in any
event, no matter what may be the physical strength which
the Government has at its command. Under such circumstances, to send a military force into any State, with
orders to act against the people, would simply be making
war upon them. • • The existing laws put and keep the
Federal Government strictly on the defensive. You can
use force only to repel an assault on the pugSic and aid
the courts in the performance of their duty.
Later Mr. Black, the Attorney-General, was to change his

I

i

.1

views as to a strictly defensive policy, but it must be
remembered that at this time no State had seceded, although
South Carolina was preparing for it.

Indicative of the

defensive attitude, not only on the part of the AttorneyGeneral, but of the Administration as a whole, is the reply
of Judge Black to a letter from Judge Woodward of Pennsylvania.
Judge Woodward wrote Black on November 28:
54. Crawford, 2£. cit. p. 16
55. CurtiS, ~. cit., vol. 2, p. 323.
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~f

As a Northern man, I cannot in justice condemn the South
for withdrawing from the Union. We hav&dri ven them off,'
andijwe raise an arm to strike, the stones of Rome will
move to mutiny.56
, I

According to Black, Woodward's letter was submitted to the
President and his Cabinet, and it "excited

univers~l

admit.-

tion and approbation for its eloquence and its truth".57
At about the same time Judge Woodward had written the

,

J\
~

I
(

j
'I"

Attorney-General:
And if they do go out, don't let a blow be struck
against them by the present administration. Dissuade them
if you can, but if you can't, let them go in peace. I
wish Pennsylvania could go with them. They are our brethren. 58
But it must not be inferred that Black was a "let them go in
peace" man.

Notwithstanding his opposition to the use of

coercion, and his approval of the spirit of Judge Woodward's
letter of November 28, he could not agree with Judge Woodward
and other Pennsylvania friends that the seceding States should
be allowed to go in peace.

He was probably inconsistent in

the following letter to Judge Woodward, but in it he gave
evidenoe of a strong Union spirit when he said:

"

.I
'I

I value as highly as anybody the recollection that I once
seemed to have some portion of the public confidenoe at
home. But it will give me far more pride for the balance
or my life to remember that I risked and lost it in a
faithful support of prinCiples which sooner or later will
be acknowledtee as necessary for" the preservation of the
noblest political system that the world ever saw. 59

on December 4, 1860, President Buchanan's message to
Congress, on the state of the nation, was delivered.

In this

message, according to Buchanan, his policy was announced, to
56.

•
p.
p. 96

which he "inflexibly adhered" to the end of his administration. 60
One can hardly read any historian whose condemnation of this
message is not severe.

One historian has said that the

message was craven and cowardly for the emergency; that its
whole scope was to upbraid the people for their chOice of a
President and "to exhort them to fall upon their knees to
propitiate the fellow-citizens they. had outvoted l and avert
the dire calamity of disunion which otberwise seemed inevitable. 6l
The

mess~ge

does charge the North with responsibility in the

following words:

{

\

Why is itl then, that discontent now so extensively
prevails, and the Un10n of the States, w hichis the source
of all these blessings, is threatened with destruction?
The long continued and intemperate interference of the
Northern people with the question of slavery in the
Southern States has at length produced its natural effects. 62
Then the President went on to plead with the South not to take
any rash and precipitate action, not to yell before the
abolitionist dog had bitten, but to await some overt act of
the incoming administration.

Speaking of the duty of the

Northern States to repeal their Personal Liberty laws, he s_id:
The Southern States, standing on the basis of the Constitution, have a right to demend this act of justice from
the States of the North. Should it be refused, then the
Constitution, to which all the States are parties l will
have been willfully violated by one portion of them in a
provision essential to the domestic ~ecurity and happiness
of the remainder. In that event the injured States, after
having first used all peaceful and constitutional means
to obtain redress, would be justified in revolutionary
resistance to the Government of the Union. 63
.
60. Buchanan, James, 2£• .ill. p. 109
61. Schouler l James, 2£• .ill. vol. V, p. 462
62. Richardson, J. D., Messages and Papers of the Presidents,
vol. V, p. 626. PublisheCl by Authority of Congress, 1899.
63. Ibid, pp. 630, 631
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The message followed the Attorney-General's opinion to
the letter

i~

that part concerning the President's lack of

power to execute the laws in a State where
had resigned.

th~

He said that that duty could not

Federal officers
po~sibly

be

performed where no judicial authority existed to issue process
and no marshal to execute it.

And even if there were such an

officer, he believed the entire population would combine to
res1st him. 54 But the right of secession he repelled in words
that might have been written by Lincoln:
This Government. • • 1s a great and powerful Government,
invested with all the attributes of sovereignty over the
special subjects to which its authority extends. Its
framers never intended to implant in its bosom the seeds of
its own destruction, nor were they at its creation guilty
of the absurdity of providing for its own dissolution. It
was not intended by its framers to be the baseless fabric
of a vision, which at the touch of the enchanter would
vanish into thin air, but a substantial and mighty fabriC,
capable of resisting the slow decay of time and of defying
the storms of ages. 55
.
,
Buchanan gave a very thorough and able argument against the
right of secession, saying that to justify secession, as a constitutional remedy, it must be on the principle that the
Federal Government is a mere voluntary association of States,
to be dissolved at pleasure by anyone of the contracting
parties. "Such a principle", he said, "is wholly inconsistent
with the history as well as the character of the Federal
Constitution".

He quoted Jackson and went back to the old

Articles of Confederation to buttress his argument.

The old-

Articles of Confederation, in the thirteenth article, expressly
declared that the Union was to be perpetual.

The preamble to

the Constitution declares that it was established "in order to
64. Richardson, J. D., 2£.
65. illl!, P .633

~.,

p. 634
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for.m a more perfect union"; therefore Buchanan insisted that
.1"

",
1-- t

the increased perfection of an already perpetual Union made
that Union doubly perpetual and indissoluble. 66 Certainly
no sign of weakness and vaoillation was shown in denying the
right of secession.
But the strength of the argument against the right of
seoessionwas considerably oounterbalanced by an emphasis on
the right of reyolution and the identification of sec$ssion
w~th

revolution.

The following paragraph might well have

been omitted:

<:'

It may be asked, then, Are the people of the States without
redress against the tyranny and 'oppression of the Federal
Govarnment? By no means. The right of resistance on the
part of the, governed against the oppression of their governments can not be denied. It exists independently of all
constitutions, and has been exercised at all periods of the
world's history. Under it old governments have been destroyed and new ones have taken their place. It is embodied
in strong and express language in our own declaration of
Independenoe. But the distinction must ever be observed that
this is revolution against an established government, and
not a voluntary secession from it by virtue of an inherent
constitutional right. In short, let us look the danger fair~
in the face. Secession is neither more nor less than
revolution. It mayor it may not be a justifiable revolution,
but still it is revolution. 67
So it might be argued that there was no legal right to secede,

I

but there might be a moral right of revolution; but secession

I

is revolution, therefore there is a moral right of secession.

i
'f

I

What Buchanan meant was that if the South seceded, it must be
without the sanction of the Constitution, while the right of
revolution existed outside the Constitution.
seems merely academic however.

The argument

Whether the Southern States

withdrew from the Union by the right of seoession or the
66. Ibid,pp. 636, 631, 632.
67. Richardson, J. D., 2£. £!i. vol. 5, p. 634.
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right of revolution, if successful, the denial of the right of
secession would matter little.

,'j

.,

As for coercion, Buchanan said, "The question fairly
statecl is" Has the Constitution delegated to Congress the
power to coerce a State into submission Which is attempting
to withdraw or has actually withdrawn from the Confederacy?"
He said that if answere4 in the affirmative, it must be on
the principle that the power to declare and to make war
against a State has been conferred upon Congress.

After much

serious reflection he had concluded that no such power had
been delegated to Congress or to any other department of the
Federal Government.

To the support of his contention he

quoted Madison's denial of coercion in a speech before the
Constitutional Convention of 1787:
The use of force against a State would look more like a
declaration of war than an infliction of punishment" and
would probably be considered by the party attacked as a
dissolution of all previous compacts by which it might be
bound.
.
Here the President identified coercion with making war against
a State, and said that the power to make war against a State
is at variance with the whole spirit of the Constitution. "But
if we possessed this power", said Buchanan, "would it be wise
to exercise it under existing circumstances?
would doubtless be to preserve the Union.

The object

War would not only

present the most effectual means of destroying it, but would
vanish all hope of its peaceable reconstruction.,,68

It was

emphasized that the Union rested upon public opinion and could
never be cemented by the blood of its citizens shed in civil war.
68. Richardson, J. D., 22.

ill., vol. 5, pp. 635, 636
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Then the President put the responsibility of conciliation on
Congress when he said: "Congress possesses many means of
preserving it by conciliation, but the sword was not placed in
~'I

their hand to preserve it by force. 69

We can at least under-

stand why Senator Hale wittily summed up Buchanan's position
as: (1) South Carolina has just cause to secede. (2) She has
no right to secede. (3) We have no right to prevent her. 70
W. H. Seward also threw in his quip: "It shows conclusively that
it is the duty of the President to execute the laws, - unless
somebody opposes him, - and that no State has a right to go
out of the Union - unless it wants to."?l
Buchanan again reminded Congress that secession could be
prevented by invoking the fifth article of' the Constitution,
which provided for amendments. "Congress can contribute much
to avert it", he said, "by proposing and recommending to the
legislatures of the several States the remedy for existing
evils which the Constitution has itself provided for its own
preservation".

Then the President recommended an explanatory

amendment on the subject of slavery.

The amendment was to be

confined to the "final settlement" of the true construction
of the Constitution on three special points: (1) An express
recognition of the right of property in slaves in the States
where it now exists

o~

may hereafter exist. (2) The duty of

protecting this right in all the common Territories throughout
their Territorial existence, and until they shall be admitted
as States into the Union, with or without slavery, as their
constitutions may prescribe.

(3) A like recognition of the

right of the master to have his slave who has escaped from one

'69. Ibid, p. 636

.'lQ. Schouler, 2.:2,•
7l.~

.£!l.,

vol. 5, p. 473
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State into another restored and "delivered up" to him, and
of the validity of the fugitive-slave law enacted for this
purpose, together w1th a declarat10n that all State laws
impairing or defeating this right are violations of the
Const1tution, and are consequently null and void.

The President

said that it might be objected that this construction of the
Constitut1on had already been settled by the Suprema Court, but
that a very large proport1on of the people st1ll contested that
decision (Dred Scott), and would never cease from ag1tation
until it was established by the people of the several States
1n their sovere1gn character.

Such an explanatory amendment,

he believed, would forever terminate the existing d1ssensions,
and restore peace and harmony among the States. 72 But 1t was
obvious that the Republicans could not agree to such an amendment.
As to the 1mmediate danger of an appeal to arms in the
harbor of Charleston, the President had the following to say:

)

,

J

,I,:

Then, 1n regard to the property of the United States in
South Carolina. This has been purchased for a fair equ1valent,
"by the consent of the legislature of the State", "for the
erection of forts, magazines, arsenals", etc., and over these
the authority "to exercise exclusive legislat1on" has been
expressly granted by the Constitution to Congress. It 1s
not believed that any attempt will be made to expel the
United States from this property by force; but if 1n this I
should prove to be mistaken, the officer in command of the
forts has received orders to act strictly on the defensive.
In such a contingency the responsib11ty for consequences
would rightfully rest upon the heads of the assa1lants. 73
In the last sentence of the' above quotation Buchanan
expregsed a determination from which he was not to depart, to
avoid any contingency that would throw the responsib1l1ty of
72. Richardson, J. D.,
73. Ibid, p. 635

2£. £!1., vol. 5, p. 638
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initiating a conflict of arms on the Government.

If war must

come, Buchanan wanted the responsibility to rest on the
secessionists.
desire. 74

.
\

Lincoln's inaugural was to express the same

There was little hope of Buchanan's plan of compromise by
the amendment method succeeding.

This was not because of the

refusal of Congress to try the method recommanded by the
President, for many were the committees appointed and the plans
. submitted.

There were the Committee of Thirteen of the Senate,

the Committee of Thirty-three of the House, the Crittenden
plan of compromise, one outstanding feature of which was the
extension of the Missouri Compromise line westward, and the
Peace Convention sponsored by the State of Virginia. 75 The
.

failure of the compromise

\':

eff~ts

was because the plans worked

out were contrary to the fundamental Republican principle of
"no further extension of slavery".

On the other hand, the

attitude of radical Southern Congressmen augured ill for the
success of compromise, for on December 13, when the "Committee
of Thirty-three" had just begun its efforts, and before a
single State had actually seceded, a group of Southern
Congressmen issued the following address to their constituents:

(,

iii

I;;

~ I~
.).
~

,
"

The argument is eXhausted. All hope of relief in the
Union, through the agency of committees, Congressional
legislation, or constitutional amendments, is extinguished,
and we trust the South will not be deceived by appearances
or the pretense of new guarantees. The Republicans are
resolute in the purpose to grant nothing that will or
ought to satisfy the South. We are satisfied the honor,
safety, and independence of the Southern people are to be
found only in a Southern Confederacy - a res~lt to be
obtained only by separate State secession - and that the
sole and primary aim of each slaveholding State ought to be
its speedy and absolute separation from an unnatural and
hostile Union. 76
74. Nicolay and Hay, 2£. £!i., vol. 3, p. 342, Lincoln's Inaugural.
75. Randall, J • G., 2£,- cit. ,p. 200
76. ~, p. 201
---
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CHAPTER II
A POLICY OF APPEASEMENT IN CHARLESTON HARBOR
••

It has already been noted that the Federal forts and
property in the harbor of Charleston were the foremost cause
of anxiety, both on the part of the Buchanan administration
and the State of South Carolina.

Even if South Carolina

were allowed to leave the Union in peace, and Buchanan's
policy of using no force to bring her back into the Union
were indefinitely continued, the possession of these forts
and property by the Federal Government would have been an
infringement of South Carolina's alleged sovereignty.

There-

fore it was almost as important that South Carolina should
secure the ultimate possession of these forts as to make good
her claim to the right of secession.
Jefferson Davis has left an interesting argument that the
,.!,

ror:ts, by virtue of the act of £ession of 1805, were legally
in the possession of South Carolina, even under the Constitution. l
He stated that the property in Charleston harbor and on Beaufort
River, the various forts and fortifications, and sites for the
erection of forts, were granted to the Federal Government by
legislative enactment by South Carolina, on the following

.,
!

conditions:
That, if the United States shall not, within
from the passage of this act, and notification
the Governor of this State to the Executive of
States, repair the fortifications now existing

three years
thereof by
the United
thereon or

1. DaviS, Jefferson,.l.UJle a.w:1 ~ of t.l!.e Confederate Government,
vol. 1, p. 210, Appleton and Co., New York, 1881.
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,

.,

I

bu11d such other forts or fortifications as may be deemed
most expedient by the Executive of the United States on
the same, and keep a garrison or garrisons therein; in
such ca~e this grant or cession shall be void and of no
effect.
.
The conditions in the act of cession apparently were not fulfilled,
for no add1t1onal defenses nor repairs were determined upon
until 1827, long after the three year 11mit had expired. 3
President Buchanan, in his annual message to Congress of December
4, 1860, declared that the property had been purchased for a
fair equivalent, by the consent of the Legislature of the State. 4
But Jefferson Davis seems to have been correct in deny1ng a
purchase, c1ting a law of 1794 prov1ding "that no purchase shall
be made where such lands are the property of a State".5

This

argument, however, was not made by Davis until after the Civil War.
Now what was the status of the forts in Charleston harbor
in the fall of 18601
Castle Pinckney.

There were forts Moultrie, Sumter, and

Fort Sumter was unoccupied, being 1n an un-

finished state, while Castle Pinckney was in charge of a single
ordnance sergeant.

The garrison of Fort Moultrie consisted

of two companies that had been reduced to sixty-five men, who
with the band made the total number in the post seventy-three.
Fort Moultrie had no strength, being merely a sea battery, and
its walls were about as high as an ordinary room.

.

The sand had

drifted from the sea aga1nst the walls so that cows could
actually scale the ramparts. 6

4

!,.·'IbIa;~quoting

p. SOl.

from Statutes at Large of South Carolina, vol. 5,

3. Crawford, 22. cit. p. 2
4. Richardson, J.-n;, 22. cit. vol. 5, p. 635
5. Davis, Jefferson, 22. cIt., vol. 1, p. 210
6. Johnson and Buel, Battles and Leaders of the Civil War,
vol. 1, p. 42, New York, The Century Co., 1887.
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Castle Pinckney. a small round- structure of brick. had

"r

~n

II

..

long been practically abandoned.

Grass grew on its walks.

its casemates had craCked here and there. a nd signs of neglect
and deoay were evident; but twenty-two guns still stood on its
parapet. and the old sergeant still polished the lacquer on
the guns and trimmed the harbor light that was mounted on its
walls. 7 This fort commanded the city of Charleston.
Fort Sumter was located on a shoal. ri~ht in the narrowest
part of the ohannel of the harbor. a large pentagonal fort.
fifty feet high.
any kind.

It was unfinished and without armament of

A few heavy guns of old pattern lay on the parade.

with masonry and large stones and material for the completion
of the work.

One hundred twenty workmen. under the charge of a

lieutenant of engineers, were at that time working on the fort
to complete it, under an appropriation made by an Act of
Congress passed in June, 1859. 8 This work on the forts, begun
in the fall of 1860, had no connection with their possible
future role in the secession drama, as the law appropriating
the funds had been passed as a matter of routine.

But as the

actual work started in the fall of 1860, it arounsed the suspicions of t he people of Charleston. 9
On November 26, 1860. W. H. Trescot. the Assistant
Secretary of State in Buchanan's Cabinet, wrote Governor Gist
of South Carolina that the President feared that before South
Carolina acted on secession in the coming convention. an
attempt might be made to take the forts in Charleston harbor.

7. C·rawford.

,2E. cit., p. 2
8. Crawford, Jll2..!. cit., p. 2
9. Ibid, p. 7
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Feeling his personal honor involved in such an attempt, the
.'

.

President, said Triscot, might make his fear the pretext to

~,' 1

order an increase of forces to those posts.

This order

would be resisted at any cost by the Southern members of the
Cabinet, but they would be strengthened in their position if
Governor Gist would assure the President that so long as the
status of the forts remained the same, and so long, as the
State remained in the Union, no attempt to take them by force
would be made. lO ,The Assistant Secretary of State received
a reply, dated November 29, 1860, which so clearly outlined
the situation as to any reinforcement that the greater part of
it will be quoted.

1

I

Said Governor Gist:

Although South Carolina is determined to secede from the
Union very soon after her convention meets, yet the desire of
her constituted authorities is, not to do anything that will
bring on a collision before the ordinance of secession has
been passed and notice has been given to the President of
the fact; and not then, unless compelled to do so by the
refusal of the President to recognize our right to secede,
by attempting to interfere with our exports or imports, or
by refusal to surrender the forts and arsenals in our
limits. I have found great difficulty in restraining the
people of Charleston from seizing the forts, and have only
been able to restrain them by the assurance that no additional troops would be sent to the forts, or any munitions
of war. • • If President Buchanan takes a course different
from the one indicated and sends on a reinforcement, the

~~:~~~~:b!~i~~

:iii ~~; ~~ ~:n~~e~i~t~~~o~~!ltorch of

Thus we see that the attitude of South Carolina was that the
Federal Government must surrender the forts after the
ordinance of secession was passed, and if war was to be avoided
d,
r
t

no troops were to be sent even before the State left the Union.
This was indeed a clever attempt to play upon the President's
10. Ibid, p. 30
11. mcolay and Hay,..2.E.! ..£!t., vol. 2, p. 379.
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If

fear of a civil war, and to ,make the taking of the forts after
secession all the easier.

This letter was shown to the
President by Mr. Trescot. 12
Buchanan's Secretary of War, Floyd, has left a story to
"

.

the effect that the President was asking him to send reinforcements at just about the time that Governor Gist sent the above
letter to Trescot.

Floyd's testimony has been questioned

because of the fact that he did quite a bit of boasting to the
South, after his resignation, of his part in preventing
reinforcements.
(.

Although contrary to the President's policy

at ,this time, it might well be that he had temporarily yielded
to the pressure of Secretary Cass and Attorney-General Black,
who favored reinforcements as early as the first week in
November.

Trescot, writing of the same period of time to which

Floyd referred, said that he went to call on Buchanan, found
Cass and Black in conference with the President, and the
President announced to him that he had determined to send reinforcements. 13 Floyd's account ran as follows:
Buchanan: "Mr. Floyd, are you going to send recruits to
strengthen the forts? What about sending reinforcements to Charleston?"
Floyd:

("I was taken very much by surprise to find the
President making this inquiry, indicating to
my mind a change of policy on his part".)
"I said", "Mr. President, nothing about sending
recruits to Charleston".

Buchanan: "Don't you intend to strengthen the forts at
Charleston?"
Floyd:

"I do not intend to strengthen the forts at
Charleston".

12. Crawford, 2£. cit., p. 34
13. Hunt, Gaillard;-ed., "Narrative and Letter of William Henry
Trescot", ~. £!i., p. 535
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Buchanan: " Mr. Floyd, I would rather be at the bottom of
the Potomao tomorrow than that these forts in
Charleston should fall into the hands of those
who intend to take them. It will destroy me,
sir."

Mr. Floyd, if that thing occurs it will cover your

"

name - and it is an honorable name. ~ir - with an
infamy that all time can never efface. because it
is in vain that you will attempt to show that you
have not some complicity in handing over those
forts to those who take them.

.

Floyd replied that he would risk his life and honor on the
declarations of the South Carolinians that they would not be
touched •. Buchanan said that was all very well, but "Does that
secure the forts?" Floyd replied that it didn't. but that it
was a guarantee that he believed in.
wasn't satisfield.

Buchanan added that he

Floyd said that he was sorry for it.

He

offered to make out orders, but said that it would mean conflict.

He

said the forts would be safe.

The State would send her

commissioners to Congress, and that body would decide what to
do.

Floyd added that he would resign if Congress decided on
coercion. 14 The above conversation so excited Floyd that he

sent for Davis, Mason, and Hunter to come up earlier than usual
to Washington to assure Buchanan there was no danger to the
forts.

DaVis, while finding Buchanan concurring with some of

his Views, was not at all successful in persuading him to take
the troops out of the harbor. 15
The appeasement policy, which was initiated by President
Buchanan's message of December 4 to Congress, had thus been
followed for weeks already by the Secretary of War.

Much

cOul~ind has been written on the question of Floyd's loyalty
14. AuchBmpaugh, 22. ill., p. 150

Floyd's speech at Richmond, Jan. 17. 1861.
15. Ibid. p. 151
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or treachery to the Union cause in this crisis, but we do
know his position on the question of reinforcing the forts in
Charleston harbor.

Mr. Trescot, who had an opportunity to

know him intimately, and who would have had no reluctance to
brand him as a secessionist in the first weeks of the crisis,
has declared that Eloyd thought secession unwise, and was in
favor of preserving the Union.

However he fully recogniz$d

the right of a State to secede and his sympathY,was with the
South. 16 The Secretary of War was opposed to the coercion
of a State, thought the reinforcement of the garrisons in
, I
"

,
"

J

.\

Charleston harbor very much the same as coercion, and would not
consent to it., On the other hand, he declared that any attempt
on the part of the people to take the forts he was bound to
resist and would resist. 17
Not only was this the avowed policy of the Secretary of War,
but his actions indicated that he opposed anything that could
be interpreted by the South Carolinians as a change in the
"status quo" of the forts.

In the month of November Fort

Moultrie's garrison was commanded by Colonel J. L. Gardner. 18
A few days before the first of November, the Chief Engineer,

J. G. Foster, had asked the War Department for forty muskets
to arm the workmen in the forts, on the ground that he feared
a possible assault. 19

There could be no better indication

16. Hunt, Gaillard, ed., "Narrative and Letter of William
Henry Trescot, rr .2E,. c1 t., p. 3.
17. Ibid, pp 533, 53~
18. u:-3. War Department, The War of the Rebellion, Official
Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series 1, vol. 1
p. 68, QUoted hereafter as Official Records.
19. ~, p. 67
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than this or the state or reeling among the people or
Charleston, who inspired such rears in the Chier Engineer
even berore the election of Lincoln.

On November 1, the

War Department asked the approval or Colonel Gardner for
the issuance of the muskets, and he advised against it, on
the ground that many of the workmen were secessionists. 20
Colonel Gardner, in his reply to the Department on November 5,
gave warning or the danger of assault and asked for reinforcements in the following language:
1'1.

I

~.

)1

(

• • • The only proper precaution - that which has no
objection - is to fill these two companies with drilled
recruits (say firty men) at once, and send two companies
from Old Point Comfort to occupy respectively Fort
Sumter and Castle Pinckney.2l
Thus it is clear that the War Department was aware of the situation, for here is a definite statement of the

fac~s

and

a request of the commanding officer for reinforcements and
for the occupation of the two unoccupied forts.

The advice

was not heeded; it was contrary to the Secretary of War's
views on coercion.
On November 6, F. J. Porter, Assistant Adjutant-General,
was ordered by the Secretary of War to Charleston harbor to
inspect the fortifications and troops.

In his report or

November 11, Porter, speaking of Fort Moultrie, said that
the unguarded state of the fort invited attack, needed strengthening without exciting the community, and that "all could

~ve

been easily arranged weeks since, when the danger was foreseen
by the present commander.

Now much delicacy must be practiced.

The garrison is weak, and I recommend that a favorable
opportunity be taken to fill up the companies with the best
20. Ibid, p. 68
21. I'5'IQ, p. 69
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drilled recruits available."22

reinforcements by the War Department's own special investi-

fa

I

gating agent.

I.

,.
I
r
( ,

I

~

'!

Here was another request for

,

(~ "I,

I

r
i"

",

These recommendations were made just a few

days after General Scott had sent his views to the President,
October 29, and asked for reinforcements. 23 Buchanan's
objection to General Scott's views was that the four or five
hundred

men available would be a confession of weakness when

distributed among the nine Southern forts, but judging from
the requests of Col. Gardner and F. J. Porter, there were
plenty of men available for reinforcing the forts in the
critical danger zone.
Why were not the forts in Charleston harbor alone rein-

.('.

forced?

Surely this line of action presented itself to the

President's consideration.

He took the responsibility upon

himself when writing in 1866 of his refusal to follow Gen.
Scott's advice, he said:
This refusal is attributed, without the least cause, to
the influence of Governor Floyd. All my Cabinet must bear
~l me witness that I was the President myself, responsible
for all the acts of my administration; and certain it is
that during the last six months previous to the 29th of
December, the day on which he resigned his office, after my
request, he exercised less influence ~i the administration
than any other member of the Cabinet.
Thus it must have been Buchanan's own policy, as well as
" t

Floyd's, not to send reinforcements to Charleston harbor, when
there

we~men

available for those particular forts, and two

~\

separate official requests for them.

The President's

22. Official Records, 2£. £!1. pp. 70,71.
23. See page 8
24. Buchanan, James, 2£. ,ill.. p. 307
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responsibility becomes all the more serious when it is
remembered that at that time the secession ordinance had not
even been passed, and the sending of a few additional
soldiers would have been merely a matter of routine.

The

South Carolina military forces were not yet organized
sUfficiently for successful resistance to reinforcement.

The

eXplanation must be in Buchanan's fear that such an attempt
must produce a collision and inaugurate a civil war.

As Floyd

thought reinforcement bordered on coerCion, sO the President
must have thought that it was aggression.

When later comparing

his policy with Lincoln's, he said:
The true policy was that expressed by President Lincoln'
to the seceded states in his inaugural months afterward,
in which he informs them, 'you can have no conflict without
being yourselves the aggressors. t2 5
The removal of the commanding officer in Fort Moultrie was,

)

t

t"

,

according to both Northern and Southern opinion, a concession
to the insurgents in Charleston.

The Southern opinion was

that Colonel Gardner was removed because of his requests for
reinforcements, and that the order to F. J. Porter to inspect
the forts and report on conditions in Charleston was simply
an excuse to get rid of an efficient commander. 26 Porter's
report, made to the War Department November 11, in the main
approved the conduct of Col. Gardner, but there were references

f
!

to "a laxity of discipline" and a reference to the facilitation
of certain matters given a "proper commander".27

If there was

no connection between this inspection and report, it was a
25~

Ibid, p. 165
26. Nicolay and Hay, Vol. 2, 2£. £!l. p. 345.
27. Official Records, I, pp. 70,-72

-
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rare coincidence that on the next day, November 12, Major
Robert Anderson received a message £rom A4jutant-General
Cooper, saying that the Secretary o£ War desired to see him
and to proceed to Washington and report to him without
unnecessary delay.28

Major Anderson was a Kentuckian with

Southern sympathies, had married a Georgia woman who owned
slaves, and there can be little doubt that he was put in
command in Charleston harbor to appease the Charlestonians. 29
Ca~tain

Abner Doubleday, the second in command under Major

Anderson, later recorded his suspicion ,that Floyd thought
:.\

'<~

;
t-

,

•

the new oommander oould be relied on to carry out the
Southern programme. 30 Another o£fioer, Captain James Chester,

i

"tl\ 'I

was o£ the same opinion, saying that Anderson was appointed
because he was expected to be reasonable, and that i£ he had
scruples upon the question of qualified allegianoe, he might
surrender on demand, on purely pro£essional grounds. 3l The
Assistant-Secretary of State, who was quite close to Floyd,
and whose evidence should carry weight, also stated, a £ew
days after Col. Gardner's removal, that it had been done

.'

J/.
f

beoause o£ Gardner1s removal o£ ammunition from the arsenal
in Charleston to Fort Moultrie. 32

A
.' .

To show the urgent need either £or reinforoement of the
£orts, or a policy o£ appeasement, we have a startling report
o£ the military storekeeper at the Federal arsenal in Charleston.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Official Records, Vol. I, p. 72
cit. p. 61
Battles andLeacrers of the Civil War, Vol. I, p. 41
!2!£, p. 51
Crawford, 22. £li. p. 85
Crawford,~.
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'

On November 12, the same day that Major Anderson was notified
to report

,

~

,

1mmediat~ly

to the Secretary of War, the military

I

storekeeper at the arsenal wrote the War Department as follows:
In view of the excitement now existing in this city and
. State, and the possibility of an insurrectionary movement
on the part of the servi~e population, the governor has
tendered • • • a guard of South Carolina Militia • • • a
lieutenant and twenty men for this post, which has been
accepted. 33
Brevet-Colonel Benjamin Huger, who was ordered to replace
Humphreys in charge of the arsenal, in a report of November
20 approved the course of Humphreys in accepting the South
Carolina guard. 54 This appointment was also in line with
the appeasement programme.

Huger was a native of South

Carolina, and from his ability, high social standing and
prominent social relations, he was expected to be a suitable
apPointment. 35 In this connection it is pertinent to refer
to an alleged conversation between S. W. Crawford and General
De Saussure.

De Saussure, at one time commanding the State

forces in Charleston, declared that he was told by Colonel
Huger that the latter took charge of the arsenal as a sort
,, .
#<

I

of envoy from Mr. Buchanan and General Scott; that he had been
assured that the status of the forts would not be changed. 56

l

Whatever the expectations of the War Department or the
Administration were as to a conciliatory policy on the part
of Major Anderson, his first report after taking command was

> ,

much in the vein of his predecessor's.

33.

34.
35.
36.

In his report to the

Official Records, vol. 1, p. 72
Ibid, p. 74
Crawford,~. cit., p. 119.
Ibid, p. 120, ne-Saussrue to author.
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War Department of November 23, soon after taking command, he
referred to his verbal instructions from the Secretary of
War to inspect the .forts', but said that as Porter had

alr~ady

made a report in relation to them, he would refer to other
matters of great importance, "if the Government intends
holding themtt • 37

This last phrase is worthy of refle ction.

Did Major Anderson's conversation with Floyd leave him with
the impression that the Government might go so far in conciliation that the forts would be given up if assaulted?
t,

Or

did the surprising weakness o.f the forts give him the idea?
In a rather lengthy report he gave such an alarming view of
things that one may easily wonder why immediate and positive
action was not forthCOming on the part of the Government.
Said the Commander:
The garrison now in it (Moultrie) is so weak as to invite
an attack, which is openly and publicly threatened. We
are about sixty, and have a line of rampart of 1,500 feet
in length to defend. If beleaguered, as every man of the
command must be el'ther engaged or held on the alert, they
will be exhausted and worn down in a few days and n!~ts
of such service as they would then have to undergo.
Again:

l! :.

The clouds are threatening, and the storm may break upon
us at any moment. I do, then, most earnestly entreat that
a reinforcement be immediately sent to this garrison, and
that at least two companies be sent at the same time to
Fort Sumter and Castle Pinckney ••• I feel the full responsibility of making the above suggestions, because I firmly
believe that as soon as the people of South Carolina learn
that I have demanded reinforcements, and that they have
been order~a, they will occupy Castle Pinckney and attack
this fort.
37.

Official Records, Vol. I, p. 74

38.
39.

!bid,

Ibid.

p. 75.

.
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Now, Major Anderson had done h1s duty, but- he had said
~,

the wrong thing for h1as requests to be granted.

~.

',.'"

)

He admitted

that reinforcements would provoke an 1mmediate attack by
South Caro11na military forces.
.

This was what President

Buchanan, above all else, was anxious to avoid. It was con40
trary to his fundamental policy.
It was contrary to Floyd's

)

J

"

stand on reinforcements.

He had said to the Assistant

Secretary of State at just about that time that if the latter
thought that collision between the people of South Carolina
and the Government forces would 'be precipitated, "he would not
'f

\

consent that a man nor a gun should be sent to any of the
'-.
1\1"--'

forts in the harbor of Charleston".4l
•

On November 28 and

December 1 Major Anderson again renewed his requests. 42

On

the latter date Major Anderson received h1s refusal through
the Adjutant-General, S. Cooper, who wrote:
It is believed, from information thought to be reliable,
that an attack will not be made on your connnand, and the
Secretary has only to refer to his conversation with you#
and to caution you that, should his convictions unhappily
prove untrue, your actions must be such as to be free from
the charge of init1ating a collision. If attacked, you are,
of course, expected to defend the trust committed to you
to the best of your ability.
The increase of the forces under your command, however
much to be des1red, would, the Secretary thinks, judging
from the recent excitement produced on account of an
anticipated increase, as mentioned in your letter, but add
to that excitement, and might lead to ser10us results. 43
The commander, if attacked, was to defend himself to the
.,

best of his ability, but the Government in refusing to send
reinforcements, was limiting his ability from the fear of
See page 16
41. Hunt, Gaillard,
ed'., "Narrative and Letter of William
Henry Trescot tl , ,22. cit. p. 535.
42. Official .. Records,-vol. I, pp. 78,79,81, 82.
43. Ibid, pp. 82, 82.

40.

¥
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serious results.

Buchanan approved this course whole-heartedly.

His feeling was that South Carolina was at that time the only st~~
advocating secession, and that had collision been the result
of reinforcement, the other cotton States would have rushed to
the support of South Carolina, thus realizing her long sought
object.

He believed that South Carolina was seeking the

spilling of a little blood in order to secure the cooperation
of the other cotton States. 44
Another instance that gave evidence of the paramount
desire on the part of the War Department to do absolutely
nothing that could be interproted as a hostile movement toward
the State of South Carolina was the case of the forty muskets
already referred to. 45 Although Col., Gardner advised against
the issuance of the muskets to the workmen, the order was
approved by the Secretary of War, but held in abeyance in the
files of the Charleston arsenal. 46 On November 30 the Chief.
Engineer in charge of the repairing of Fort Moul ~r'ie, notified
the War IDepartment that he intended to use the old order for
the forty muskets and more if Col. Huger, in charge of the
arsenal, would agree to let him have them. 47 In this communication he disagreed with Major Anderson's report of November
23. 48

He thought that the sending of reinforcements would not

have produced a collision of arms, while the Major believed
a collision would have fOllowed.

No plainer charge of a

neglect of duty on the part of the Administration could have

44.
45.
46.

47.
48.

Buchanan, James, 22,. ill. pp. 163, 164.
See page 22.
Official Recordsd Vol. I, p. 68
Ibid, p. 80
~page 27.
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been made.
t.: .

to his superior, De Russy:

!

•
1+:"
,

"

Wrote the Chief Enginner, Lieutenant J. G. Foster,

I think that more troops should have been sent here to
guard the forts, and I believe that no serious demonstration
on the part of the populace would have met such a course.
But, as it is decided not to do this, and to rely instead
upon the Engineer employes for the protection of'the public
property, I shall do everything in my power to carry out
this purpose. I shall, of oourse, exercise the neoessary
amount of prudenoe, and avoid'any appearance of armingz. as
I conoeive this to be the wish of the War Department.4~

t

If

the forts were to be proteoted as publio property only, it

seemed that it was up to the engineer workmen to do it.
President Buchanan, just three or four days after Foster's
denunoiat.ion of Government policy, explained that po1ioy in
his annual address to Congress of Deoember 4, 1860.

Speaking

of the publio property in Charleston harbor, he said that he
did not believe that any attempt would be made to expel the
United States from that property by foroe, but if events
should prove him wrong, the offioer in command had orders to
aot striotly on the defensivej that if an attaok was made, the
responsibility for consequenoes would rightfully rest upon
the heads of the assailants. 50

Thus, i.t was acting on the

defensive to refuse to send reinforoements, which were apparently needed to make a suooessful defense of the publio property.
At any rate, the Chief Engineer obtained his forty muskets by

\

l
,

I

virtue of the previous order on file at the arsenal.

They

were transferred to Forts Sumter and Castle Pinokney on
Deoember 17, without oausing any excitement, according to
Major Anderson's report. 51 But on the same day that Major

49. Official
50.
51.

~eoords, Vol. I, p. 81
Riohardson, J. D., ~. cit., Vol. ~ p. 635
Offioial Reoords, ~. r;-P. 95

a

.i _

:

(
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Anderson made his report, the military storekeeper at the

r:\
7'

',I.

arsenal addressed a note to the Chief Engineer, stating that
the transfer of the muskets had caused intense excitement,
and that Col. Huger had assured the Governor of the State
that no arms would be removed from the arsenal and pledged
his word that the arms should be returned at once. 52
Chief Engineer refused to return them. 53
On December 19, W. H. Trescot,

w~

The

had recently resigned

as Assistant Secretary of State, and had assumed his new role
as special negotiator for South Carolina, received the following telegram from Charleston:
Captain Foster yesterday removed forty muskets from the arsenal
in Charleston to Fort Moultriej great excitement prevailsj
telegraph to have the arms instantly returned, or a collision
may occur at any moment. Three days will determine, in convention, peace or war, and this act, not instantly countermanded
by telegraph will be decisive. Not a moment's time should be
lost. Telegraph immediately to me. 54
The threat brought results.

On the same day that Trescot

received his telegraph message, the Secretary of War telegraphed
Major Anderson: "I have just telegraphed Captain Foster to
return any arms that he may have removed from Charleston
Arsenal. p55

If the public property was to be defended, it was

Onll

,
I

not
to be done, if at all, by the. engineer workmen) /Jilt ~/~o
wt"f4o u s ,,;;/ e/eNf t1 rAt S.
,
Another example, although seemingly trivial, will show the

'

4

Government's policy of appeasement.

Toward the latter part of

November, an aplication was made by an adjutant of a South
Carolina regiment to the engineer officer at Moultrie for his
52. Crawford, 22. cit. p. 77
53. Official RecorQS7 Vol. I, p. 97
54. Hunt, Gaillard, "Narrative and Letter of William Henry
Trescot", QQ. cit. p. 539.
55. Official ReCords, Vol. I, p. 98
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rolls,

the purpose

~or

the State.

~or

~rom

i~

o~

military duty

the State authorities should de-

Captain Foster men whom they might have enrolled

into the service o~ the State. 56
reply

~or

Major Anderson wrote to the War Department

asking what he should do
mand

enrolling the men

o~

the Secretary

On December 14 came the

War:

o~

I~ ~he State authorities demand any o~ Captain Foster's
workmen on the ground o~ their being enrolled into the
service o~ the State, and the subject is re~erred to you,
you will, a~ter ~ully satisfying yoursel~ that the men
are subject to enrollment, and have been properly enrolled
under the laws o~ the United States, and o~ the State o~
South Carolina, cause them to be delivered up or su~~ert4eM
to depart. 57

Major Anderson was so surprised at the attitude
Secretary

o~

War that he

stood his question.

~elt

o~

the

the latter must have misunder-

In a reply

o~

December 18 we can read

the Major's astonisbment between the lines:
As I understood it, the South Carolina authorities sought
to enroll as a part o~ their army intended to act against
the ~orces o~ the United States, men who are employed by
and in the pay o~ that Government, and could not, as I
conceived, be enrolled by South Carolina "under the ll-ws o~
the United States and o~ the State o~ South Carolina. 58
Major Anderson had also asked the War Department

~or

authority to level the sand hills and remove some houses which
rendered the defense o~ Fort Moultrie extremely di~~icult.59
J

In the same communication

~rom

14, regarding the enrollment

the War Department of December

o~

the workmen, it was stated

that under ordinary circumBtances the leveling
hills, which commanded the

~ort,

o~

would not be considered as

initiating a collision; but in the delicate state
56.
57.
58.
59.

Craw~ord,~.~.

the sand

p. 67
Official Records, Vol. I, pp 82, 93
Ibid, p. 94
~ciaJ Records, Vol. I, p. 88

o~

the

50

popular mind, the question demanded the coolest and wisest
judgment; that the leveling of the houses in anticipation of
an attack might betray distrust, and prematurely bring on a
collision.

The advice was to await an attempted assault
before taking the necessary measures for defense. 60 In a
letter to a friend, December 19, Major Anderson summed up
his anomalous situation when he said that the fort (Moultrie)
was a very weak one in its capacity of being defended and
"it is surrounded by houses that I cannot burn or destroy
until I am certain that I am to be attacked, and I shall not
be certain of it until the South Carolinians are in possessionj
but I have so little ammunition that I cannot waste it in
destroying houses."6l

In the same letter he lamented his

lack of authority for leveling the sand hills, asserting that
sharpshooters could pick off his little band of sixty men in
a short time. 62
This situation had been previously prepared by one of the
most widely publicized episodes of the Government's appeasement policy. On December 8, the members of the South Carolina
Congressional delegation who had not yet resigned their seats
called on the President.

They were John McQueen, WID. Porcher

Miles, M. L. Bonham, W. W. Boyce, and Lawrence M. Keitt. 53
Their purpose was stated in a written memorandum handed to the
President in their second interview of December 9.
memorandum read:

60.

61.
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In comp1iance with our statement to you yesterday, we
now express to you our strong convictions that neither the
constituted authorities nor anybody of the peop1e of the
State of South Caro1ina wi11 either attack or mo1est the
United States forts in the harbor of Char1eston previous1y
to the action of the convention, and we hope and be1ieve,
not unti1 an offer has been made through an accredited
representative to negotiate for an amicab1e arrangement of
a11 matters between the State and the Federa1 Government,
provided that no reinforcements sha11 be sent into those
forts, and their re1ative mi1itary status remain as at present. 64
The importance of this communication is that it was the basis
for most of the condemnationof Buchanan's p.o1icy, both North
and South.

The be1ief was genera1 throughout South Car01ina

that the President had given a p1edge that the status of the
forts wou1d not be changed prior to the secession of the State
and the sending of accredited agents to negotiate for their
possession. 65 Mr. Buchanan himself lateremphatica11y denied
that he had given any p1edge and that he objected to the word
"provided ff beoause it might give cause for be1ieving he had
given a pledge "which he never wou1d make. n66 But the question
of a p1edge seems to have been only an academic argument.

It

seems from the evidence that the interview resu1ted in the
I

equiva1ent of a pledge.

The report of two of the Congressiona1

delegation who ca1led on the President admitted Buchanan's
refusa1 to give a forma1 pledge; but when the delegation emphasized a gent1emen's agreement that the relative mi1itary
status of the forts wou1d be maintained, and asked Buchanan
about the possibi1ity of his changing his mind and ordering
reinforcements, the President said in·that case he wou1d first
return to them "this paper".67

M. Curtis,~. cit. Vol 2, p. 3-77
65. Crawfora;-9Q. cit. p. 40
66. Buchanan, ~mes, 2£. cit. p. 168
67. Statement of Miles an~itt, Official Records, Vo1. I, p. 126
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It is to be remembered that these members of the South
Carolina Congressional delegation, by their own admission,
, I

r

were not calling on the President as authorized agents of
the State of South Carolina, but only as individuals.

The

President likewise let them know that he had no authority to
make a pledge and that he was acting in an unofficial capacity
in his discussions. 68 To substantiate the statement that the
President made the equivalent of a pledge, we have his own
admission of the fact in his reply to the South Carolina
commissioners of December 31, 1860.

To use the President's

own words, he said:
But I acted in the same manner I would have done had I
entered into a positive and formal agreement with parties
capable of contracting, although such an agreement would
have been, on my part, from the nature of my official
duties, impossible. 69
Another admission in this

s~e

communication explains the

bewilderment of Major Anderson and his officers at their
neglect by the Administration.

The President stated that it

was a well known fact, freely admitted, that it was his
determination not to reinforce the forts in the harbor ahd
thus produce a collision, until they had been actually attacked, or until he had certain evidence that they were about to
be attacked. 70 If the Government did not have sufficient
evidence that the forts would be attacked if they were not
surrendered after the ordinance of secession was passed, then
Major Anderson and his subordinate officers should have been
68.
69.
70.

"
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removed on the grounds of willfully misinforming the
Government or of being incapable of sound judgment.

For on

December 9, the very day that the South Carolina delegation
gave the President the written proposition for maintaining
,

r

the relative status of the forts, Major Anderson had reported that the attention of the South Carolinians seemed to be
turned more toward Fort Sumter than it had been and that
probably their first act would be to take possession of that
work. 71 The danger of attack seemed to be so imminent that
Anderson thought it might be advisable to destroy the
ammunition, except what might be required for the defense of
Moultrie and the armament of Sumter and Castle Pinckney,
rather than let it fall into the possession of South Carolina.

71.

Official Record~, Vol. I, p. 89
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MAJOR ANDERSON TRANSFERS HIS C01mAND
FROM FORT MOULTRIE TO SUMTER
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CHAPTER III
MAJOR ANDERSON TRANSFERS HIS COMMAND
FROM FORT MOULTRIE TO SUMTER
It

~s

been already noted that as soon as Major Anderson

arrived in Charleston harbor and inspected the rorts, he' made
his rirst report or November 23, in which he asked that the
two unoccupied rorts, Castle Pinckney and Sumter, should be
garrisoned. l In ract, he immediately saw the superior location or Fort Sumter ror the derense or the harbor.

He

believed that Sumter was the key or entrance to the harbor,
its guns commanded Fort Moultrie and could drive out its
occupants, and should be garrisoned at once. 2 Major Anderson's
insistence that Fort Sumter should be garrisoned did not proceed rrom a soldier's impulse to invite a conrlict.

He

thought that the occupation and strengthening or the two other
rorts would prevent an attempt or the South Carolina rorces
to occupy them, and thus avoid a collision or arms and a
civil war.

His attitude toward the south and war was express-

ed on December 11 in a letter to Robert N. Gourdin, a rriend
and leading secessionist in Charleston:
You need no assurance rrom me that, although I am exerting myselr to make this little work as strong as possible
and to put my handrul of men in the highest state or discipline, no one will do more than I am willing to do to
keep the South in the right and to avoid the shedding of
blood. You may be somewhat surprised at the sentiment I
express, being a soldier, that I think an appeal to arms
and to brute rorce is unbecoming the age in which we live.

J
r

J , ,

r

1.
2.

See pa.ge 27.
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Would to God that the time had come when there should be
no war, and that religion and peace should reign throughout'the world. 3
In several or his reports to the War Department he express-

,

i ..

ed his anxiety concernirg the threat or Fort Sumter's being
taken by the rorces or South Carolina.

1
I

He also expressed a

desire ror derinite written instructions, as he had nothing
but the verbal instructions or the Secretary or War to guide

I"

f.

him.

•

1860, emphasizes his rears inspired by the visit or the

1

, <

,

;

His communication to the War Department or December 1,

Assistant Surgeon Crawrord to Charleston.

Rererring to

Crawrord's report or the situation in Charleston, Major
Anderson writes:
He (Crawrord) says that never until today did he believe
that our position was critical. One or his rriends told
him that we would have trouble in less than rirteen days.
He thinks that they'will rirst attempt to take Fort Sumter,
which they (justly) say will control this work. Castle
Pinckney they regard as theirs already. Mr. King, the
intendant or this island, told the doctor that as soon as
the act or secession was passed a demand would be made on
me to surrender this rort. All these remarks lead to the
same conclusion - a rixed purpose to have these works.
The question ror the Government to decide - and the sooner
it is done the better - is, whether, when South Carolina
secedes, these forts are to be surrendered or not. Ir
the rormer, I must be inrormed or it, and instructed what
course r am to pursue. rr the latter be the determination,
no time .is to be lost in either sending troops, as already
suggested, or vessels or war to this harbor. Either or
these courses may cause some or the doubting states to join
South Carolina. 4

I

I

l

,I ,

I
1,

Again the commander joins his request ror reinrorcements with

i,
;

I:..

the" opinion that such an action might encourage the secession
or other States.

No thing could have been surer to cause

the President to hesitatej this was in opposition to his
3.
4.

Ibid. p. 69
OffIcial Records, Vol. I, pp 81, 82
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fundamental policy of doing nothing to encourage the secession movement.
As the time was fast approaching when South Carolina's
Secession Convention was to meet, and as the result was a
foregone conclusion, the Government felt it urgent that

1

Major Anderson should have some additional and written

I

instructions to guide his conduct.

r

Accordingly, Major Don

Carlos Buell, an officer of the Adjutant-General's Department l
was selected by the War Department to proceed to Charleston
and convey the instructions to Major Anderson. 5

The reali-

zation of the urgency of sending orders l however, seems to
have been the result of Major Anderson's repeated entreaties. 6
The subject of orders had been discussed in the Cabinet around

I'

,

December 7, but the nature of the instructions had not been

"+

~
I,

I

agreed upon, being left solely to the responsibility of the
Secretary of War, Floyd. 7 Because of the crisis produced by
Anderson's future conduct, and because Buchanan's Secretary
of State, J. S. Black, defended Anderson on the basis of

(

these instructions, it is deemed essential to quote them in
full.

i

,
I

!

It is to be remembered that they were communicated

\

verbally to Major Buell, but he, impressed with the importance
of the occasion and the responsibility of the Commander of
Moultrie l took it upon himself to commit them to writing. 8

/

The written instructions were not the literal record of the
Secretary's communication to Buell, but were the latter's
5.
6.
7.

8.

Crawf ord,..2l2.a cit, pp. 71,72
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Rhodes, ~. ~. Vol. 3, p. 73
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interpretation of the Secretary's intentions, adapted to the
conditions of things.9

The written form of the order was

approved, however, by the Secretary of War lO and were as
follows:
, I
f

,

You are aware of the great anxiety of the Secretary of
War that a collision of the troops with the people of
this State shall be avoided, and of his studied determination to pursue a course with reference to the military
force and forts in this harbor which shall guard against
such a collision. He has therefore carefully abstained
from increasing the force at this point, or taking any
measures which might add to the present excited state of
the public mind, or which would throw any doubt on the
confidence he feels that South Carolina will not attempt,
by violence, to obtain possession of the public works or
interfere with their occupancy. But as the counsel and
acts of rash and impulsive persons may possibly disappoint
those expectations of the Government, he deems it proper
that you should be prepared with instructions to meet so
unhappy a contingency. He has therefore directed me
verbally to give you such instructions.
You are carefully to avoid every act which would needlessly tend to provoke aggression; and for that reason you are
not, without evident and imminent necessity, to take up
any position which c'ould be construed into the assumption
of a hostile attitude. But you are to hold possession of
the forts in this harbor, and if attacked you are to defend
yourself to the last extremity. The smallness of your
force will not permit you, perhaps, to occupy more than
one of the three forts, but an attack on or attempt to take
possession of anyone of them will be regarded as an act
of hostility, and you may then put your command into either
of them which you may deem most proper to increase its power
of resistance. You are also authorized to take similar
steps whenever you have tangible evidence of a design to
proceed to a hostile act. ll

,.

/

f

II

OJ

I

}

I'

\.

Thus, we see that in the last sentence of the first
paragraph, that originally the orders were to be given verbally.
It is probable that Buell's sympathy with Anderson in his
delicate position outweighed his directions from the Secretary
of War, and caused him to commit them to writing.

9.

Ibid.

10. OffIcial Records, Vol. I, p. 103
11. Ibid. pp. 89,90.
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careful consideration of Anderson's secret desire to occupy
Fort Sumter, one might wager that the last sentence of the
instructions was added at Anderson's request.

Certain

writers have taken the extremely suspicious view that the

;

.~

,.i

instructions were purposely ambiguous and meant to subtly
prepare Anderson's mind for an easy surrender; that they were
the treacherous work of a secession conspiracy in Washington. l2

I,

.~

~
r' I

I

Another historian, considered reliable, does not agree with
such a theory, and believes tllat the policy of the Government
being what it was, it is difficult to see how the instructions
could be improved upon. 13
One ground for the conspiracy charge is that the instructions
were kept secret from General Scott; in fact, up to December

, I f

28, the whole conduct of military affairs in Charleston harbor
had been withheld from the knowledge of the Chief of Staff
of the Army. 14 Another reason giwen for doubting Floyd's loyal-

t¥ is that he did not refer the instructions to t he President
before communicating them to Anderson.

It is true that the

President was not aware of the instructions until December 21,,15
but as they were more aggressive than the President's policy,
he ordered them amended to a more defensive nature. 16 It 1s
diffucult to consider the instructions in any other light than
the repetition of a policy of appeasement to avoid armed
host11ities; yet, considering the threats of aggression evidenced
by Major Anderson's reports, the necessary authority to move

12.

13.
14.
15.
16.
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his command to Fort Sumter was in the last sentence of
Buell's memorandum, as was to be pointed out later by
Secretary of State Black.

The orders given by Buell to

Major Anderson contained no hint that the forts were to be
turned over to South Carolina.
Things were now on the move in South Carolina.

On the

morning of December 17, the Convention met at Columbia.
Mr. D. F. Jamison, its President, closed his inaugural speech
wit~

advice to the South: "To darel and again to darel and

without end to darel"17 South Carolina had just elected a
new Governor, Francis W. Pickens, who was inaugurated on
on the same day the Convention met. lS

The new Governor

immediately dispatched a special messenger to Washington
, I f

with a message to the President on the subject of the forts. 19
. After stating that the forts in Charleston harbor were being
pr~pared

to turn their guns upon the city, the Governor

asserted that such preparation might be proper in case of
an ordinary mob rebellion, but not so when the people of a
sovereign State were in convention assembled to resume their
original powers of separate and individual sovereignty.

He

asked that all work on the forts be stopped and no more force
ordered there.

Referring to the fact that the arsenal in

Charleston had been turned over to the keeping of a State
force at the request of the Governor, it was asked that the
State be allowed to take possession of Fort Sumter to give
a feeling of safety to the community.

Then came a sort of

threat when Governor Pickens said: "If something of the kind
be not done, I cannot answer for the consequences".20
17.
18.
19.
?n_
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Assistant Secretary of State, whose resignation had not yet
become final received this message and was the intermediary
agent; and through him the President was to give an answer
to this threat of Governor Plckens. 21
t"

There is a record of this episode left by the President

I

himself.

The following memorandum in the President's own

hadnwriting describes what took place at the meeting between
the President and the Governor's messenger:
On Thursday morning, December 20th, 1860, Hamilton, late
of South Carolina, sent especially for this purpose,
presented me a letter from Governor Pickens, in the presence
of Mr. Trescot, dated at Columbia, South Carolina, 17th
December (Monday). He was to wait until this day (Friday
afternoon) for my answer. The character of the letter will
appear from the answer to it, which I had prepared. Thursday
night, between nine and ten o'clock, Mr. Trescot called upon
me. He said that he had seen Messrs. Bonham and McQueen of
the South Carolina delegation; that they all agreed that
this letter of Governor Pickens was in violation of the
pledge which had been given by themselves not to make an
assault upon the forts, but leave them in statu quo until
the result of an application of commissioners to be apPointed
by the State was known; that Pickens, at Columbia, could
not have known of the arrangements. They, to wit, Bonham,
McQueen, and Trescot, had telegraphed to Pickens for authority
to withdraw his letter.
Friday morning, 10 o'clock, 21st December. - Mr. Trescot
called upon me with a telegram, of which the following is a
copy from that which he delivered to me:
December 21st, 1860. - You are 'authorized and requested to
to withdraw my letter sent by Doctor Hamilton immediately.
Mr. Trescot read to me from the same telegram, that
Governor Pickens had seen Mr. Cushing. The letter was
accordingly withdrawn.22
marsl~l

• It

I •

It will be seen in this memorandum of the President that
the members of the South Carolina Delegation stated that they
had given a pledge not to make an assault on the forts, and
probably they would not have made this pledge unilaterally
21.
22.

Ibid. p. 83.
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without the agreement of the President not to change the
status of the forts.

In his prepared reply to the letter

of Governor Pickens, the President stated that he had "declined for the present to reinforce these forts, relying
on the honor of South Carolinians that they will not be
assaulted whilst they remain in their present condition".23
This question of a pledge made by the President is very
important in the light of later developments. Q;>e8!f;tt;e the
Ppe8t~8Rt

is very important the light of later developments~

Despite the President's denial of a formal pledge the
evidence seems to show that he did make the equivalent.

Even

Judge Black, the President's Attorney-General and later
Secretary of State, hesitated to assert that he didn't make
this pledge.

When S. W. Crawford, in an interview with

Black, asked: "Well, then, Judge Black, there appears to be
but one inference to be drawn, but one conclusion to be
reached; the President did make that agreement."

Judge Black

always faithful to Buchanan, replied: "Remember, that is
your conclusion.,,24
~

.

Of course, the President's prepared reply was not sent,
(

as Governor Pickens' letter was withdrawn.

The reply, however,

shows a consistency of policy reminding the Governor of the
risks he had incurred and would still incur to prevent any
armed hostilities.

But he rejected the idea that he had any

power to surrender Fort Sumter, or any of the other forts or
public property in South Carolina to any human being.
23.
24.

Nicolay and Hay, 2£. £li. vol. 3, p. 5
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had said in his address to Congress of December 4, it was
a matter for Congress to decide. 25 The letter shows the
confusion in the President's mind when he flatly rerused to
"acknowledge the independence of that State" and yet had
expressed a willingness to refer the future commissioners
of that State to Congress, which seemed to be an implied
recognition of independence. 26 But he did warn the Governor
that any attack on the forts would mean war, saying:
If South Carolina should attack any of these forts, she
will then become the assailant in a war against the United
States. It will not then be a question of coercing a
State to remain in the Union, to which I am utterly opposed,
as my message proves, but it will be a question of voluntarily precipitating a conflict of arms on her part, without
even consulting the onlY2,uthority which possesses the power
to act upon the subject.
"~

l, "

According to the testimony of Trescot. a principal in the

I {

events just related, President Buchanan expressed his pleasure
at the withdrawal of the Governor's letter, repeated over
and over his desire to avoid collision, his readiness to receive commissioners, to refer them to Congress in good faith,
and his determination not to disturb the status of the forts,
but to

aw~it

the result of negotiation.

He was pledged not

to disturb the status in favor of the United States, and the
Governor could not justly ask him to disturb it in favor

or

the State.

He was acting under the obligations of his honor
and would redeem it to the uttermost. 28 In a letter of
December 21, to Governor Pickens, Trescot thanked the latter
for withdrawing the letter, restating all the concessions
25.
26.

27.
28.
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Buchanan had already made, saying that such a course had
been violently denounced by the Northern press, and that
an effort was being made to institute a Congressional
investigation.

Then there were hopes for the future.

Said

Trescot:
At that moment he could not have gone to the extent of
action you desired, and I felt confident that, if forced
to answer your letter then, he would have taken such
ground as would have prevented his even approaching it,
hereafter - a possibility not at all improbable and which
ought to be kept open. 29
In order to allay the fears of the Governor, Trescot, in the
same letter, said that he had seen the Secretary of War
that morning, and no orders had been issued that would at
all disturb the "present condition" of the garrisons. 30

Had

the instructions of December 11 been forgotten?
These December days were indeed crowded ones for the
President.

The day after Governor Pickens had addressed his
$.

letter to the President demanding posses}on of the forts,
President Buchanan, December 18, had addressed one to the
Governor, asking tlmt the secession of the State of South
Carolina might be stayed "so long as to allow the people of
her sister States an opportunity to manifest their opinion
upon the causes which have led to this proceeding. ,,31

This

message was sent by Caleb Cushing, also entrusted with a
secret mission, believed to have been to persuade the Convention to postpone secession until after the 4th of March.

t

,

f

f,

,

Mr. Cushing also informed the Governor that there was no
intention to change the status of the forts in the harbor in
29.
30.
31.
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any way.32

Of course, this mission was a failure, for the

Convention had met on the 17th of December with the irrevocable determination to secede from the Union.

The irony of

it all was that he reached his destination just in time to
be invited by a joint committee of both Houses of the
Legislature to attend the solemn ceremonies of the signing
of the Ordinance of Secession.

This invitation he declined. 33

The Ordinance was signed on December 20, and on

~cember

22

the Convention elected by ballot three commissioners, Robert

w.

Barnwell, James H. Adams, and James L. Orr to be sent

forthwith to Washington, "to treat with the Government of
the United States for the delivery of the forts, magazines,
light-house:;!, and other real estate, with their appurtenances,
within the limits of South Carolina.,,34
Pressure was being brought on Governor Pickens for the
1mmediate seizure of the forts. 35 Major Anderson was aware
of this popular excitement, and on the same day that the
commdssioners were appointed, December 22, he was writing
the War Department:

/

No one can tell what will be done. They may defer action
until their Commissioners return from Washingtonj or if
apprised by the nature of the debates in Congress that their
demands will not probably be acceded to, they may act without waiting for them.
I do not think that we can rely upon any assurances, and
wish to God I only had men enough here to man fully my guns.
Our men are perfectly conscious of the dangerous position
they are placed in, but are in as fine spirits as if they
were certain of victory.36
Major Anderson's fears were justified.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

On the same day that he
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I

was deploring the fact that he had not men enough to man
fully the guns of Fort Moultrie, the "Charleston Mercury"
was boasting of, the fact that no reinforcements would be
sent.
and

It further' declared that when the forts were demanded

~ot

given up, the people would obey the call for war and

take the forts. 37

No wonder Major Anderson was anxious,

and we can imagine his reaction when he received at just
about this time "a modification of his previous instructions
38
of December 11.
President Buchanan has claimed the responsibility for the
change of Anderson's written orders of December 11, delivered
to him by ~jor Buell. 39 The President must have been alarmed
at the phrase, flif attacked you will defend yourself to the
last extremity".

Having observed that phrase, the President,

on December 21, the very day the orders first came to his
notice, caused the Secretary of War to modify the instructions
to "if attacked by a force so superior that resistance would,
in your judgment, be a useless waste of life, it will be
\

your duty to yield to necessity, and make the best terms 1n
( .

your

power~40 In fa1rness to Buchanan and Floyd 1t should

perhaps be stated here that L1ncoln sent Major Anderson a
message of the same nature, April 4, 1861. 41

Such 1nstructions

seemed only an act of humanity, and cons1dering the plight
the garrison had been left in by the Government, such instruct10ns seem to have been the very least the Government
37. Charleston Mercury, Dec. 22, quoted 1n, Greeley, Horace,
American Conflict, Vol. 1, pp. 407,408. Hartford: Pub11shed
by O.D. Case & Company. Chicago : Geo. & C. W. Sherwood 1865.
38. Off1cial Records, Vol. 1, p. 103
39. Buchanan, James, 2£ • .£li. p. 166.
40. Official Records, Vol. 1, p. 103
41. Nicolay and Hay, ~ £li. Vol. 4, p. 28
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could have done to atone for what Black later called its
"fatal error" of not reinforcing the forts at an early date.
But it is a fact, verified by Major Anderson's daughter,

'.

that Major Anderson considered these instructions from Floyd
of December 21 as an "infamous order" to give up the Fort
without a fight, and to brand him in the eyes of the world
as a traitor to his trust. 42 The secrecy of these orders and
the closing paragraph, "These orders are strictly confidential

, I

!

and not to be9nommunicated even to the officers under your
connnand without a clear necessit'1,ft 43 probably contributed
to this suspicion.
Since the first report Major Anderson had made to the
Gove'rnment, he had never ceased to stress the importance of
garrisoning Fort Sumter.

He believed it to be impossible

for the Government to maintain any occupancy of the harbor
if South Carolina should seize and garrison it.

Daily threats

were heard that his position would be attacked, and after the
passage of the Ordinance of Secession these threats were more
frequent and positive.
.'

A nightly watch with patrol boats was

maintained by South Carolina lest he should transfer his
connnand to Fort Sumter. 44 He had orders to defend the forts
in the harbor and the one he occupied was not in a state of
defense.

It was rumored that two thousand riflemen had been

detailed to shoot down the troops from the houses which
42.
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1861, p. 5. New York, Knickerbocker Press, 1911.
~
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commanded the fort. 45

Anderson had always had a desire to

throw his garrison into Sumter,46

and after Floyd's orders

of the 21st of December, which he received on the 23rd, his
desire was intensified.

His daughter has stated that he

made his transfer of command to escape the snare which he
thought the Secretary of War had set for him.47

This was

surely not the only reason, but it is possible that the new
orders and Anderson's feeling toward them had something to
do with the date of the transfer.

He received these orders

on December 23, and determined to make his move on December
25, which was prevented by rains. 48 He had orders not to
make a useless resistance and needlessly sacrifice the
lives of his men.

The officers and men were of the opinion

that in case of an attack from Charleston few of them would
survive, but considered it a part of their business and were
determined to make the best fight possible. 49 Therefore, it
would seem that not only to make a successful defense of the
forts, but to protect the lives of his men as well, the
transfer was to be made.

In a telegram to Floyd the day

after the transfer, Major Anderson declared that in spite of
the orders of December 21 "the garrison would never have
surrendered without a fight,"50
It must be admitted that the move was in harmony at least
with Floyd's orders to avoid a needless sacrifice of life,
when it is. remembered that in the bombardment of Fort Sumter
45. Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, vol. 1, p. 42
46. Crawford, 22. cit. p. 100
47. Lawton, Eba Anae:rson, ~. £!i. p. 5
48. Crawford, QE. cit. p. 102
49. Battles ana-Leaders of the Civil War, p. 43. Statement of
Captain Abner Doubleday, Second~in Command.
50. Official Records, vol. I, p. 3
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the garrison suf£ered not one casualty.

It must also be

remembered that Major Anderson was convinced that he had
tangible evidence o£ a design to attack Fort Moultrie on
the part o£ South Carolina,51

and his orders o£ December 11

authorized him to occupy anyone of the forts when he had
"tangible evidence of a design to proceed to a hostile act".52
At any rate, he transferred his command £rom Moultrie to
Sumter December 26.

It was done with the utmost secrecy as

was essential in order to escape the constant vigilance of the
South Carolina patrols.

On December 25 preparations £or the

transfer were made under the guise o£ preparations £or a
possible attack from Charleston.
~

at~icles

The packing of necessary"
53
was done under plausible pretenses.
Anderson kept

the plan o£

so secret that even his officers were
given only twenty minutes notice. 54 The soldiers disguised
mo~ement

as laborers, the movement was effected in the night of
December 26 without being suspected by the South Carolina
guards. 55 Immediately after the move had been made, at 8:00
P.M. on the night o£ December 26, 1860, Major Anderson
addressed the £ollowing report to the War Department:
I have the honor to report that I have just completed,
by the blessing of God, the removal to this £ort (Sumter)
o£ all of my garrison, except the surgeon, four noncommissioned officers, and seven men. We have one year's
supply of hospital stores and about four months supply of
provisions for my command. I left orders to have all "the
guns at Fort Moultrie spiked, and the carriages of the
32 pounders, which are old, destroyed. I have sent orders

51. Crawford, 2£. cit. p. 100
52.
53.

54.

55.

See page 38
Crawford, 2£. cit. P. 102
Battles ana-Leaaers-of the Civil War, vol. 1, p. 44
Ibid.
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to Captain Foster, who remains at Fort Moultrie, to
destroy all the ammunition which he cannot send over. The
step which I have taken was, io my opinion, necessary to
prevent the effusion of blood. 56
Early on the morning of December 27, the smoke rising
from the burning gun carriages notified the people of
Charleston that somethint was wrong at Fort Moultrie.

The

fact of the evacuation of the Fort was soon communicated to
the authorities and people of Charleston, creating intense
excitement.

Crowds collected in the streets, military

organizat1ons paraded, and threats were made that they
would be heard from before twenty four hours and that bloodshed was now unavoidable.

Anderson was pronounced a traitor,
and it was claimed that his act would concentrate the South. 57
A committee from the Governor of South Carolina, headed by
Colonel Pett1grew, was sent over to Fort Sumter to demand that
he return to Fort Moultrie.
~

,

After confessing that in the

controversy between the North and the South, his sympathies
were entirely with the South, but that his duty as commander

t

of the harbor was first with him, Major Anderson rep11ed:

J

"Make my compliments to the Governor, and say to him that I

I", I

decline to accede to his request; I cannot and will not go

l

back.,,58
I

I

The committee informed Major Anderson that there

was an agreement between South Carolina and President Buohanan
not to change the military status in the harbor, and that
this move to Fort Sumter was considered by them as reinforoement.
Anderson replied that as far as any understanding of the sort
56.
57.
58.

Official Reoords, Vol. 1, p. 2
Grawford, 2£. cit. pp. 108,109
Crawford, 2£. cit. p. III
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existing he had not been informed of it. 59

.:' i

(

Now, disregarding the question of an understanding, it

I r
__

is certain beyond any doubt that Major Anderson had acted
contrary to the policy and wisheS of both the President
and the Secretary of War.

The President admitted a few

years after the event that he had determined not to disturb
the status quo at Charleston as long as the troops remained
in unmolested possession of the forts,60 but it should have
been apparent to the President that as soon as this Ifmolesting"
by overwhelming odds had been directed at about sixty men in
an indefensible fort, it would have been too late to reinforce
for their safety.

The Secretary of War was opposed to the

transfer to Sumter, and as soon as the news reached Washington,
and before receiving Major Anderson's report of the 26th, Floyd
telegraphed the Major on December 27:
Intelligence has reached here this morning that you have
abandoned Fort Moultrie, spiked your guns, burned the
carriages, and gone to Fort Sumter. It is not believed,
because there is no order f§l any such movement. Explain
the meaning of this report.
But had Floyd forgotten the orders of IDecember ll?

Floyd

had approved. Major Buell's written order that "you are also
authorized to take similar steps (to put his command in any
one of the forts) whenever you have tangible evidence of a
design to proceed to a hostile act. n62
"',

i

I

~'
f

r

It was nowhere

stated in the orders that anyone but Major Anderson should

59.
60.
61.
62.

!bia, p. 110

~anan,
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be the judge of the "tangible evidence".
On the same day that he received Floyd's telegram of
censure, Major Anderson telegraphed the explanation called for:
- i

,I

"

The telegram is correct. I abandoned Fo~t Moultrie
because I was certain that if attacked my men must have
been sacrificed, and the command of the harbor lost. I
spiked the guns and destroyed the carriages to keep the
guns from being used against us. If attacked, the
garrison would never have surrendered without a fight. 53
In the last sentence Anderson was evidently objecting to the
orders of December 21, which he interpreted as an order to
64
surrender Moultrie without putting up a resistance.
Considering the text of the orders, Major Anderson seems to
have had full authority to transfer his command, but still,
there seems to have been some confusion on the point in his
own mind, for at one time he wrote to a friend, on December
27, that he had made the move on his own responsibility and
not in obedience to orders from Washington. 65 He obviously

(

was referring 'to an absence of immediate and specific orders
to occupy Sumter at that particular time.

In a letter of

December 30, to his former rector, the Rev. R. B. Duane, he
said:
You see it stated that I came here without orders. Fear
nott I am sure I can satisfy any tribunal I may be
brought before, that I was fully justified in mOving my
command. 66
And President Buchanan, writing in 1866, justified Anderson
when he said that the "President never doubted for a moment
that Major Anderson believed before the movement that he had
63.

64.
65.
66.

Official Records, Vol. 1, p. 3
See page 46
Crawford, £2. cit. p. 128
1.Q!£., p. l3TI

( . .4%

LQ@. $.1!k1M6

71
'the tangible evidence' of an impending attack required
by his instructions.,,67
But this move was of the utmost importance and seriousness at the time, not only because it was in opposition to
the avowed policy of the Government and South Carolina's
belief in a pledge not to change the status quo, but on
the very day the move was made, the .three commissioners
elected by the South Carolina Convention, to negotiate the
question of the forts and public property, reached Washington. 68
The commissioners arrived on December 26, and according to
Buchanan, writing in 1866 a defense of his administration,
it was through them that he received his first intelligence
of the transfer to Fort Sumter. 69 The President recorded
that he received this news with astonishment and regret.
--

With

I

astonishment, because he believed Major Anderson to be in
security at Fort Moultrie and that he wouldn't make such a
move, especially while the commissioners were on their way to
Washington.

With regret, because it would probably impel

the other cotton States, and the border States, into active
sympathy with South Carolina; that it would defeat the measures

"

.

of compromise before the Committee of Fifteen of the Senate,
and wreck his policy of confining secession to South Carolina
alone. 70 There was no mention here of a pledge having been
violated by this act, nor of orders violated.

67.

"
','

I

68.
69.
70.
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w.

H. Trescot, the former Assistant Secretary of state,

who had recently resigned and was now acting as South
Carolina's special manager of her interests in Washington,
has left quite a different record of Buchanan's reaction to
Major Anderson's sudden change of the status quo.
his record

jus~

He wrote

a few weeks after the event and should have

been less subject to errors of memory.

Trescot has stated

that on the morning of December 27, he, Jefferson Davis,
and Senator Hunter of Virginia, called on Buchanan for an
71
explanation of Major Anderson's move.
Jefferson Davis
told the President that he was surrounded with "blood and
dishonor" on all sides.

Buchanan called God to witness

that they, better than anybody, knew that the move to Sumter
was not only without, but against his orders.
against his policy.72

It was

Either he was at this time oblivious

of the orders he had seen December 21, or he was, in his
excited state, confusing his own
orders.

polic~

with War Department

He was urged by these three gentlemen to restore the

status by ordering Anderson back to Moultrie, which he declined to do, although he seemed disposed to at first_

He

said that he must call his Cabinet together, for he could not
condemn Major Anderson unheard, and he postponed his meeting
't

with the South Carolina commissioners until the next day.73

\

'I.

I I

(

f:

,
:~

r

The Secretary of War seemed to believe that Buchanan had made
a pledge to South Carolina, for on the same day, December 27,
71. Hunt, Gaillard, ed. "Narrative and Letter of William Helll'T
Trescot," 2£.. cit. p. 543.
72. Hunt, Gaillard, ed. "Narrative and Letter of William Henry
Trescot,"...JlP.. c.i:t. p. 539.
73. Ibid, p. 544.
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that Trescotl Davis l and Hunter called on the President l
Floyd had a conversation with Major Buell l in which he
said that Anderson's move bad made war inevitable and had
compromised the President. 74
The Cabinet was called together immediately.

At first

all seemed to think that Major Anderson had acted without
orders.

Secretary Floyd vehemently repeated his accusation

made to Anderson in the telegram of December 27, that he
had disobeyed his instructions.

At this point the Secretary

of State l Judge Black l suggested ,that the orders of December
11 be sent forI and they were read in the presence of the
President and the Cabinet, Black pointing out that the orders
contained the endorsement of the Secretary of War for the
move to Sumter.

75

But there were other serious results of this transfer of
command to Sumter, besides the frustration of the policy
(

pursued by Buchanan and Floyd.

It accentuated the hostile

attitude of South Carolina toward the Government and inspired

r
I

her to take drastic retaliatory measures.

On December 27,

immediately after Anderson's move to Sumter, the Governor of
South Carolina issued to Colonel J. J. Pettigrew the following

•• I

[I
~

I

,(
1',,

I

order:
You are ordered to take possession of Castle Pinckney.
You are to act with the greatest discretion and prudence,
and to let it be known that you take possession in the
name of the Governor of South Carolina, and in consequence
of the extraordinary orders executed last night in relation
to Fort Moultrie l and with a view at present to prevent

'14.
75.
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74

further destruction of public property, and as a measure
of safety also. 76
A similar order was issued to Lieutenant-Colonel
De Saussure, to take possession of Sullivan's Island and
Fort Moultrie.

Both Moultrie and Castle Pinckney were thus

taken the day after Anderson abandoned Fort Moultrie, all
of

and provisions being seized and appropriated by South Carolina. 77
thei~property

On December 29, the Governor of South Carolina ordered
Colonel John Cunningham to take a detachment of select men,
and in the "most discreet and forbearing manner", proceed
to the United States arsenal in Charleston and demand in
his name its "entire possession".

This was also done with

"a view to prevent any destruction of public "'~f'band also
as due to the public safety." So df)clared the Governor. 78
The Governor declared also that "I do not apprehend any
difficulty in giving up the same, but if refused, then you
are to take it, using no more force than may be absolutely
necessary.,,79

No doubt the Governor's optimism was well

warranted by the Government's past policy of appeasement,
and the consequent defenseless position of everything de'j •
t·

manded.

The arsenal was taken.

Captain Humphreys surrendered

it under protest, "as he had no force for its defense."

He

demanded the right to salute his flag, and that his men be
76.
77.
78.
79.
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\

allowed to occupy their quarters until instructions could be
obtained from the 'War Department.

I

;"

'~

I

This was granted and

Colonel Cunningham began to issue the property of the
United States arsenal to the soldiers of South Carolina. 80
On December 29 Captain Humphreys, in a report to the War

/'

,

I '

t,

Department, complained that he had asked for instructions
but had received none, that the arsenal was practically in

)

'/'.
j'

,

.~

a state of siege; that he would make a formal protest
against the posting of sentinels around the arsenal and ask
that they be removed unless otherwise instructed from the
War Department.

I

f,.

,

If his request was denied he would consider

I

the arsenal occupied by the State, haul down his flag and
surrender. 81

Just as Anderson had begged for some specific

instructions and received none, so, it seems, a deaf ear
was turned to Captain Humphreys, for on December 30, he sent
a two-line report to the War Department, saying, "This
arsenal has today been taken by force of arms.
position am I to make of my

What dis-

command~82

On the same day, December 30, Fort Johnson and adjacent
grounds were seized and occupied by South Carolina troops.
A large supply of fuel, later badly needed by the Sumter
"

I

Garrison, thus passed into the hands of South Carolina.
Having now obtained possession of the unoccupied forts and
the arsenal, measures were now taken by the Governor for the

\
•

I

establishment of batteries for the control and defense of the
harbor. 83

80.

81.
82.
83.

Explaining his course to D. F. Jamison, President
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of the Convention, Governor Pickens definitely declared
that there was a pledge on the part of the Buchanan

r
~\1

)

'f

Administration, and this pledge had been violated by Major
Anderson.

He considered the latter's action an act of

aggression when he wrote:
I considered the evacuat 10n of Fort Moul tria, under all
the circumstances, a direct violation of the distinct
understanding between the authorities of the Government at
Washington, and those who were authorized to act on the
part of this State, and bringing on a state of war. I
therefore thought it due to the safety of the State that
I should take the steps I have. I hope there is no
irmnediate danger of further aggression for the present. 84

.<

.
,

Regardless of the interpretations placed upon the action
of Major Anderson by South Carolina and the Government at

I

'I'

Washington, the fact remains that he had by this action,
although authorized, produced a crisis.

Vlhile waiting for

the reception of the South Carolina commissioners by the
President, let us see what Major Anderson said about his
alleged violation of a pledge and the status quo.

On

December 29 he wrote a long letter to his secessionist friend,
Robert N. Gourdin, of Charleston, to whom he expressed himself
rather frankly.

•

He wrote:

No one will regret more deeply than I shall, should it
prove true that the movement I have made has complicated
rather than disembarrassed affairs. There is an unaccountable mystery in reference to this affair. I was
asked by a gentleman within a day or two, if I had been
notified by your Government that I would not be molested
at Fort Moultrie, and when I replied that I had not been
so notified, he remarked that he was glad to hear it, as
it convinced him that I had acted in good faith, having
just told him that I had not received such an intimation
from my own Government. Now if there was such an understanding, I certainly ought to have been informed of it.
84.
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But why, if your Government thought that I knew of this
agreement, was everything done which indicated an intention
to attack? Why were armed steamers kept constantly on the
watch for my movements? The papers say that I was under
panic. That is a mistake; the moment I inspected my
position I saw that the work was not defensible with my
small command, and recommended weeks ago that we ought to
be withdrawn. I remained, then, as long as I could under
the fearful responsibility I felt for the safety of my
command. 85
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CHAPTER IV
THE SOUTH CAROLINA COMMISSIONERS AND THE CABINET CRISIS
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CHAPTER IV
THE SOUTH CAROLINA COMMISSIONERS AND THE CABINET CRISIS

At the time of the President's annual message to Congress,
December 4, 1860, the Cabinet membership was unchanged.

The

President had the same Cabinet that he had originally
,

\

, 4

appointed, with the exception of Joseph Holt, who, as has
been noticed in the first chapter of this study, had been
appointed to succeed Aaron V. Brown, deceased. l Cobb and
Thompson were the only members of the Cabinet to disagree
with the President's message, in particular that part of it
which denied the right of secession. 2 Cobb was the first
member to resign, December 8, 1860, and he was replaced by
Philip F. Thomas, formerly Governor of Maryland. 3 Cobb, in
his letter of resignation, said that 'a sense of duty to the
State of Georgia required that he should take a step which
made it proper that he should no longer be a member of the
Cabinet.

He said that his remaining in the Cabinet would

expose him to unjust suspicions. and put Mr. Buchanan in a
false position.

He said the evil had passed beyond control

and must now be met by each and all under "our responsibility
to God and country", and he believed that history would
record Mr. Buchanan's administration as the last one of the
1.
2.
3.

Buchanan, James, 2£.
Ibid.
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Union and would place it "side by side with the purest and
ablest of those that preceded it."4

Cobb was an ardent

secessionist, and his action stands in bold contrast for
honesty to that of the equally ardent secessionist,
Thompson, who notified the President of his intention to
resign at about the same time, but who remained as long as
possible to use his influence in behalf of secession. 5
Now the President wanted his Cabinet to remain intact
and all go out together at the end of his administration,
and he felt keenly the necessary withdrawal of the Southern
members. 6

An even more serious blow to the Administrationts

policy, in the eyes of the North, was the resignation of
Secretary of State Cass, the oldest and most prominent member
of the Cabinet and the most insistent on the necessity of
sending reinforcements to the forts in Charleston harbor.
He sent in his letter of resignation December 12, 1860, and
although he expressed his agreement with the Presidentts
message and the theory that the Government had no power to
coerce a State back into the Union, he made the basis of his
resignation the President's refusal to reinforce the forts
in Charleston harbor.

"I continue to think", he said, "that

I,

these arrangements should be immediately made.,,7
, .j

In reply,

the President said that as he believed that no necessity existed for a resort to force for the protection of the public 4.
5.
6.

7.

Crawford, QQ. cit. p. 37
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property, it was impossible for him to risk a collision of
arms in the harbor of Charleston, which would have defeated

~

the reasonable hope which he cherished of the final triumph
of the Constitution and of the Union. 8 Cass was succeeded

'iJ

by the Attorney-General, Black, who was in turn replaced as

/,,1

l~·

Attorney-General by Black's friend and protege, Edwin M.
Stanton. 9 Thus the difficulties in Charleston harbor were
interfering with the President's personal desire to keep his
Cabinet together to the end of his term of office and "all go
out together."
Now one of the most, if not the most, influential men in

!
't,

the Cabinet was Jeremiah S. Black.

He was from Buchanan's

own State and the President leaned on him for advice and
trusted him.

Although Black's advice to the President on

November 20, the basis for Buchanan's constitutional
argument on secession of December 4, was not all that might
have been expected of a sincere Unionist that he was, no
critic, however rabid, of the Buchanan administration has even
hinted that Black was not able, sincere, and honest.

Some

writers on the period of history now under consideration believe that Black's more responsible

po~ition

as Secretary of

State caused him to take a different view of the theory of

;

,

.

r
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,

,

coercion, and that he reversed his constitutional argument
of November 20. 10 It has also been alleged that Black's
8. Curtis, 2£. £!i., vol. 2, p. 398.
9. Buchanan, James, 2£. ill. p. 110
10. Burgess, 2£. £li. vol. 1, p. 89

.SQ£

81

friend, Stanton, who succeeded the former as Attorney-General,
had some influence in this stronger view of the President's
powers. ll However this may' be, in view of Black's opinion
of the President's powers as to coercion given on November 20,
and his firm policy as Secretary of State, there can be no
doubt there was an intervening political metamorphosis.
As the Secretary of State was to be the decisive factor
in the coming interview between the President and the South
Carolina cOmmissioners, let us see what type of man he was.
A leading Republican contemporary of the period has left an
enviable characterization of Black, the Unionist but
I1.\, ".

r;
,6
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{
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extremely anti-abolitionist.

Said James G. Blaine:

He was a man of remarkable character. He was endowed by
nature with a strong understanding and a strong will. In
the profession of the law he had attained great eminence.
His learning had been illustrated by a prolonged service
on the bench before the age at which men, even of exceptional success .at the bar, usually attract public observation • • • In history, biography, criticism, romance, he
had absorbed everything in our language worthy of attention.
Shakespeare, Milton, indeed all the English poets, were
his familair companions. Reading had made him a full man,
talking a ready man, writing an exact man. The -judicial
literature of the English tongue may be sought in vain for
finer models than are found in the opinions of Judge Black
when he sat, and was worthy to sit, as the associate of
John Bannister Gibson, on the Supreme Bench of Pennsylvania.
•• He applied to his own political creed the literal
teachings of the Bible. If Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob had
held slaves without condemnation or rebuke from the Lord
of hosts, he believed that Virginia, Carolina, and Georgia
might do the same. 12
But after this eulogy, Blaine stated that because Black
wished it understood that the position of the Republican party
was inconsistent with loyalty to the Union, and that its

~

!
(

.

11.

12.
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permanent success would lead to the destruction of the

t--(

~

Government, it was not unnatural that his extreme views

It
.: <

should have carried him beyond the bounds of prudence in

!

[ I

t

his legal opinion of November 20; that he thus in large

II

degree became responsible for the unsound position of

f'

Mr. Buchanan.

I(

was the more "odiOUS and more dangerous by the quotation of

i

"

But Blaine admitted that Buchanan's message

I

a part and not the whole."

Blaine, as many others, believed

that Black changed his position because of his more responsible position as Secretary of State, and also because of the

,.

greater seriousness of the issue after Major Anderson's

!

occupation of Fort Sumter. 13

Such an opinion seems correct.

We have already seen that it was Black who had the orders

."

1,1

of December 11 sent for and pointed out to the President

i;

and Cabinet that Major Anderson's occupation of Sumter was

.-,

(

(

r
(
(

according to orders. 14
Now, the South Carolina Commissioners had arrived in
Washington on the same day that Major Anderson caused the
military crisis in Charleston harbor, and in their turn
were to cause a political crisis in the Cabinet.

On December

22, 1860, W. H. Trescot, now South Carolina's special agent

at Washington, received the following telegram from Governor
J

{ .
,j

J

r'..: -

•

Pickens:
The Hon. R. W. Barnwell, the Hon. J. H. Adams and the
Hon. James L. Orr have been appointed Commissioners by
the Convention to proceed immediately to WaShington to
present the Ordinance of Secession to the President,
and to negotiate in reference to the evacuation of the
forts and other matters growing out of the Act of
Secession. They will probably arrive on Tuesday next.
13.
14.

Ibid, pp. 231, 232, 233.
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Please inform the President of this.

Answer this. 15

On Wednesday, December 26, the Commissioners arrived in
Washington, and their arrival was communicated at once to
the President by the agent

o~

the State, Trescot.

ing to Trescot, Judge Black, the Secretary
(;'

State, was

J

present at the interview.
~ormally,

\

o~

Accord-

,

i

The subject was spoken

in-

o~

and the President appointed one o'clock on the

following day, December 27,

as the hour when it would be
agreeable to him to receive the Commissioners. 16 The
President was told by Trescot that the Commissioners proposed

4'

to present their credentials and have an informal conversa•

tion with him, but that

"

question of their reception to Congress, they wished to

)

,.

i
,,1

,r
(~

i~

it was his intention to submit the

submit a written communication to accompany his message.

I~,

however, the President should agree in thinking it the better
course, the Commissioners would not, prepare the paper until
after the interview with him, when they would better under-

"

I (

'l

stand one another, but in that case it was to be considered
tl~t the communication was submitted at the interview. 17
According to Trescot, the President consented to thiS,
and matters were approaching some definite solution when

/
\

:
i

"

Anderson made his sudden and unexpected movement
Moultrie to Sumter.

~rom

The news arrived in Washington, "at

once wholly changing the relations of the parties and
altering the whole character of the negotiation. ff18

.

\

Fort

Because

15. Crawford, 2£. cit. Pr. 142
16. Hunt, Gaillard;-6d 'Narrative and Letter of William
Henry Trescot, "....2J2.. cit. p. 543.
17. Ibid.
18. -Hunt, Gaillard, ed., If Narrative and Letter of William
Henry Trescot,·~.~. p. 543.
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of the excitement and the changed nature of things, the
meeting of the President with the Commissioners, set for

,

\'I

the 27th, took place on the next day.

\

Commissioners presented the President their credentials l

r

under which they were "authorized and empowered to treat
with the Government of the United states for the delivery

i ..j'

f.

of the forts, magazines, lighthouses, and other real estate,

I~

',J
I ~

rf
~

On December 28 the

with their appurtenances, within the limits of South Carolinaj

•
I

..

'

and also for an apportionment of the public debt and a

'f

division of all other property held by the Government of the

I.

United States as agent of the Confederated States, of which
South Carolina was recently a memberj and, generally, to
negotiate as to all other measures and arrangements proper
to be made and adopted in the existing relations of the
parties, and for the continuance of peace and amith between
this Commonwealth and the Government at WashingtoJ!19
A copy of the South Carolina ordinance of Secession was
delivered to the PreSident, and their desire to negotiate
peaceably on the above matters was reiterated, but the changed
state of things rendered a peaceful issue doubtful.

Then the

charge of a pledge violated. "We came hare", they said, "the
j

(

I'

representatives of an authority which could at any time within
the past sixty days have taken possession of the forts in
Charleston Harbor, but which, upon pledges given in a manner

,I

that we cannot doubt, determined to trust to your honor rather

\

;.
~

than to its own power."20
19.
20.

Then there was a demand for

Official Records, vol. 1, p. 109
OffIcial Records, vol. 1, p. 109

Q Q4 . £
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satisfactory explanations before any negotiations would be
continued, and a request for the immediate withdrawal of the
I

I

,

troops from Charleston harbor, Ita standing menace which
r'enders negotiation impossible. ,,21

.,

This interview with the

South Carolina Commissioners lasted nearly two hours, with
R. W. Barnwell acting as chairman of the Commission.

Mr.

Barnwell stressed the fact that an agreement on the part of
,I .~

I,)

I (

~'

f

the Government of the United states had been violated by
'I

Anderson's conduct, and the faith of the President and the
Government had been forfeited.

Then he urged the President

to restore the status in the harbor of Charleston by ordering Anderson back to Moultrie, an inconsistent demand in the
light of the request in the Commissioners' credentials to
withdraw the troops from Charleston harbor altogether. 22
Three times at least during the interview Mr. Barnwell
insisted: "But, Mr. President, your personal honor is involved
in this matter."

Mr. Barnwell pressed him so hard on this

point that the President said: "Mr. Barnwell, you are pressing
me too importunately; you don't give me time to consider;

r, f

you don't give me time to say my prayers.

I always say my

(.

prayers when required to act upon any great State affair. 23

"

The President wrote a reply to the Commissioners and submitted
it to the Cabinet on December 29.
I'
,

Mr. Toucey, Secretary of the

Navy, was the only member to wholly approve it.

Black, Holt

and Stanton suggested changes in the paper, thinking that from
I •
'\"

21.
22.
23.

't

I

Ibid, pp. 109, 110.
Crawford, Qg. cit. p. 148, Letter of James L. Orr to Crawford.
~, pp. I48,-r49.
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r
,

,
I

,

(

concessions, which it could not be the purpose of the

'

..

,I
,:. ,I
,

the unguarded language it was open to the criticism of making

I

t,

It-/ '
} r,"

President or his Cabinet to make.

The three remaining members,

Mr. Thompson, Mr. Thomas, and Mr. Floyd, opposed it because
it yielded too little to the demands of South Carolina. 24
The President made no reply to these opinions but took the
objections under consideration.

The Secretary of War, Floyd,

took this reply of the President as an opportunity to resign
from the Cabinet, to avoid the odium of being forced out on
other more serious grounds.

As early as December 23 the

President had, through his friend Breckenridge, asked for
25
The story of the charges against Floyd
Floyd's resignation.
of aiding treasonably the rebellion, by supplying the Southern
arsenals with arms in the fall of 1860, and otherwise promoting
the interests of secession while still a member of the Cabinet,
is too long to be told here.

However, Mr. Buchanan himself

stated that the reason he requested Floyd's resignation was the
discovery of the latter's irregularity in bond issues.

Floyd

was instrumental in purloining bonds, to the amount of 870,000
dollars, from the Interior Department and delivering them to
William H. Russell, a member of the firm of "Russell, Majors

& Waddell".26
J

l

I'.

It was for this irregularity of conduct that

the President had asked for his resignation.
But Floyd, who, until Major Anderson's move to Sumter, had
apparently seen eye to eye with Buchanan's policy, in the
Cabinet meeting of December 29, read to the President, before
the Cabinet, the following paper:

I

24.
25.
26.

Crawford, ~~ ~. p. 149
Buchanan, James, 2J2.. ill. p. 185
f£!£, p. 186
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I1
I

~

Sir: On the evening of the 27th instant, I read the
following paper to you, in the presence of the Cabinet:
Sir: It ·is evident now, from the action of the cormnander
at Fort Moultrie, that the solemn pledges of this
Government have been violated by Major Anderson. In my
judgment, but one remedy is now left us by which to vindicate our honor and prevent civil war. It is in vain now
to hope for confidence on the part of the people of South
Carolina in any further pledges as to the action of the
military. One remedy only is left, and that is to withdraw the garrison from the harbor of Charleston altogether.
I hope the President will allow me to make that order at
once. This order, in my judgment, can alone prevent
bloodshed and civil war. 27
Embodying the above in a formal letter of resignation on
December 29, Floyd stated that he considered the honor of the
administration pledged to maintain the troops in the position
they occupied.

Again he was ignoring the orders he had given

Anderson December 11, notwithstanding Black's recent review
of those orders on December 27 before the whole Cabinet.

Such

an attidute indeed justified Anderson's suspicion that the
modified orders of December 21 were of treasonable intent. But
Black, whose honesty has never been doubted, later stated his
conviction that Floyd's sudden espousal of the cause of
secession was because of the break with the President on other
matters. Said Black: "Up to the time when he got notice that
he must resign, he was steadily opposed to the Southern movement, and the bitterest enemies he had were the leading men of
that section. After he found the whole Administration against
him, he was driven by stress of necessity into the ranks of
the party which he had previously opposed."28
In closing his letter of resignation, Floyd stated that
the refusal, or delay, to place things back as they stood
I

27. Curtis, 2£. £!i. vol. 2, p. 409
28. Black, C. F., Essays and Speeches of J. S. Black, 2£.
pp. 266 •. 267.
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under "our agreement" inn ted collision" and must inevi tably
lead to civil war.

He could not consent to be the agent o£

such a calamlty.29

Thus" the crisis had afforded Floyd the

opportunity to withdraw on more dignified grounds than those
of fraudulent manipulations of bond issues.

Mr. Holt was

transferred from the Post Office to the War Department at
the end of December, his place being filled by the appointment o£ Horatio King, of Maine, as acting Postmaster-General"
and shortly a£ter confirmed as Postmaster-General. 30 The
importance of this change in the War Department" as well as
Southern confidence in Floyd" was reflected in the telegram
sent by the secessionist Louis T. Wigfall, in Washington, to
M. L. Bonham, of Charleston.
1861: "Holt succeeds Floyd.

Wig£all telegraphed on January 2,
It means war.

Cut off supplies

from Anderson and take Sumter soon as possible."3l

This fear

proved to be exaggerated, but the telegram shows the excitement produced by the Cabinet crisis produced by Major Anderson's
action.
But the most serious threat o£ withdrawal £rom the Cabinet
was yet to come, immediately after Floyd's resignation.

The

determination o£ the Secretary o£ State, Black" to resign"
proceeded £rom the same reply the President had written to the
Commissioners, but on wholly different grounds £rom those o£
Floyd.

Black believed that the reply conceded too much to

South Carolina" and compromised the President and Cabinet.

29.

30.
31.
j,

curtis,,~. £!i. vol. 2" p. 409.
Buchanan, James, 2£. cit. p. 111
Official Records, vo1:-I, p. 252.
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the morning after the President presented his reply to the
Commissioners to the Cabinet, Judge Black communicated his
conviction to Messrs. Stanton# Holt, and Toucey that it
..

t'

.

was his conviction that the President's mind was fixed beyond
all hope of change, and his own determination to resign in
consequence. 32 Mr. Toucey told the President, and Judge Black

"

was sent for.

He went reluctantly, dreading the effect on

his own feelings of the appeal which he knew Mr. Buchanan
wou~a

make to the sacred friendship which had lasted through

so many years.

The President showed great emotion at the

interview# which ended by the President's handing Black the
paper and telling him to revise it to meet his own views. 33
There has been no copy of this original reply of the President
preserved, but in it, among other unwise things, the President
seemed to have admitted a pledge made to maintain the status
quo in Charleston harbor.

In the interview, Judge Black told

him that such an understanding was impossible, that he could
not make it or any other agreement that would tie his hands
in the execution of the
repudiate it. 34

l~wsj

that if he did make it, he must

JUdge Black immediately went to the Office

of the Attorney-General, Stanton, and there made the amendments

.'

I

to the President's reply to the Commissioners.

As fast as the

I

i

sheets were written they were handed to the Attorney-General,
who copied them in his own hand, the original being sent
directly to the President. 35

32.
33.
34.
35.
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As the original letter to the Commissioners has not been
preserved, it will be necessary to quote rather freely from
the long reply of the Secretary of State, which he divided

,

.
•i

f

I

{

i

t

into seven headings:
1. The first and the concluding paragraphs both seem to
acknow'ledge the right of South Carolina to be represented
near this Government by diplomatic officers. That implies
that she is an independent nation, with no other relations
to the Government of the Union than any other foreign power.
If such be the fact, then she has acquired all the rights,
powers, and 'responsibilities of a separate government by
the mere Ordinance of Secession. • • But the President has
always, and particularly in his late message to Congress,
denied the right of secession, and asserted that no State
could throw off her Federal obligations in that way.

2. I would strike out all expressions of regret that the
Commissioners are unwilling to proceed with the negotiation,
since it is very clear that there can legally be no negotiation with them, whether they are willing or not.
3. Above all things it is objectionable to intimate a
ness to negotiate with the State of South Carolina
the possession of a military post which belongs to
United States, or to propose any adjustment of the
or any arrangement about it.

willingabout
the
subject

4. The words, 'coercing a State by force of arms to remain in
the Confederacy' - a power which I do not believe the
Constitution has conferred upon Congress - ought certainly
not to be retained. They are too vague, and might have the
effect (which I am sure the President does not intend) to
mislead the Commissioners concerning his sentiments. The
power to defend the public property, to resist an assailing
force which unlawfully attempts to drive out the troops of
the United States from one of their fortifications • • • is
coercion, and may'very well be called 'coercing a State by
force to remain in the Union.
I

I

.)

'.

)

Thus Black departed from his 'constitutional legal hair
splitting of November 20.

No one can compare this opinion with

that of November 26 and doubt that Black, the Secretary of

"

State, held much stronger views on combating secession than
Black, the Attorney-General.

.91

,

;

•

.

5. The implied (sic) assent of the President to the accusation
which the Commissioners make, of a compact with South
Carolina by which be was bound not to take whatever measures
he saw fit for the defense of the forts, ought to be
stricken out and a flat denial of any such bargain or pledge
or agreement asserted.
6 • The remotest expression of a doubt about Major Anderson's

•

perfect propriety of behavior should be carefu~ly avoided.
He is not only a gallant and meretorious officer, who is
entitled to a fair hearing before he is condemned: he has
saved the country, I solemnly believe, when its day was
darkest and its peril most extreme.

(;
I

f
(

i

-

7. The idea that a wrong was committed against South Carolina
by moving from Fort Moultrie to Fort Sumter ought to be
repelled as firmly as may be consistent with a proper
respect for the high character of the gentlemen who compose the South Carolina Commission. It is a strange
assumption of right on the part of that State to say that
the United States troops must remain in the weakest
position they can find in the harbor. • • The apparent
objection to his being in Fort Sumter is, that he will be
less likely to fall an easy prey to his assailants. 36

From the above, it might seem that the President had
conceded nearly every thing to South Carolina except the
national debt.

But it must be remembered that Floyd based

his resignation on his not conceding enough.

At any rate,

Black's amendments and advice to the President give us an
analysis of the nature of the President's original reply.
It is quite possible that the President had determined to
\

'

order Anderson back to Moultrie, for the President has
admitted that "at the moment it was worthy of consideration",
but t'to abandon all these forts to South Carolina, on the

,"I
,

i '

demand of commissioners claiming to represent her as an
independent State, would have been a recognition, on the
part of the Executive, of her right to secede from the Union.
This was not to be thought of for a moment. n37

36.
37.

Black, C. F., 2£. £!i., pp. 14, 15.
Buchanan, James, 2£. £!i., p. 182
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\

.,

wrote this in 1866.

Among the many other writers who have

attempted a defense of Buchanan's policy, Horatio King,
Buchanan's friend and Postmaster-General, in speaking of

I.

r'.;
,

Black's memorandum, does not attempt to reconcile Black's
strictures with the claim of Buchanan's executive propriety
in the answer to the Commissioners. 38 King quoted a declaration
of Holt to the effect that never had the President "willingly

'!

contemplated the surrender of the forts at Charleston."39
Judge Black, after listing the seven points on which the
President's reply to the Commissioners should be amended,
also entreated the President to order the Brooklyn and the
Macedonian to Charleston without the least delay, and in the

,I,..

meant:1.me send a trusty messenger to Major Anderson to let him
know that the Government would not desert him. 40 In the seven
points Black had condemned the past policy of the Adminis'\').

tration, when he charged "the fatal error of the administration in not sending down troops enough to hold all the forts. 4l
Buchanan's policy had definitely reached a turning pOint.
The retirement of Cass had undoubtedly weakened Buchanan' at
the North, and when Black threatened to resign, it seems that
Buchanan capitulated and was willing to change his attitude
toward secession to prevent another Cabinet defection at the
I"

President's expense.

In the last analysis, his administration

i
:,

38.
39.
40.
41.

King, Horatio, 2£. cit. p. 171
Ibid.
Crawford, 2£. cit. p. 155.
C. F.' Black, 2E-;-cit., p. 15
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must rest upon conservative Northern opinion. 42

The

President amended his reply to the Commissioners on the
basis of Black's pOints, and it is believed that Black's
\

f

influence prevented the President from following his first
impulse and ordering Anderson back to Moultrie. 43 '
On December 31 the President communicated to the South
Carolina Commissioners a rather lengthy reply, in which he
made it clear that negotiations were now impossible.
went over the old ground very fully, quoted the

\

\

f

, t

correspo~

dence between him and the South Carolina delegation of
December 10, denied the charge of a pledge, and

Ii'

He

qUdte~

full the orders sent to Anderson on December 11.44

in

The

President further declared that he had acted in the same

.

(

r

(

c

.. ,
{

manner as he would have done had he entered into a positive
and formal agreement with parties capable of contracting,
although such an agreement would have been on his part, from
the nature of his official duties, impossible."

The world

knows that I have never sent any reinforcements to the forts
in Charleston Harbor, and I have certainly never authorized
any change to be made "in their relative military status~45
This statement was indeed puzzling, as he had been reminded
by Black of the orders by which Anderson had moved his
command, and the President was to say in 1866 that Major
Anderson did have the necessary instructions to change "the

.
i

,

j

42. Randall, 3. G., The Civil War and Reconstruction" p. 207
Chicago, Ill., D. C. Heath Co., 1937.
43. Crawford, ££. £11. p. 156.
44. Official Records~ vol. 1, pp. 115,116,117,118.
45. Ibid, p. i17.

.94
relative military status~46
'J!',

The President further stated that his first promptings
were to command Anderson to return to his former position#

I

, I

and there await the contingencies presented in his instructions; but that before any steps could be taken in that direction#

,

the South Carolina authorities had seized all the remaining

(

forts in the harbor; and on the very next day after the
occupation of Sumter by Major Anderson# the Federal

CustomHouse and Post Office in Charleston had been taken. 47 The
,

\

\ U

.

,

,..,

President continued:
It is under all these circumstances that I am urged
immediately to withdraw the troops from the harbor of
Charleston, and am informed that withoug this, negotiation
is impossible. This I cannot do; this I will not do.
Such an idea was never thought of by me in any possible
contingency. No allusion had ever been made to it in any
communication between my fBlf and any human being. But
the inference is that I am bound to withdraw the troops
from the only fort remaining in the possession of the
United States in the harbor of Charleston, because the
officer there in command of all the forts thought proper,
without instructions, to change his position from one of
them to another. I cannot admit the justice of any such
inference. 48
The President closed the communication by saying that, while
it was his duty to defend F'ort Sumter as a portion of the
ftpublic property" of the United States against hostile

)

l

'.

attacks, he did not see how such a defense could be construed
into a menace against the city of Charleston. 49 The statement
that Fort Sumter was to be defended as public property# and

i

not necessarily as a military post of the United States, was
r
I,!!:

.'

1

46.
47.
48.
49.

Buchanan, James, .2.E,. ill. p. 165
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evidently an attempt to calm the South Carolina fears of

\

aggression.

"
"

Later, it was to be made the basis of another

attempt to negotiate the question of the forts, by outright
purchase.
On January 1, 1861, the South Carolina Commissioners
r'A

replied to the President in an equally long and comprehensive
argument.

The whole tone of the letter was a scathing

denunciation of the duplicity practiced on South Carolina by

,', >
I4

:

,

\

.

the President and the Government of the United States.

The

Commissioners refuted the President1s assertion that he had
made no formal pledge. 50 In replying to his denial that he
had never thought of withdrawing the troops from Charleston
harbor, the Commissioners were "compelled to say that your
conversation with us left upon our minds the distinct impression that you did seriously contemplate the withdrawal
of the troops from Charleston Harbor. tl5l

And in support of

their contention, they had the positive assurance of gentlemen
of the highest possible public reputation, that such suggestions
had been "made to and urged upon you by them, and had formed
the subject of more than one earnest discussion with you. tl52
They also declared that they could simply not believe the
:

"

President's claim that Anderson had occupied Sumter against
the orders of the President.

The President was charged with

~

I
I

.,

probably rendering civil war inevitable, but the State of
South Carolina would accept that issue, "relying upon Him
who is the God of Justice as well as the God of Hosts, will
50.
51.
52.

."

Ibid, PP. 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125.
p. 123.
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endeavor to perform the great duty which lies before her,
, .,

hopefully, bravely, and thoroughly."53

Expressing their

belief that the President had determined to reinforce the
garrison in Charleston harbor, and the impossibility of
negotiation and peace in the light of the President's letter
of the 31st of December, they stated their intention

.

~

o~

returning to Charleston on the afternoon of January 2.54

(

The President's reaction to the Commissioners' reply of

..

')

January 1 can best be given in the President's own words:

,
I

\

" b
i

"i

/'•

,t
,

This (reply) was so violent, unfounded, and disrespectful,
and so regardless of what is due to any individual whom
the people have honored with the office of President, that
the reading of it in the Cabinet excited indignation among
all the members. With their unamimoUB approbation, it was
immediately, on the day of its date, returned to the
commissioners with the following indorsement: "This paper,
just presented to the President is of such a character
that he declines to receive it." Surely no negotiation
was ever conducted in such a manner, unless, indeed, it had
been t he predetermined purpose of the negotiators to produce an open and immediate rupture. 55

I

Buchanan's explanation of his offer to lay the propositions
the Commissioners had to make before Congress, when he
knew they would not meet a favorable response, reiterates
his fundamental policy.

He said he made the offer to gain

time for passion to subside, to bring the whole subject before
the representatives of the people and cause them to adopt such
i

;

I

measures as might possibly reclaim even South Carolina hersel.f.
But even if South Carolina were not reclaimed, it might prevent the other cotton States from following her example. 56

.
I

\

. I

.'
)

(

.

,

53.
54.
55.
56.

Official Records, vol. I, p. 124
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At least the critical phase of Buchanan's policy had now
passed.

and advisers.

I

(

I

•

•

He now broke completely with his Southern friends
The remaining secessionist sympathizers in

the Cabinet were soon to go as a result of the new direction
given his policy by this crisis.

,

~

I

This new direction was
largely owing to the threat of Black's resignation. 57 It
has also been stated by more than one critic of Buchanants

(

administration, that from the time of the above crisis, the

,>

f

c
I

i

I

administration of Buchanan was not only thoroughly loyal to
the preservation of the Union, but it fixed the policy that
Lincoln accepted and pursued until war came upon him. 58

.,
!

new direction and a different attitude had been assumed, but#
•

I

/'

f

as will be seen, the necessary aggressiveness of action was
to be thwarted by last minute hopes of avoiding a conflict.

/~

r

A

Also, an apparent change of attitude, and the adoption of
'

r.
Ii,
.

an unwarranted optimism as to the safety of his position on
the part of Major Anderson also contributed to a laxity in
the prosecution of the new policy of firmness.

I

,

~

,

,

\

:

-
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, I

!

(

,

,

57. Dumond, DWight L., The Secession Movement 1860 - 1861, p. 176
New York, The Macmillan Co., 1931.
58. McClure, A. K., Abraham Lincoln and Men of War Times,
p. 273, Philadelphia, The Times Publishing Co., 1892.
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CHAPTER V
THE NEW POLICY OF REINFORCEMENT
r'

The insistence of General Scott on reinforcing all the

I

Southern forts, and the cOlnmunication of his views on the
subject to the President on October 29, have already been
;-

I

The President turned down the proposal of

•

General Scott as inconsistent with his policy and as re-

t

quiring more troops than were available.

-'

l

.

;

I

observed.

</'

Again, on December

12, General Scott had gone to Washington and, in an inter-

.\

view with the Secretary of War, Floyd, had urged that

I.

reinforcements be sent, and pointed out the organized companies and recruits available for the purpose.

The Secretary

refused his request on the ground that it would be in
opposition to the announced policy of the President. l

The

Secretary of War arranged an interview between General Scott
and the President, which took place on the 15th of December.
The General again urged a policy of reinforcement, but in vain. 2
The President later stated that Scott knew at the time that
his request would be rejected, that the President could not
consent to it "without at once reversing his entire po1icYI
and withoug a degree of inconsistency amounting almost to
,',.

self-stultification."3

His main reason was that it would have

,,

".

"

"

.

)
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dissolved the existing conferences for a peaceable adjustment.

I

According to ScottI the President was determined to await
the action of the South Carolina Convention and the arrival
of Commissioners to him, which he would refer to Congress,
and if Congress should decide against them, he would then
reinforce the forts in Charleston harbor and direct the
commanding officer to defend them.4

,,

Referring to this interview, the President later stated
that Scott knew at the time that a warship, the "Brooklyn", had a
"

j

I

I

, \

short time before been ordered to be made ready to go to the
relief of Major Anderson in case of need. 5 Now # on the 28th
of December, General Scott urged upon the Secretary of War that
Fort Sumter might not be evacuated, but that one hundred fifty
recruits be sent immediately to the fort. 6 On this same day

\ -',

General Scott sent a message to the President, revealing that
since Major Anderson had been assigned to Fort Moultrie# "no
order, intimation, suggestion, or communication for his
government and guidance has gone to that officer from the
Headquarters of the Army."
i

ed any communication from Major Anderson, later than the first

!

;

I

i

Nor had the General-in-Chief receiv-

",

report of the latter. 7

The General definit,ely did not trust

t

the Secretary of War.

In a letter written to Major Anderson's

brother, through the agency of Lieut. Col. Lay# Scott's aide,

,

.

,,

..
f

"

"

, 4

the General asserted that he had done everything in his power

4.
p•

5.
6.
7.

Crawford, 2£. £!i., p. 169. Quoting Scott's autobiography,
615.
Buchanan, James, 2£. ill., p. 168
Crawford, ~. cit., p. 169
Official RecoraB; vol. 1, p. 111.
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to support Major Anderson and declared that the War Department
I",

"

had kept secret from the General the instructions sent the

,

.

Major, but that the General, in common with the whole army,
"has admired and vindicated as a defensive

measur~

the

masterly transfer of the garrison from Fort Moultrie to the
position of Fort Sumter.,,8
I

I,

":

There was a mutual distrust of

Scott on the part of the Secretary of War, and he had intentionally ordered that all communications from Charleston harbor

r>

"

should be kept from the General-in-Chief of the Army.9
General Scott's distrust of the Secretary of War, and the
latter's

i,: \.

compl~te

conversion to the cause of South Carolina

and secession, as evidenced by his statement in the Cabinet
meeting of December 27, probably account for the language
of General Scott's memorandum to the President of December 30.
On this date the General requested of the President permission,
"without reference to the War Department and otherwise, as
secretly as possible, to send two hundred and fifty recruits
from New York Harbor to reinforce Fort Sumter, together with
some extra muskets or rifles, ammunition, and subsistence
stores."lO

The General hoped that a sloop of war and cutter

might be ordered for the same purpose as early as the next day.ll
At this date General Scott's request fell on more willing ears.
It came &hortly after Secretary of State Black's advice of the
same date.
, I

We have the President's own admission that on the

8. Ibid, pp. 113, 114.
9. IbId, p. 77, Adjutant-General Cooper to Anderson, Nov. 28
10. ~cial Records, vol. 1, p. 114
11. Ibid.
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I

-

I

,!
l.",
,
!

receipt of Scott's request "the President immediately decided
to order reinforcements~12

But now the President and General

~

Scott differed on the kind of ship to be used.

. I

I ;

Scott had

asked for~slooP-of-war, while the President preferred the
warship

If

Brooklyn", and on Monday, December 31, he instructed

the Secretaries of War and Navy to despatch the
Fort Sumter.

\L
,l
~rooklyn to

The Gneeral, on the same evening, called on

Buchanan to congratulate him, saying that he had the orders
13
in his pocket.
But the President explained to General Scott
~

I

i

that it might be considered improper to transmit the orders
to the "Brooklyn" until the Commissioners had had time to

I, \

reply to his letter of a few hours before, _,and the delay, in

,

~

.
I

-

,

I',

'J

..

,

r'
\

I ~

I

The General

General Scott had conferred with an expert in naval
affairs, and had become convinced that both secrecy and success
would be best secured by sending a "mercantile steamer".

-

General Scott's opinion was based on the fact that the Brooklyn
drew too much water to cross the bar of Charleston harbor. 15

~

"

his opinion, would not exceed forty-eight hours.
concurred in this suggestion. 14

For this reason the "Star of the Tv'IJest", a side-wheel merchant
steamer, was substituted for the "Brooklyn", to which change
the President yielded with "great reluctance" on the "pressing
instance" of General Scott. 16 The detail of the expedition

,,

I2.

I •

,

,
•

13.
14.
15.
16.

Buchanan, James, Ope cit. p. 189.
Ibid
-!SIa, p. 190
Crawford, QQ. cit., p. 190
Buchanan, TameS;-2E.. ill. p. 190
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was entrusted to General Scott, who, for the first time in
all the long drawn crisis, was taken into the confidence
.~

f

of the Government and given his proper role as Chief of
Staff of the Army.

It has been alleged that the brief delay

in executing the orders issued December 31, until the Commiss/' ;

"

ioners had had time to reply to the President's letter, was
fatal, in that it gave time for General Scott to change the
ship to be used.

The argument is that instead of a powerful

man of war and seasoned soldiers, capable of repelling an
~,

I

attack in the harbor, there was substituted a weak, unarmed
merchant steamer, with lately recruited men, and at a decided

.

\

~

I

disadvantage if attacked by the South Carolina batteries
in the harbor. 17 A good argument if it could be conclusively
shown that the "Brooklyn" could have crossed the bar in the

\

harbor.

Available facts and the opinions of authorities

support the argument.
The details of chartering the Star of the West, which
had previously been suggested to General Scott by a Mr. Schultz,
were entrusted to Assistant-Adjutant General L. Thomas. Thomas
went to New York, saw Schultz, and the two visited, a Mr. M. O.
Roberts, the owner of the "Star of the west".

In his report

to General Scott of January 4, Thomas stated that Mr. Schultz
was acting for the good of his country, but that Mr. Roberts
was looking exclusively to the dollars.
chartered at $1,250 per day.18
11

The ship had been

The Assistant Adjutant-General

further stated:

j

I

'4

17. Chadwick, French Ensor, Causes of the Civil War, 1858-1861,
p. 225. American Nation Series, New-,:or~Harper &Brothers 1906.
18. Official Records, vol. 1, p. 130.

... ·'Y

10$.'

She is running on the New Orleans route l and will clear
for that port; but no notice will be put in the papers l
and persons seeing the ship moving from the dock will suppose
she is on her regular trip. Major Eaton, commissary of
subsistence l fully enters into my views. He will see 1~.
Roberts, hand him a list of the supplies with the places
where they may be procured, and the purchases will be made
on the ships account. In this way no public machinery will
be used. Tonight I pass over to Governor's Island to do
what is necessarYI i.e' l have 300 stan~ of arms and ammunition on the wharfl and 200 men ready to march on board
Mr. Schultz's steam-tugs about nightfall tomorrow l to ~o to
the steamer, passing very slowly down the bay. I shall cut
off all communication between the Island and the cities
until Tuesday morning l when I expect the steamer will be
safely moored at Fort Sumter. 19

'.I

Thus precautions for secrecy were being taken.

On January

I

( I

Thomas sent an order to Major T. H. Holmes of Fort Columbus,

51
,

./

,

I

saying that by order of General ScottI Holmes would detach
that evening two hundred of the best instructed men l by the
"Star of the Westl" to reinforce Fort Sumter. 20
On the same day, January 5, Thomas notified First Lieutenant

c
I

Charles R. Woods of Fort Columbus:

f

• '1

The steamship "Star of the West" has been chartered to
take two hundred.recruits from Fort Columbus to Fort Sumter,
South Carolina, to reinforce the garrison at that post. You
are placed in command of the detachment, assisted by Lieuts.
W. A. Webb, C. W. Thomas, and Asst. Surge P. G. S. Ten
Broeckl Medical ~partment. Arms and ammunition for your
men will be pla~!d on the steamer and three months' supply
of subsistence.
The. greatest secrecy was enjOined, his men were to be
placed below deck on approaching the Charleston bar, and
every precaution was to be resorted to to prevent being fired
upon by batteries erected either on Sullivan's or James Island. 22
Then l again on the same day I the Assistant Adjutant-General

.Ii

19.
20.
21.
22.

Ibid. pp. 130, 131
Official Records l vol. 1, p. 131.
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J

Thomas wrote a communication to Major Anderson, which, if it had
':",'.'
I'

not been carried to him on thet'Star of the West;) might have
brought on civil war in January instead of April.

.,

were as follows:
Should a fire, likely to prove injurious, be opened upon
any vessel bringing reinfo!cements or supplies, or upon
tow~boats within the reach of your guns, they may be employed to silence such firej and you may act in l~~e manner
in case a fire is opened upon Fort Sumter itself.

."
{-

"

The orders

Note the qualification of the order, "likely to prove

injurious~

Just as in the orders of December 11 it was left to Anderson's
Q;iscretion to determine whether he had "tangible evidence of '

$;,: design to proceed to a hostile act", now he was authorized
'f:

J
I.

\
I

~t

to open fire if he thought the enemy fire not "likely to

prove injurious."

•

.
\

On the very day that General Scott pad the orders for
~einforcement

in his pocket, December 31, Major Anderson,

despite his almost daily reports detailing the extensive
I

,

.,

preparations of South Carolina in the harbor, gave the
Government an optimistic report on his situation.

It is

difficult to reconcile the Major's optimism with the intensive
erection of batteries at various points by the South Carolina
forces.
,

j

J,

I'

Still he wrote the Government:

Thank God, we are now where the Government may send us
additional troops at its leisure. To be sure, the uncivil
and uncourteous action of the Governor in preventing us
from purchasing anything in the city will annoy and inconvenience us somewhatj still we are safe • • • We can
command ~~is harbor as long as our Government wishes to
keep it.
Then, on January 6, Anderson's position was so controlled by
the South Carolina authorities that a message was sent to

,

23.
24.

Ibid.
OffIcial Records, vol. I, p. 120
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Washington "through the courtesy of Governor Pickens. rr

t

.~

Again

I
- ... •• •

the commander reports on the warlike preparations of South

1

Carolina, but says that if there is no treachery among his

·

.'

workmen, he would be able to hold the fort against any force
that could be brought against him. 25 Then concerning the

-.( Ii)

relief expedition, which sailed on the 5th of January, but

,,

which Anderson didn't know was coming, he gave no encourageI' .,

ment.

·)

He reported that "at present it would be dangerous

and difficult for a vessel from without to enter the harbor,

-< • ,

in consequence of the batteries which are already erected
and being erected."
:'

,
,

To show the difficulty of his situation

in consequence of being deprived of free communication with

'.

.

the Government, after reinforcement was on the way, Major
Anderson wrote:

••
~

,

I

I shall not ask for any increase of my command, because
I do not know what. the ulterior views of the Government
are. We are now, or soon will be, cut off from communication,
unless by means of a powerful fleet, which shall have the
ability to carry the batteries at the mouth of this harbor. 26
It is difficult to reconcile Major Anderson's optimism with
this last opinion.

It is evident that in the Major's mind

there was confusion as to the intentions of the Government.
His opinion that it would take a powerful fleet to run the

.',!

•

l

batteries at the mouth of. the harbor gave little hope of
success for the relief expedition already under way.
Abner Doubleday, second in command at Fort Sumter, has

·.
.j •

:

,

,

charged that Anderson was a Union man, and in the beginning
25.
26.

Ibid, p. 133 •
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(
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.
of the difficulties was perfectly willing to chastise
South Carolina in case she should attempt any revolutionary measures, but that his feeling changed when he found
that nearly all the Southern States had joined in the
support of South Carolina. 27 It is true that Anderson had

" ,j

always felt a reluctance to see a beginning of hostilities,
and his hesitancy of action in later developments proceeded
,t-

.)

both from this reluctance to see civil war initiated as

)

well as from his correct opinion that it was still the policy
of his Government to do everything possible to prevent a
collision.
,
,

.

On the very day the "Star of the West" sailed, General

'

t" .'

Scott despatched a telegram to his son-in-law, Colonal Scott,
then at New York, to countermand her departure.

This action

,.

was authorized by the Government on the basis of Anderson's

, ,,

report of December 31, but the countermand came too late to
28
stop the sailing of the relief ship.
Buchanan has asserted
that now both the Secretaries of War and Navy, as well as
General Scott, were convinced of the error of substituting
the "Star of the West" for the "Brooklyn", and proceeded to
provide, as far as possible, against anticipated disaster. 29
This was based on the receipt of Anderson's communication of
January 6,for on the next day the following order was sent by

.

'

.,

27.
28.
29.

Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, 2£. cit. p. 41
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r•

General Scott to Lieut. Woods, in command of the troops
on the "Star of the WestJ n

-.,

.' ~.)

."

"

.

,
"

t

J

This communication is sent through the commander of the
steam sloop-of-war "Brooklyn".
His mission is twofold: First to afford aid and succor
in case your ship be shattered or ~njured; second, to
convey this order of recall for your detachment in case
it cannot land at Fort Sumter, to prGceed to Fort Monroe,
Hampton Roads, and there await further orders.
In case of your return to Hampton Roads, send a telegraphic
message here at once from Norfolk.
P. S. On arrival at Fort Monroe, land your troops and
the ship.30

discl~rge

From this order it seems that there was no con-

fidence the relief expedition would succeed.
In fact, it seems likely that the expedition would never
.1 ' .

,.

have been

attemp~d

if Anderson's report of December 31,

affirming the safety of his position, had reached the Govermnent
in time to countermand the sailing.

.

A letter sent to Anderson

on January 10, before the fate of the "Star of the West" was

\

.

.

known, shows that the policy of the Government was still a
defensive one, and the emphasis was on preventing a COllision •
Secretary of War Holt wrote the following:

J.

.

,

.
\

! \

Your despatches to No. 16, inclusive, have been received.
Before the receipt of that of 31st December, announcing that
the Government might re-enforce you at its leisure, and that
you regarded yourself safe in your present position, some
two hundred and fifty recruits had been ordered to proceed
from Governor's Island to Fort Sumter on the 'Star of the
West t , for the purpose of strengthening the force under your
command. The probability is, from the current rumors of
today, that this vessel has been fired into by the South
Carolinians, and has not been able to reach you. To meet
all contingencies, the •Brooklynl has been despatched, with
instructions not to cross the bar at the harbor of Charleston,
but to afford to the "Star of the West" and those on board
all the assistance they may need, and in the event the
recruits have not effected a landing at Fort Sumter, they will
return to Fort Monroe.
30.

Official Records, vol. 1, p. 134.
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avail myself of the occasion to express the great
satisfaction of the Government at the forbearance,
discretion and firmness with which you have acted, amid
the perplexing and difficult circumstances in which you
have been placed. You will continue, as heretofore, to
act strictly on the defensive; to avoid, by all means
compatible with the safety of your command, a collision
with the hostile forces with which you are surrounded.
But for the movement, so promptly anq brilliantly executed, by which you transferred your forces to Fort
Sumter, the probability is tha-t ere this the defenselessness of your position would have invited an attack, which,
there is reason to believe, was contemplated, if not in
active preparation, which must have led to the effusion
of blood, that has been thus so happily prevented. The
movement, therefore, was in every way admirable, alike for
its humanity and patriotism, as for its soldiership.3l
I

I (

..

'

,

I

At least the Government

Hot

was~condemning

giving him some moral support.

Major Anderson, but

This Secretary of War sent

a message quite different from Floyd1s "there is no order

"

for any such movement~ explain the meaning of this report. 32
:,

)

,'

At 1:30 on the morning of January 9, the "Star of the
West" arrived off the Charleston hare The harbor lights were
all out and she extinguished her own.

All of the buoys that

marked the channel had been taken up, making careful soundings
necessa,ry.

At 6:20 A. M. the national flag was run up, and

the ship crossed the bar at high tide and continued along the
Morris Island side up the ship channel.

When opposite a

group of houses near the shore, a red palmetto flag was seen
and without warning a gun-battery opened on the ship.

battery was concealed amid the sand-hills near the shore and
its existence had been unsuspected. 33 The first shot had

.
;

J

The

'

been fired across the bow of the ship, and as the ship con-

.

tinued on her course, a rapid and continuous fire was opened

I,

31.
32.
33.

Official Records, vol. 1, pp. 136, 137
See page 49.
Crawford, 2£. £11. p. 183.

r"

11.0

by the battery.

.'

,

The ship was hit but suffered slight damage.,

As soon as the battery opened fire a large garrison flag
was run up on the ship, lowered, and again run up as a
signal to Major Anderson, whose flag was flying at Sumter.
Before leaving New York, Assistant Adjutant-General Thomas
had sent the gdrrison flag to the ship, giving

••
/

"

'/

ordersf~

its

use, and saying that in case the ship was fired on by the
batteries, Major Anderson would understand the signals and
protect the ship with the guns of Sumter. 34
At reveille on the 9th of January it became generally
known among the men at Sumter that a large steamer, flying

,'1

the United States flag, was off the bar, apparently at anchor.
There had been some talk among the men, based upon rumors from

: t')

,"

Charleston, that the garrison would either be withdrawn from
the harbor or returned to Fort Moultrie, and there were some

,

who believed the rumors.

Therefore quite a few of the men

believed that a withdrawal had been determined upon and that
thisship was the transport to take them away.35

Nearly all

the men were at the ramparts when the ship was fired on by
the batteries, and there was great "hurrying and scurrying"
among the men.

The long roll was beaten, and the batteries

were manned almost before the guns of the hidden battery had

..
,- ."

fired their second shot.

a single gun at Fort Moultrie opened at long range, its shot
falling over half a mile short. 36 Major Anderson was excited
and uncertain what to do.

..

As the "Star of the West" approached

34.
35 •
36.

Should he open fire with his

Ibid, p. 184.
Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, ~. cit. pp. 60, 61.
Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, .2.£. cit. p. 61.
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batteries and thus initiate the civil war which he so re'-

..

j

j

ligiously hoped would be averted?

The responsibility for.

decision was his, and the time was upon him.

Lieutenant

Meade, of Virginia, who ,was shortly after to go'with the
Conrederacy, advised that fire should not be opened at all,
as it would at once

t '.

~n1tiate

civil war, and that the

Governor would probably repudiate the act of hostility on
the part of the South Carolina battery.37
called a conference of his officers.

Major Anderson

He stated that he

had called them together to hear their views in relation to

-

. ,

the act of the State, and to tell them that he proposed to
close the harbor with his

g~s,

and to fire on any vessel

that might attempt to enter.

• t

,

He desired to receive any
recommendations they might have to make. 38

\

The decision of the officers' council was not to open fire#

\

but to await the Governor's explanation.
not~bly

Captain Abner Doubleday, second in command, advised

immediate action.
",

Some of the officers,

Assistant Surgeon Crawford thought that as

the battery was not fired upon when it opened up on the ship,
they had allowed the opportunity to go by for immediate action.

.

Lieutenant Meade repeated his opinion, adding that as they
-

had been directed to act strictly on the defensive, they had
no right to open fire.

Major Anderson acted on the advice of

his officers, that the Governor should be advised of the
course he proposed to take in case the action should not be

..
,

.

disavowed by the Governor.~9
37.
38.
39.

CraWford,

££. £!i. p.

Crawford,~
Ibid, pp.-l~o,

There was apparently some

186.
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.,

'".

dissatisfaction with the decision, as one witness has left
the record that Captain Foster left council, "smashing his
hat, and muttering something about the flag, of which the
words, 'trample on it' reached the ears of the men at the
t
guns. ft40 Lessening her speed, t he c. Star of the West' " came
, I

round in a narrow part of the channel, lowered the flag

f'

from her fore, and putting on all steam headed down the
channel for the bar.

The battery on Morris Island continued

its fire as long as the ship was in range, but without injury.

,,

The strong ebb-tide carried the ship swiftly out of range to the
bar, upon which the tide had so fallen that she struck three
,/

times in crossing it.

A steamer from Charleston followed the
retiring ship for some time, but finally returned. 4l Thus the

(

'"

)

,
I

first determined effort of the Buchanan administration to "defend
the public property" ended in a fiasco.
Buchanan, writing in '1866, stated

'j

tl~t

Major Anderson was

wrong in his action subsequent to the firing on the'~tar of

l'

the West; that if he thought the fort was going to be attacked,
"which was then extremely doubtful tt , that,he let a propitious
moment slip by for the commencement of hostilitles. 42 This
"

was hardly a fair criticism in the light of the Government's
past policy, and even at the very time the(~tar of the West"
was being fired on, the attitude of the Government justified
Anderson's failure to open fire on the South Carolina batteries.
The orders sent Anderson by Holt, Secretary of War, on January

,,
,

.

•

40.

41.
42 •

Battles ana Leaders of the Civil War, .2l?. cit. p. 61.
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>

10, prove this.

He was still to "avoid, by all means

f
-,.

-f

compatible with the safety of your command, a collision
with the hostile forces with which you are surrounded.,,43
Strictly speaking, it was not Anderson's command in Fort
Sumter that was threatened as long as the firing was directed at the Star of the West.

vVhether or not the failure to

return the fire was wise, it cannot be denied that the action
was in harmony with the Government's ftstrict1y defensive"
policy.
i,

On January 9, Major Anderson addressed a communication
to the Governor of South Carolina, declaring. that he had re./

.

frained from opening fire on the

South Carolina batteries

under the hope that the hostile act was without the Governor's

(

,

"

'\
•

sanction.

If the action was not disclaimed, after the return

of his messenger, Anderson would not permit any vessel to
pass within range of his guns in Fort Sumter. 44 On the same
day the Governor replied that the act of firing on the Star
of the West was perfectly justified by him.

Later in the

same day Major Anderson sent another communication to Governor
Pickens, informing him that the plan to blockade the harbor
'.

with his guns would be withheld until the whole matter could
be referred to Washington, and asked that his messenger,
Lieutenant Hall, be allowed to make the journey unmo1ested. 45
On the same day, Captain Foster, Chief of Engineers at Sumter,
was voicing his protest at Anderson's action by writing his
superior, General Totten:
"

.

.

43.
44.
45.

See page 80.
Crawford, 2£.
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.'
•

The firing upon the star of the West this morning by the
batteries on Morris Island opened the war, but Major Anderson
hopes that the delay of sending to Washington may possibly
prevent civil war. The hope, although a small one, may be
the thread that preventsthe sundering of the Union. We are
none the 12gs determined to defend ourselves to the last
extremity.
This was the same officer who, earlier in the day, had left
the officers' council smashing his hat and protesting that
the flag was being trampled on. 47

I

In the meantime, South Carolina was taking measures to
,

,

completely isolate Fort Sumter and prevent a second attempt
to send reinforcements.

On January 11, the main ship channel

."

(

was closed by sinking four 'hulks across it" upon the bar"
and during the night a good deal of work was done on Fort
<

I

\

Moul trie., now in possession of' South Carolina, to defend it

',.

from the fire of Fort
,

.

large steamer, apparently
a man of war, was stationed outside the bar. 48 Amid th~se
Sumt~r.

A

defensive preparations, the Governor sent two agents, Judge
A. G. Magrath and General D. F. Jamison, two of the highest
ranking officials of the State, to hear Major Anderson a demand
to deliver Fort Sumter to the constituted authorities of'
South Carolina. 49 Major Anderson replied that the demand must
not be made on him, but on the Government.

He was just as

anxious as Buchanan to effect a peaceful settlement of the
difficulties.

He appealed "as a Christian, as a man, and as

a fellow-countryman", though not as a soldier, as he said his
,,~

..

,

46.
47.
48.
49.
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duty was plain in that

.

.

respect~

that the Governor's messengers

,

would use their influence to prevent an appeal to arms.

He

would send an officer with a messenger from t he Governor to
Washington.

He would do anything that was possible and

honorable to prevent an appeal to arms. 50
new Secretary of

f '

had so
.

•

.

feared~

whose aggressive character Senator Wigfall

War~

at this time agreed with Buchanan on the desira-

"I

~

Even Holt, the

bility of preserving

peace~

and was not as "stifflt in policy

as Stanton or Black. 5l
Therefore, in consonance with the prevailing attitude,
Anderson sent the Governor a message by the returning agents,
Magrath and

Jrunison~

in which he regretted

that the Governor

had made a demand on him with which he could not comply, but
stated that should the Governor deem fit, "prior to a resort
to armsn, to refer the matter of surrendering the fort to
Washington, he would depute one of his officers to accompany

"-

.'

any messenger the Governor might deem proper to be the bearer
52
of his demand.
The Governor accepted Anderson's proposal,
and appointed Colonel I. W. Hayne, the Attorney-General of
South Carolina, to accompany Lieut.

Hall~

who had already

been charged by Anderson with referring the matter of closing

\

the harbor to Washington.

The two started to Washington on

the afternoon of January 12.53

This was the origin of what

the President considered as a truce, the news of which
reached him ftgreatly to the surprise of the President. rr54

••
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I

Quoting Vattel's Law of Nations, the President called this

t
-'-,

",.

"p partial truce under which hostilities are suspended only
in certain places, as between a tovm and the army besieging
itl"

\ I

t,

And until the deciSion should be made by the President,

Major Anderson had thus placed it out of his own power to ask
for reinforcements, and equally out of the power of the
Government to send them without a violation of the public
faith pledged by him as the commandant of the fort. 55

Thus

Major Anderson, according to the President, had produced a
stalemate which could only be broken when the truce ended, and
Hayne's negotiations were prolonged until February 5.56

It

was an anomalous fact that the Government's first and only
real attempt to send reinforcements to Charleston harbor was
to lead to a situation which for weeks prevented a second
effort.
This act of firmness on the part of Buchanan had brought
other results.

The Secretary of Interior, Jacob Thompson,

claimed that the President had promised, after the orders for
reinforcements had been held up temporarily to await the reply
of the

~outh

Carolina Commissioners, that no further orders

would be issued without being previously considered and discussed in the Cabinet. 57

It seems that Thompson was kept in

the dark on the "Star of the test" expedition, for on the
very day that it sailed from New York, he sent Judge A. B.
Longstreet of South Carolina, a message to the effect that he
55.
56.
57.
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didn't believe that any additional troops would be sent to
....

' ~f

Charleston while the "present status" lasted; but if Fort
Sumter should be attacked, he believed they would be sent. 58
On the day before he had telegraphed to a Mr. Kimball, of

" I

Jackson, Mississippi, that no troops had been sent, nor would
be, while he was a member of the Cabinet. 59

Naturally, the

Secretary's discomfiture was uncomfortable when on January 8

He sent the

he learned that reinforcements had been sent.

President his letter of resignation the same day, charging
that the matter of reinforcements had been discussed in the

I·

Cabinet meeting of January 2, but no conclusion had been
reached. 60 The President sent Thompson a letter accepting
his resignation, January 9, with a full argument against the
Secretary's contention, which showed that Thompson must have

.

\

been asleep at the Cabinet meetings or was lying. The
President regretted that he had been mistaken. 6l Thus the
~~

.

\\

Star of the West fiasco at least accomplished a resignation'

from the Cabinet which should have occured back in December
with that of Cobb.

The post of Thompson was not filled by a

new appOintment, the duties being performed by the chief
clerk, Moses Kelly, until the close of the administration. 62
The new policy also brought the resignation of Philip F. Thomas,
Secretary of Treasury, who gave his reason to be the purpose
./

)

.

of the Cabinet and President to enforce the collection of the
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
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customs in the port of Charleston.

He resigned January 11. 63

Thus# by January 11# all the secessionists were out of the
Cabinet.

John A. Dix, of New York,

to fill the Treasury vacancy#64

w~s

immediately appointed

and he was a strong Unionist.

The stiffening of the Buchanan administration 'was also
made evident in the President's message to Congress on January 8,
1861.

According to one of the Cabinet members, Thomas# it

was written paragraph by paragraph in the presence of the
Cabinet and discussed as it was prepared. 65 The President
stated frankly that the hope that Congress might make some
amicable adjustment of the difficulty had been diminished by
every hour of delay# and that as the prospect of a bloodless
settlement faded away the public distress was becoming more
aggravated.

Government bonds were not being taken at a lower

rate of interest than 12 percent~96

There was an absence of

negative emphasis, such as insistence on the lack of power to
coerce a State and a positive emphasis on his "right and •••
duty to use military force defensively against those who resist
the Federal officers in the execution of their legal functions
and against those who assail the property of the Federal

"

Government. 67

But the President still urged Congress to act

to settle the difficulties which had now reached such vast
and alarming proportions as to place the subject above and
beyond Executive control.

"The fact can not be disguised",

said the President, "that we are in the midst of a great
revolution.

In all its various bearings, therefore, I commend

the question to Congress as the only human tribunal under
63.
64.

65.
66.
67.
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Providence possessing the power to meet the existing emergency.u68
Then the President declared that to Congress alone belonged
the power to declare war or to authorize the employment

o~

military force in all cases contemplated by the Constitution l
and Congress alone possessed the power to remove grievances
which might lead to war and to secure peace and union to the
69
distracted country.
Instead of condemning the North for
bringing on the trouble, as he did in his message of December 4,
the President now accused the South of being in the wrong.
He was firmly convinced that the secession movement "has been
chiefly based upon a misapprehension at the South
sentiments

o~

the majority in several

o~

o~

the

the Northern States."

; i

He appealed through Congress to the people of the country that
• f~·\.;

the Union "must and shall be preserved by all constitutional
means. ff

"The present If, he said, "is no time for palliations.

Action, prompt action, is required.

A delay in Congress to

prescribe or to recommend a distinct and practical proposition
for conciliation may drive us to a point from which it will

,
f .

be almost impossible to recede. ff70
message he praised Major Anderson

Toward the end o~ the
~or

his occupation of Fort

Sumter and gave evidence to the effect that the move had been
made according to orders. 71
This was the last time the President addressed Congress on
the subject of disunion.
aspects of his policy

In this last message he stressed two
w'llck

in~he

was consistent

~rom

the beginning,

that Congress or the people should find some satisfactory
'I

,. "

•

68.
69.
70.
71.

Richardson, J. D., 2£.
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. compromise, and that any forceful measures were for the
Congress to prescribe and outside the province of the
Executive.

In closing his message of January 8, 1861, the

President expressed sentiments prophetic of the avalanche
of criticism to be loosed upon him.

He said:

In conclusion it may be permitted to me to remark that I
have often warned my countrymen of the dangers which now
surround us. This may be the last time I shall refer to
the subject officially. I feel that my duty has been
faithfully, tho~gh it may be imperfectly, performed, and,
whatever the result may be, I shall carry to my grave the
consciousness that I at least meant well for my country.62

'r

t.
I
•

t

"

,-

)

,

..
,
J.
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CHAPTER VI

..

THE HAYNE MISSION AND THE END OF THE BUCHANAN ADMINISTRAT ION
The attempt through the "Star o:f the west" to rein:force Fort
Sumter marked the highest point of Buchanan's "aggressive"
defensive policy.

.

.'

Major Anderson, because o:f hesitancy

and overcaution, and a sincere aversion to initiating a
civil war, played into the hands of the South Carolina
authorities when he made the truce with the Governor. l
di:fficulty of the Fort Sumter situation was that time
the side of the South Carolinians.

The
W.~SON

Although military pre-

parations had been in progress in the harbor since the

..
.
.

I

~

.

,

occupation of Sumter by Anderson, the South Carolina military
power was very slight at the time Anderson made the truce.
On January I, the South Carolinians had on :Morris Island
only three 24-pounders, manned by a :force that had probably
never seen a 24-pounder manipulated or fired. 2 It was all
important for South Carolina to have time to erect batteries

,

.

..

and strengthen the forts taken over from the Federal
Government, while the small Federal force in Fort Sumter was
isolated

,

.

a~d

without rein:forcements.

The President, writing in 1866, said that Major Anderron
probably had committed an error in making the truce, that

•

•

1.
2.

a

See page 85 •
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under the laws of war it might be annulled after due notice
to Governor Pickens; but it would cast a serious reflection
on Major Anderson for having concluded it, although he,
beyond question, had acted from the purest and most patriotic

'.

-

j

motives."3

In this connection it is interesting to refer to

the communication to Anderson from Secretary of War Holt on

\

January 16, 1861.

-.,. ,

signated the firing on the "Star of the West U as "an act of

,

Holt stated that Anderson rightly de-

war", and had it been perpetrated by a foreign nation, it
would have been "your imperative duty to have resented it
with the whole force of your batteries"; but as it was the

,

work of the Government of South Carolina, which must still be

I

t

considered a member of the Union, and was prompted by the

,
I'

passions of citizens of the United States, his forbearance
to return the fire was fully approved by the President. 4 But
note the responsiblity of Major Anderson for a return to the
non-reinforcement policy.

,

;

In the same letter Holt stated

that, from Anderson's late dispatches, the Government was
relieved of the apprehensions previously entertained for his
safety, and therefore it was not the Government's purpose

,

,

at present to reinforce him.

"The attempt to do sort, said

Holt, "would, no doubt, be attended by a collision of arms
and the effusion of blood - a national calamity which the
,

,

President is most anxious, if possible, to avoid."5

From

this point on, Major Anderson must share a large part of the
responsibility for his own discomfiture.
,
c

,\
,I

.
•

4.
5.

Official Records, vol. 1, p. 140.

Ibid.

He was told in the
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same letter that whe,never.. in his judgment .. additional supplies
-

"

or reinforcements were necessary for his safety .. or for a
Successful defense of the fort .. he was to communicate the
fact at once to the War Department, and a prompt and vigorous
effort would be made to forward them. 6
secretary of State Black, impatient at the turn events
were taking, on the same day as Holt's letter to Anderson,
addressed a long letter to General Scott.

In this letter

Judge Black expressed a fear that the old policy of inaction
was to be resumed.
1.

•c

"Is it the duty of the Government to reinforce Major

Anderson?"

~

'"

·

2.

~rIf

yes .. how soon is it necessary that those

reinforcements should be there?"

t

·

He asked General Scott three questions;

.
I

3. "vVhat obstacles exist

to prevent the sending of such reinforcements at any time
when it may be necessary to do sJl7 'Judge Black said that
it then seemed to be settled that Major Anderson and his
command at Fort Sumter were not to be withdrawn.

But if

the troops remained in Fort Sumter without any change in their
condition, and the hostile attitude of South Carolina remained the same, the question of surrender was one of time
,

,

only.

"If he is not to be relieved", asked Judge Black .. "is

it not entirely clear that he should be ordered to surrender
at once?"

· .'

.

He urged that relief be sent at once before it was
too late to save him. 8 Black asked for an immediate reply
from Scott .. but it seems that he never received one. 9
6.

7.
8.
9.
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Crawford .. .212..~. p. 237.
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-t

It was just three days before Secretary of State Black's
questions were put to General Scott that South Carolina's
envoy, I. W. Hayne, arrived in Washington, accompanied by
Lieut. Hall, Major Anderson's messenger.

They arrived on

January 13, and on the next morning, January 14, Hayne called
upon the President and stated that he would deliver the
Governor's letter on the following day.

The President,

"admonished by his recent experience with the former
•

commissioners", declined to hold any conversation with h1m
on the subject of his mission, and requested that all communications between them might be in writing. lO The President
suspected that the message contained a demand for the

.-

,

surrender of Fort Sumter, "which he was at all times prepared
peremptorily to reject."
•

The President expected that the

j

letter would be transmitted to him on the following day, that
he would refuse to surrender the fort, and the truce would
be terminated, leaving both parties free to act as each saw
fit.ll
On January 16, Senator C. C. Clay, of Alabama, called
upon the President on behalf of a group of Senators from
"

seceding States.

He mentioned the fact that there had been

a truce agreed on so long as Hayne was in Washington, to

,

.

which the President agreed.

The President was told that

these Senators wanted Hayne to remain a few days while they
submitted through him a proposition to the Government of
10.
11.

L
,

Buchanan, James,
Ibid.

£E. £li. p.

196.

,
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South Carolina, suggesting that the latter agree that
Major Anderson should be placed in his former position;
which meant that he was not to be treated as under siege;
that his Government might have free access to him, and he

,i
I

..

.

"'
'

j)

could buy all the provisions he wanted in Charleston.

He

should not be disturbed if the President would not send

~.

him additional reinforcements.

Senator Clay went on to

suggest that the truce, already effected and confirmed by
the President, might be extended till the 4th of March. 12
The President made it clear that the truce would last only
until Hayne left Washington, and that no proposition could
.

~,

I

be entertained unless it was presented in writing.

The

last sentence of Buchanan's memorandum on this interview)
made it clear that he "could not, and would not, withdraw
Major Anderson from Fort Sumter.,,13

,

This action on the part

of the seceding Senators was an attempt to forestall any
action on the part of South Carolina until the Southern Confederate Government had been organized, when the controversy
regarding possession of the Charleston forts would be made

,

a part of a more comprehensive programme of "taking over".
Nearly all the cotton States seceded in January.

It was

expected that the Confederate Government would be instituted
in a few weeks, and to that Government Jefferson Davis was
anxious to leave the settlement of the Charleston harbor
controversy.

12.

13 •.

f

Davis wrote to Governor Pickens after Hayne had

Curtis,~.
~,

p.

£!i. vol. 2, PP. 452, 453.

54.

Buchanan's memorandum.

,
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arrived in Washington:

t
f

.,

The opinion of your friends • • • is adverse to the
presentation of a demand for the evacuation of Fort Sumter.
The little garrison in its present position presses
on nothing but a point of pride, and to you I need not say
that war is made up of real elements. Your friends here
think that you can well afford to stand still, so far as
the presence of' the garrison is concerned, a nd if things
continue as they are for a month, we shall then be in
a co~!tion to speak with a voice which all must hear and
heed.
The above was written on January 20, just a week after
Hayne had arrived in Washington, and after the seceding
Senators had conferred and agreed on a plan of delayed
action.

,

,

Just a week before, January 13, the day Hayne

arrived in Washington, but of whose mission Davis had only
a vague idea, the latter's letter to Pickens was quite

•

different in tone.

Davis had written to Pickens on January 13:

I cannot place any confidence in the adherence of the
administration to a fixed line of policy. The general
tendency is to hostile measures, and against these it is
needful for you to prepare. I take it for granted that
.the time allowed to the garrison of Fort Sumter has been
diligently employed by yourselves, so that before you
could be driven out of your earthworks you will be able
to capture the fort which commands them.
. i

Let us compare the letter of January 13 with that of January 20,
and we can agree that Davis expected the Hayne mission to tie
up any action on the part of the Government, and in this he
was supported by the President's own views.

If Hayne could

be kept in Washington, the truce would remain in effect,
Davis could trust in a "fixed line of policy", the Charleston

'."

.

batteries would be strengthened, and the Confederate Government

!

't
\

·'f

~

\
r
It

14.
15.
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would be a Going concern, able to cooperate with South
Carolina, while the Government's position, and that of
the garrison in Fort Sumter, would be growing daily weaker.
On January 15, Senators Louis T. Wigfall, John Hemphill,

D. L. Yulee, S. R. Mallory, Jefferson Davis, C. C. Clay,
Benjamin Fitzpatrick, A. Iverson, John Slidell and J. P.
Benjamin had addressed their note to Hayne, asking him to
defer presenting the South Carolina Governor's letter to
the President. 16
They said they had assurances that
Sumter was held with no hostile purpose, but "merely as
property of the United States".

They went on to say that

they represented States which had already seceded fram the
United States, or would have done so before February 1, and
"'

(

~

those States would meet with South Carolina in convention
before li'ebruary 15.

Then, flour people feel that they have

a common destiny with your people, and expect to form with
them in that convention, a new confederation and provisional
, 1

government.

We must and will share your fortunes - suffering

with you the evils of war, if it cannot be avoided, and
enjoying with you the blessings of peace it if can be preserved.
We therefore trust that an arrangement will be agreed upon
between you and the President, at least till the 15th of
February next, by which time your and our States may in con-

.,

vention devise a Wise, just, and peaceable solution of existing
difficulties.
16.

,

If not clothed with power to make such an

Ib,ld, p. 220, Official Records, vol. 1, p. 149.

,

,

,
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\

arrangement, then we trust that you will submit our suggest -

tions to the Governor of your State for his instructions."17
They added that, of course, until Hayne had received his
reply and communicated it to the President, South Carolina
would not attack Fort Sumter, and the President would not
reinforce it. 18 They urged, too, that South Carolina should
allow Major Anderson to obtain necessary supplies of food,
fuel or water, and enjoy free communication with the President,

'~ )

all of which had been prohibited or seriously curtailed,
upon the understanding that the President would not send
reinforcements during the same period. 19
Hayne replied to the Senators on January 17, saying that

,/'
';

!JI

he had no power to make the arrangement referred to, but
that he agreed to withhold the presentation of the Governor's
letter pending further instructions. 20 On the 19th of January
the correspondence between the Senators and Hayne was sub-

I

mitted to the PreSident, accompanied by a note from three of

f

1

the Senators asking him to take the subject under consideration.
The President's answer made through his Secretary of War, on
January 22,21

..

stated that the President refused to enter into

the proposed agreement.

The Senators were told that they

did Mr. Buchanan no more than justice when to Hayne they had
said: "Notwithstanding the circumstances under which Major
Anderson left Fort Moultrie and entered Fort Sumter with the
forces under his command, it was not taken, and is not held,
\

~'

.

,:

17. Nicolay and Hay, ££.
18.
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21.
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with any hostile or unf'riendly purpose towards your state,

f

but merely as property of the United States, which the

1 -,
\

1

President deemed it his duty to protect and preserve. ff22
The same words had been used in the reply to the South

\
,)

Carolina commissioners.

The Secretary further declared

that as to the proposition of Hayne, that no reinforcements
"

~

.

i

,

t)

,

.

would be sent to Fort Sumter in the interval, and that the
public peace would not be disturbed by any act of hostility
towards South Carolim, it was impossible for him to give
any such assurances; the President had no power to enter into
such an engagement.

But further, flat the present moment

it is not deemed necessary to reinforce Major Anderson, be-

,

cause he makes no such request, and feels quite secure in

'd

his position.

Should his safety, however, require rein-

forcements, every effort will be made to supply them. "23

The

" I

secretary expressed his pleasure at Hayne's assurance that

I

Major Anderson was then receiving all necessary suppliesfrom Charleston, and hoped that he would continue to do so.
, !

Yet in a report to the War Department of the same date as the
above, Maj6r Anderson asked that he be sent through Leiut.
Hall some tlthin ruled note paper, with envelopes".

Being

"

cut off from Charleston, he could not procure "those indispensable articles.,,24
On the next day, January 29, seven of the seceding
(I.

Senators again addressed Hayne, enolosing him a copy of
22.
23.
24.
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Secretary Holt's reply and again asking him to withhold the
Governor's letter unt1l he had further 1nstruot1ons.

They

-'-f

,.,\

\,

.)

,

expressed the hope that South Carol1na would take no step
tend1ng to produce a collis1on unt11 their States should join
the1r counsels w1th hers. 25 In his reply to th1s note,
Hayne took advantage of both the Pres1dent's and Holt's
declarat10n that Fort Sumter was held and protected as merely
property.

He gave an argument on purely a property bas1s,

say1ng that South Caro11na would acorn the appropr1at1on of
another's property without paying for it to the last dollar.
He adv1sed that holding the fort by Un1ted States troops was
"

'(I

I

the worst poss1ble means of protect1ng it as "property".26

-. ,

Later developments were to prove h1m correct in the latter

. ,)

observation.
After a rather long and repetitious exchange of correspon-

" f

dence among the several parties concerned, Hayne, at last,

I

received the reply of the Governor of South Carolina, on
January 30, and on the next day, January 31, transmitted the
reply to the President. 27 The Governor's letter was dated

" j

January 12, the day Hayne left Charleston, and Hayne transmitted it with a long letter of h1s own to the President. 28

"

,',

'~"

The Governor's long-delayed letter read as follows:
At the t1me of the separation of the State of South
Carolina from the United States, Fort Sumter was, and still
is, in the possession of the troops of the United States,
under the command of Major Anderson. I regard that .
possession as not consistent with the dignity or safety
25.
26.
27.
28.
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of the State of South Carolina, and have this day
addressed to Major Anderson a communication to obtain
possession of that fort by the authorities of this
State. The reply of Major Anderson informs me that he
has no authority to do what I required, but he desires
a reference of the demand to the President of the
United States. Under the circumstances now existing,
and which need no comment from me, I have deter~ined to
sand to you Hon. I. W. Hayne, the Attorney-General of
the Btate of South Carolina, and have instructed him to
demand the delivery of Fort Sumter. In the harbor of
Charleston, to the constituted authorities of South
Carolina. The demand I have made of Major Anderson, and
which I now make of you, is suggested by my earnest
desire to avoid the bloodshed which a persistence in
your attempt to retain possession of that fort will .cause,
and which will be unavailing to secure to you that
possession, but induce a calamity most deeply to be deplored. If consequences so unhappy shall ~nsue, I will
secure for this State, in the demand which I now make,
the satisfaction of having exhausted every attempt to
avoid it.29
The last paragraph of the letter emphasized the purely
proprietary aspect of the demand, for which view there had

\

.j

been some support given by the President's statements.
I •
,

j

I
I

: I

On

this point the Governor continued:
In relation to the public property of the United States
within Fort Sumter, the Hon. I. W. Hayne, who will hand
you this communication, is authorized to give you the
pledge of the State that the valuation of such property
will be accounted for by this State, upon the adjustment
of its 38lations with the United States, of which it was
a part.

II

To this letter the President gave an answer through the
Secretary of War, February 6, 1861. The Secretary of War
went over the whole ground of the correspondence exchanged
on the subject of Hayne's mission, and gave a very able
and thorough argument against the claims advanced by the
Governor and Hayne. 3l
,J

1

The reply was too long for full

29. ·eu:rtis, .£l2.. £li. vol. 2, p. 456.
30. Curtis,.2.£. £li. vol. 2, p.I 456.

31.
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.
"

quotation in this paper, but it definitely corrected the
impression that the demand for the surrender of the fort
was to be made on a purely proprietary basis.

'. I

•

.
,)

'.

•

')

Hayne had

referred, in one of his communications to the President,
to the right of "eminent domain" possessed by South Carolina.
Said the Secretary of War:
The title of the United States to Fort Sumter is complete
and incontestable. Were its interest in this property
purely proprietary, in the ordinary acceptation of the term,
it might, probably, be subjected to the exercise of the
right of eminent domain; but it has also political relations
to it, of a much higher and more imposing character than
those of mere proprietorship. It has absolute jurisdiction
over the fort and the soil on which it stands • • • South
Carolina can no more assert the right of eminent domain
over Fort Sumter than Maryland can assert it over the
District of Columbia. The political and proprietary rights
of the United States in either case rest upon precisely
the same grounds. 32
Holt added that the President was relieved from the necessity
of further pursuing that phase of the subject, whatever might

. t

J

,

be the claim of South Carolina to the fort, as he had no
constitutional power to cede or surrender it. 33

Holt stated

that it could not be a menace to the safety of Charleston
and South Carolina, as the garrison was acting under orders
to act strictly on the defensive; that South Carolina must
well know that she could receive nothing but shelter fram
its guns, unless, in the absence of all provocation, she
should assault it and seek its destruction. 34 The Secretary
quoted Jefferson Davis and the other seceding Senators, in
their letter to Hayne of January 15, to counter the argument
of the Governor that the fort was a menace to the safety of
South Carolina: "It is not held with any hostile or unfriendly
32.
33.
34.
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purpose towards your State, but merely as property of the
1,

.
f

\

I

\

,)

,

f

,

,

I

United States, which the President deems it his duty to
protect and preserve".35

In conclusion the Secretary

declared:
If, with all the multiplied proofs which exist of the
President's anxiety for peace and of the earnestness
with which he has pursued it, the authorities of that
State shall assault Fort Sumter and peril the lives of
the handful of brave and loyal men shut up within its
walls., and thus plunge our common country into the horrors
of civil war, then upon them, and them alone., must rest
the responsibility.36
In a letter dated February 7, but which the President
has said addressed to him on February 8, Hayne gave what
the President considered an insulting reply., flnot to
Secretary Holt, as usage and common civility required, but
directly to the President".37

\,

Hayne commenced his letter by

)

saying that he was constrained to correct some t'strange misapprehensions into which your Secretary has fallen tl • 38 The
f

reply was a very bitter denunciation of the Govermnent's
I

\

policy., and contained a flat denial of the Secretary's

I

, (

1!

inplied charge that Hayne had
of the Governor.

~odified

the original demand

Said Hayne:

You next attempt to ridicule the proposal as simply an
offer on the part of South Carolina to buy Fort Sumter and
contents as property of the United States., sustained by a
declaration, in effect., that if she is not permitted to
make the purchase, she will seize the fort by force of arms.
It is difficult to consider this as other than intentional
misconstruction. 39
Then Hayne delivered a rather astute argument when he referred
to the point of the President's former declaration that the
fort was held as public property:
\~

I,

!,

-

35.
36.
37.
38.
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/
It was precisely because you had yourself chosen to place
your action upon the ground of 'purely proprietary' right,
that the proposal of compensation was made, and you admit
that in this view 'it (Fort Sumter) would probably be
subjected to t he exercise of the right of eminent domain.
In your letter of yesterday (through your Secretary) you
shift your position. You claim that your Government bears
to Fort Sumter 'political relations of a much higher and
more imposing character,.40
Hayne's letter was returned to him on the same day,

addressed to Charleston, with the following indorsement by the
President: liThe character of this letter is such that it
cannot be received.

Col. Hayne having left the city before

it was sent to the President, it is returned to him by the
,'" 41
first mail.
'
Although Hayne failed in his immediate mission, the
seceding Senators had scored a success in their policy of
delay.

Hayne was kept in Washington from January 13 to

February 7, during which time,by the President's own admission,
the status quo in Charleston harbor was to be maintained, unilaterally only, while the South Carolinians were free to prepare
to take the fort.

Also, by February 7, the Confederate

Government was well on the way to being instituted.

Seven

States had now seceded, and shortly before Hayne had left
Washington, a meeting of delegates was held at Montgomery,
Alabama, to form a provisional Government for the Southern
(

Confederacy.

The provisional government was soon formed and
in operation. 42 By the 18th of February, Jefferson Davis

had been inaugurated as President, and the new Government
40.
41.
42.
43.
(
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was put into operation. 43

, ..

The forts in Charleston harbor

were no longer a subject for negotiation between the Federal
Government and South Carolina, for the Confederacy had taken
over the matter.
In addition to Major Anderson's truce, which the President
had respected, a nd which had precluded the reinforcement of
of Fort Sumter for several weeks, there was yet another event
which, in the mind of the President, amounted to a truce.
This was the Peace Convention, which had been instituted under
the auspices of the General Assembly of Virginia.

Now, on

February 4, just a day or two before the Anderson truce and
the Hayne mission ended, this Peace Convention assembled in
Washington.

It was presided over by the ex-President John

Tyler, and had many distinguished names among its delegates.
The Convention was seriously weakened by the refusal of the
seven States of the lower South to send delegates, as well as
the failure to do so on the part of Arkansas, Michigan,
Wisconsin, Minnesota, California, and Oregon. 44 The Convention
delib,erated until February 27, when it presented to Congress a
plan of conciliation, involving seven amendments to the
Constltution, very similar to those of the abortive Crittenden
plan.

The plan received but negligible support when brought

to a vote in the Senate on March 2.

Even the Virginia leaders

repudiated the plan of the Convention.
Thus, as the President has said, this Peace Convention "had
\

,

,

43.
44.
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Randall, ~ G., ££. £!l. p. 204.
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,

,

r '

'r
(

interposed another insurmountable obstacle to the reinforce-

( ,

\ ..

ment of Fort Sumter, unless attacked or in immediate danger
of attack, without entirely defeating this beneficent
measure".45

Thus, knowing the President's paramount desire

that some plan of compromise might be effected to insure a
peaceful settlement of the crisis, and in the light of his
w •

own statement above, it is logical to consider the Peace
Convention with the same force of a truce as the truce made

I
J

'
.,'

by Major Anderson.

This view is supported"

in a measure,

by a dispatch from the Secretary of War to Major Anderson,
February 23.

In this dispatch, the Secretary reminded

i'j

Anderson that he still held Fort Sumter as he had helf Fort
,

I

.

Moultrie, under the orders given him by Major Buell,
December 11, and as subsequently modified by the instructions

«

,

#

•

,.

,

.

.

.

,

1-

\

•
f

f

of December 21.

Anderson was to continue to act strictly on

the defensive, and was encouraged and advised as follows:
A dispatch received in this city a few days since from
Governor Pickens, connected with the declaration on the
part of those convened at Montgomery, clamining to act on
behalf of South Carolina as well as the other seceded
States, that the question of the possession of the forts
and other public property therein had been taken from the
decision of the individual States and would probably be
preceded in its settlement by negotiation with the '
Government of the United States, has impressed the President
with a belief that there will be no immediate attack on
Fort Sumter, and the hope is indulged in that wise and
patriotic counsels may prevail and prevent it altogether •
The labors of the Peace Congress have not yet closed, and
the presence of that body here adds another to the powerful
motives already existing for the adoption of every measure,
except in necessary self-defense, for avoiding a collision
with the forces that surround you. 46
45.
46.
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Thus, from January 13 to almost the end of the Buchanan
administration, the President had considered his hands tied

•
•

in the matter of reinforcements.

Yet, they would probably

have been sent even during the Peace Convention had there

I

been an attack or danger of attack.
It must be noticed, to the credit of the Buchanan
administration, that on January 30, the President was taking

It, '

measures to reinforce in case of need.

'
t .'

J .
1

t.'

On

Janu~ry

30, the

day before he had received the demand of Governor Pickens
for the surrender of Fort Sumter, the President had requested
the Secretaries of War and the Navy, accompanied by General

f

,

Scott, to meet him for the purpose od devising the best

.

"

,.

practicable means of "instantly reinforcing Major Anderson,
should this be required tr • 47 After several consultations
an expedition for that purpose was quietly prepared at
New York, under the direction of Secretary Toucey, the command

I

of which was intrusted to the Secretary's intimate friend,

,

Commander Ward.
\

,

)

The expedition consisted of a few small

steamers, and it was arranged that on receiving a telegram
from the Secretary of the Navy, in case of an emergency,
the Commander, in the course of the following night, should
set sail for Charleston,

·,

He was to enter the harbor in the
night and anchor under the guns of Fort Sumter. 48 Again it

f

must be noticed that Major ..Anderson's changed opinion on
reinforcement contributed in large measure to the Government's
•

•

'...

'

policy at this time.
47.
48.
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President was arranging for the expedition to relieve him

I

..

in case of an emergency, Anderson was writing to the War
Department, hoping "that no attempt will be made by our

....

friends to throw supplies in; their doing so would do more

,(

harm than good". 49
Another attempt to form a plan of relief for Major
Anderson had been undertaken by General Scott.

Early in

January, soon after the"Star of the Vlestllfiasco, Captain
I;

,

,

'.

G. V. Fox submitted a plan in writing to a friend of
General Scott, to whom it was shown and approved. 50

The Fox

plan was to place troops and provisions on board a large
1 •

'I

)

steamer, preferably the Baltic, whiCh was to carry three
hundred extra sailors and enough armed launches to land all
the troops in one night.

The whole was to be convoyed by

the United States sloop of war, the Pawnee, the only avail'"

I

•

able steam vessel north of the Gulf of Mexico.
were to be run at night by the tugs. 5l

The batteries

On February 4,

General Scott summoned Fox to Washington.

The plan was dis-

f\
, (

,

cussed in the presence of Major Anderson's messenger, Lieut.
Hall, who had accompanied Hayne and was still in Washington.
The plan was approved by Scott on February 7, and he agreed

.

.

, I

to present it to the President that evening.

Fox's plan

was turned down. for the time in deference to the Peace
Convention. 52 According to the President's statement, it was
49.
50.
51.
52.
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learned a few days after the termination of Major Anderson's
truce that Governor Pickens had determined to respect the

'.

appeal made to him by the General Assembly of Virginia, and

,

I
<

to retrain from attacking the fort during the session of the

'

Peace Convention. 53
The story of President Buchanan's policy regarding Fort
\I;

I

Sumter would not be complete without a word or so about the
Fort Pickens truce.

At Pensacola, Florida, there was a

large navy yard, and near it, on the mainland,Fort Barrancas
with a nominal garrison of 46 men under Lieut. A. J. Slemmer;
1 ,.

also there was Fort McRae, occupied by an ordnance sergeant
only, and Fort Pickens, entirely unoccupied. 54 On January 3,

-\

General Scott sent a written order to Slemmer to take
measures to prevent the seizure of either- of the forts in
Pensacola Harbor by surprise or assault.

"

I

•

Slemmer received

the order on January 9 and immediately started the occupation
of Fort Pickens,

comp.~ting his move on January 11.55 On
~

January 21, orders were given by the Assistant Adjutant-General

,.

for the sloop of war Brooklyn" to be provisioned and loaded
with troops,w.ith sealed orders for Captain Vogdes, not to be
opened until the ship was at sea. 56 The sealed orders directed
Captain Vogdes to reinforce Fort Pickens, of which he would
become the commander, as well as of other forts which it
might be in his power to occupy and defend with the cooperation

<

53.
54.
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56.

•

<
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of any naval commanders at hand.

,

,

The company was to be first
landed to cover the supplies intended for the fort. 57 In a
postscript Vogdes was given to understand 'that he was not to
attempt any reoccupation or recapture involving hostile
collision, but to confine himself strictly to the defensive. 58
But it seems that representations from ex-president Tyler,

f,

I

Senator Mallory, and others, prevailed on the President to
change the plan of reinforcing Fort Pickens. 59

On the 28th

of January, Senators Slidell, Hunter, and Bigler received a

I

telegram from Senator Mallory, who had gone to Pensacola to
.. I

>

..

I

\

inspect the situation.

Mallory asked them to present the
telegram to the President. 60 ~~llory reported:
We hear the "Brooklyn" is coming with reinforcements for
Fort Pickens. No attack on its garrison is contemplated,
but, on the contrary, we desire to keep the peace, and if
the present status be preserved we will guarantee that no
attack will be made upon it, but if reinforcements be
attempted, resistance and a bloody confl~ct seem inevitable •
Should the Government thus attempt to augment its forcewhen no possible call for it exists; when we are preserving
a peaceful policy-an assualt may be made upon the fort at a
moment's warning. Our whole force - 1,800 strong - will
regard it. as a hostile act. Impress this upon the President,
and urge that the inevitable consequence of reinforcement
under ~resent circumstances is instant war, as peace will
be preserved if no reinforcements be attempted. ol

The peaceful intent, barring reinforcements, expressed by

'.

Mallory, is hard to reconcile with the fact that already the
navy yard had been demanded by Florida authorities and
surrendered. 62 Mallory1s telegram was dated the 28th, and on

•

j

I.
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,.

the 29th of January the Secretaries of War and the Navy sent
a joint order to the officers responsible at Pensacola.

The

.(

assurances of Senator Mallory were believed, Fort Pickens
would not be assaulted, so "you are instructed not to land
L»

.

the company on board the Brooklyn unless said fort shall be
attacked or preparations shall be made for its attack.

The

provisions necessary for the supply of the fort you will
land. "53

But the "Brooklyn') and other vessels were. to reamin

and the officers were to exercise the utmost vigilance and

I

be prepared to land the company at a moment's warning. They
were to instantly repel an attack on the fort. 54 This has
been considered as a truce, but the time limit was indefinite.
I

I

.~

--(\

The Anderson truce ended when Hayne left Washington.

The

secessionists claimed that the Pickens truce was still in
e·ffect when the Lincoln administration was inaugurated.
Buchanan has stated his reasons for the trude.
carefully considered Senator Mallory's proposal".

He
The Brooklyn

might not arrive in time for the protection of the fort.

\

Besides, he thought a collision would be fatal to the Virginia
Peace Convention, about to assemble.

But the fort was badly

I,

in need of provisions, and these must flat every hazard" be
supplied. 55

The President later claimed that the decision

reached was with the approbation of every member of the Cabinet,
I

but in a letter in July, 1861, Secretary Stanton declared that
the order was opposed by himself, Black, and Dix. 66 General
i

f

63. Official Records, vol. 1, p. 355.
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ScottI in a later report to Lincoln# severely condemned the
Pickens truce# and said the armistice was consequent upon
the meeting of the Peace Convention# and was understood to
end with it.67

Scott denied that he had approved the truce

or the joint order of the Secretaries establishing it.

This

claim must have been a result of defective memory, for

~

I

(.

Secretary Holt# in a letter to Buchanan, declared that Scott
was shown the order and said that he could see no objection
to it. 68 Thus the Buchanan administration ended on March 4,

-,

1861# after having "muddled through" one of the most critical
periods in the history of the nation.

The key to the policy

throughout the four months of the secession threat was,
\

without doubt# the overwhelming desire to avoid ,war at almost
>

any cost, and to cling to any hopeI even the faintest# of
saving the Union without a civil war.
There has been written a mass of criticism, favorable
and unfavorable, of Buchanan's course.

Many reasons and

theories have been advanced to explain his conduct of the
crisis.
,

A Democratic anti-secessionist candidate for the

I

qpvernorship of Tennessee, in a campaign speech delivered an

t

extremely condemnatory opinion of Buchanan.
,

.

very common opinion of Union men immediately after Buchanan's
retirement, it is worthy of quotation.
March 23, 1861:

,,.

,

I

As this was a

67.
68.
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Said Parson Brownlow,
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1

\.
i

"

The late Chief Magistrate, James Buchanan, was inaugurated into office under auspices of general peace and
prosperity, -- strong in the confidence of a might, united,
and triumphant Democracy. Possessed of every aid and
inducement to an hontest, a patriotic, a brilliant, and
a vigorous and successful administration of the Government,
he has retired from power amid general execration and
disgrace, carrying into his retirement the offioial brand
of public condemnation upon his forenead, and leaving to
history, as the only trophies of his administration, the
national treasury depleted, the country loaded with an
incubus of debt, that great national and conservative party,
to whose generous and confiding suffrages he owes all
his fortunes, demoralized and dismembered, and perpetuity
of the republic a doubtful and an appalling problem, and
his own name a by-word of infamy and derision throughout
the civilized world. 69
The same opinion as the above has been expressed by many
historians with a Northern viewpoint.

The charge has been

frequently made that Buchanan's policy was strained in the
"skim-milk of apology", that it had no backbone in it, and
that the secessionists who came to Washington to negotiate
with the Government should have been arrested as traitors
instead of being encouraged by official welcome. 70
The frequent charge that Buchanan was senile and in his
dotage, incapable of meeting the heavy responsibilities of
office, must have an element of truth in it, but has been
probably overemphasized.

In a letter to a correspondent of

New York, on December 20, 1860, the President stated that he
had never enjoyed better health nor a more tranquil spirit
than during the past year.

He said that all his troubles bad

not cost him an.hourls sleep or a single meal, though he
trusted he had a just sense of his high responsibility. "I
69. Brownlow, W. G., Sketches of the Rise, pro~ess, and
Decline of Secession. Philadelphia, George w. hIlds Co.,
1862, p. 232.
70. Schoulder, 22. £!1. vol. 5, p. 472.
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weigh well and prayerfully", he said, "what course I ought
to adopt and adhere to it steadily, leaving the result to
Providence".7l

W. H. Trescot, the Assistant Secretary of

State during some of Buchanan's most trying months, and
very much in his confidence, has left his opinion of the
President, written in February, 1861.

Said Trescot of

Buchanan:
He therefore diplomatized with those whose action he
could not entirely stay. He promised not to force an
issue, to refer to Congress, and in this policy he perservered even in the face of General Cass' resignation.
But the issue came nevertheless, and Major Anderson's
move to Sumter placed it sharp and sudden before the
country. Now this policy of delay and compromise and
reference was Mr. Buchanan's, not his Cabinet's - it was
conducted without the intervention of his Northern
members, and in private consultations with his Southern not exactly in official pledges, but in conversations
with Southern members of Congress - in adopting suggestions from Floyd and Thompson - and keeping up indirect
communications with those in authority in South Carolina.
When Anderson's conduct made the issue, official action
was necessary. Mr. Buchanan had to take his choice
between two courses, to sustain him or condemn him. The
conduct of his officer was in direct contradiction to the
whole undercurrent of his policy. • • He surrendered intQ
the hands of the North and refused to withdraw Anderson. 72
Trescot went on to assign a selfish motive for Buchanan's
policy.

His opinion was tllat Buchanan could not bring himself

to take decisive measures in Lincoln's interestj that while
he was anxious.to preserve the Union, his secret sympathy

.

was with the South, and in his heart he felt that their protest was his defense.

The Black Republican triumph was one

especially over him, taking from him his State of

Penn~ylvan1a,

71. Curtis, QR. cit. vol. 2, pp. 354, 355.
72. Hunt, GaITla"I='d:; ed., ff Narra t i ve and Le t te r of William
Henry Trescot", 2l!.. ill. p. 548.
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and they had held him up tu scorn by the famous Covode
investigation.

According to Trescot, Buchanan had no

objection to see the storm rage if it stopped short of
shipwreck, to see the Black Republicans broken to pieces
in the very flush of their insolent triumph and a reaction
sweep over the North and float the old Democracy to power
in 1864. 73
Buchanan, in his defense, charged with truth that much
of his dilemma was the result of the persistent refusal of
Congress to pass laws to increase

military forces, and

th~

to authorize him to take the necessary measures.

The Congress

that met in December was hostile to the administration and
not inclined to help the President.

Buchanan has charged

that "Congress positively refused to pass a law conferring
on the President's authority to call forth the militia, or
accept the services of volunteers, to suppress insurrections
which might occur in any State against the Government of
the United States".74

He further stated that this ammission,

which ought to have been supplied, was allowed to continue
until after the end of his administration, and was remedied
only on the 29th of July, 1861, when Congress conferred the
necessary power on Lincoln. 75 Buchanan's Secretary of State,
Judge Black, has made the same charge.

In a letter to Henry

Wilson Black charged that the Republicans refused to increase

73.
74.
75.
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the military forces.

"iNhy?"1 Black asked; "you must have

desired the Union cause to be disgraced and defeated l for
nothing else could have resulted from such a war as you now
abuse Mr. Buchanan for not making.

You and your party in

Congress • • • did not recommend peace l nor offer your support
to war. "76
As bas. been noted before l the failure of the administration
to reinforce

M~or

Anderson after the Cabinet crisis of

December 30, must be in a large degree charged to the responsibility of Major Anderson.

It may be that the Government's

policy up to that time had demoralized Anderson l and thoroughly
convinced him that a collision of arms would be the inevitable
result of reinforcement.

In factI there is a letter written

by Anderson, on April 51 1861 1 to a woman sympathizer in
New York, in which he admits his responsibility for the failure
of reinforcement after the Floyd resignation.

Major Anderson

wrote as follows:
. Justice l however l compels me not to stop here l but to
take upon myself the blame of the Government's not having
sent to my ruscue. Had I demanded reinforcements while
Mr. Holt was in the War Department I know that he would
have dispatched them at all hazards, I did not ask for them,
because I knew that the moment it should be known here
that additional troops were coming, they would assault me
and thus inaugurate civil war. My policy, feeling - thanks
be to God - secure for the present in my stronghold l was to
keep stil11 to preserve peace l to give time for the quieting
of the excitement, which was at one time very high throughput this region, in the hope of avoiding bloodshed. The
ladies must not then blame the latter part of Mr. Buchanan's
administration, nor the present one l for not having sent me
reinforcements. I demanded them under Mr. Floyd. T~~ time
when they might have been sent has passed weeks agg.
In the same letter Anderson expressed the hope that the seceding
States, leaving the Union as friends l might at some future

76.
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time be won back by conciliation and justice. 78
Historians of the present day tend to judge Buchanan
with more tolerance and pronounce a more favorable and
unprejudiced opinion.

A recent study of the period under

investigation concludes that Buchanan's motives, at any rate,
were of the best, and that unless one begs the question with
\

,

the assumption that his basic policy of peace toward the
South was invalid, it is hard to find many mistakes in the
measures that he actually took.

He did avert war for a time,

giving the various compromise efforts a chance to develop,
and offering the incoming administration an opportunity to
work out its own schemes of conciliation, should that be the
intention.

Avoiding any recognition of the Confederacy,

Buchanan made no commitments that would seriously embarrass
his successor. 79
A very thorough study of Buchanan and his Cabinet on the
eve of secession has been made by Dr. Philip G. Auchampaugh,
who came to the conclusion that Buchanan had every reason to
congratulate himself on the success of his policy.

According

to the writer, Buchanan's main aim, to give things a peaceful
direction, to prevent the opening of a brothers' war, had been
accomplished.

At the same time, Buchanan had held his Northern

Cabinet members together, save one, thus preventing the disintegration of his administration.

No official recogn1tion

had been given the seceded States, so that his successor was
under no commitment in that regard.

Some Federal property

had been taken, but other pointshad been reinforced.

78.

79.
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had been left unturned to promote measures of compromise
that would be fair to all concerned.

The public was rapidly

becoming qui~ed and reconciled to the idea that the Union

"

could be saved without civil war.
~

.

The President had also

escaped the pitfalls of the Republicans, by standing firmly
on his constitutional prerogatives, both in dealing with

,

,I

Congress a nd the Southern States.

Few men, thought Dr.

Auchampaugh, beset by so many chances of pitfall have ever
managed to extricate themselves so skillfUlly.80
Some Northern historians would have one believe that
Buchanan's Secretary of War, Joseph Holt, was contemptuous
of his chief's policy and constantly sought to strengthen it
on the side of aggressiveness toward the secessionists.
facts do not seem to justify this belief.

The

During the war,

Holt became a Republican and therefore was much more hostile
toward the South than at the time he was Buchanan's Secretary
of War.

Holt has left many letters of approval of Buchanan's

policy.

A typical one is the following:

I wish distinctly to say that I believe Mr. Buchanan was
in all respects and at all times true to the Union. He
believed, and so did I, that a war during his admimdstration,
especially if we began it, would result in the destruction
of the Union. It was his policy to preserve the peace if
possible and hand over the Government intact to his successor.
Mr. Stanton, Judge Black, and myself differed at times with
him as to the be~i way to do thiS, but we were agreed that
it must be done.

At the end of Buchanan's administration, Buchanan and Holt
were warm friends.

Buchanan said, "Holt, you have been true".
"I have tried to be", replied Holt. 82

80. Auchampaugh, 2£.
81.

82 •
I.
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It is the opinion of the writer of this study that
Buchanan, with all his faults and pro-Southern leanings could
hardly have accomplished more than he did in the way of preventing civil war and a rapid disintegration of the Union.
He did turn the Government over to the incoming administration
without having recognized the independence of any of the
seceding States, and had refused all along to withdraw the
Federal garrison from Fort Sumter.

It is true that five more

States had followed South Carolina in secession before the
end of Buchanan's administration, and most of these had seceded after the only effort Buchanan had made to reinforce
Fort Sumter.

Before condemning Buchanan's policy there should

be some evidence that fewer States would have seceded if
Buchanan had resorted to more forceful measures.
It might also be argued that the apparent weakness of
Buchanan's policy toward the seceding States was its strength.
It was Buchanan's chief desire to save the Union and avert
civil war, to do nothing that could swell the tide of secession.
He did everything in his power to give the people an opportunity
to settle the crisis by peaceful means.

Much has been made of

Buchanan's failure to emulate Jackson in his forceful treatment
of the South

Carolip~

nullification crisis in 1832; but at

that time Jackson had to deal with the rebellious attitude of
one State alone, with the people of the state about equally
divided for and against nullification.

Buchanan had to deal
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with practically a unanimous South Carolina in her secession
movement, with other states ready to follow her if the
Federal Government resorted to coercion.

A comparison of

Buchanan's dilemma with Jackson's smaller problem is not
fair.

Buchanan was successful in the policy that he chose

to follow.

CHAPTER VII
LINCOLN AND SECESSION THROUGH THE INAUGURAL

CHAPTER VII
LINCOLN AND

o~CESSION

THROUGH THE INAUGURAL

We have reviewed the policy of the Buchanan administration
in regard to secession in general, and the Fort Sumter crisis
in particular.

We have seen that the policy pursued was

hased on the fear of an armed conflict as the result of any
forceful action.

Secession was illegal, yet it could not

legally be prevented by coercive measures.

The President

disclaimed any responsibility for a settlement of the difficulties
and put the burden on Congress exclusively.

He pinned his

faith on compromise and conciliation, to be effected by
Congressional action.

He promised to receive, and did receive,

South Carolina commissioners.

Vlhile waiting for Congress to

repair the house divided, he followed a "strictly defensive"
policy in regard to the forts in Charleston harbor, and refused to reinforce the garrisons there.

Those garrisons could

have been successfully reinforced in November, when Major
Anderson and his predecessor, Colonel Gardner, earnestly requested it.

But the policy of delay and inaction had not only

made reinforcement more difficult, but had disheartened the
commander of Fort Sumter, and convinced him also that a conflict
should be prevented at almost any price.
It is reported that Buchanan, during his last days at the
White House, exclaimed several times, "I am the last President
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of the United States!"

Lincoln, on the contrary, decided

that the Union could and must be saved.

Buchanan believed

in and proposed further compromises on the slavery question,
while Lincoln, in accordance with the Chicago platform on
which he was nominated, could accept no compromise which
would extend slavery in the Federal territories.

Buchanan's

proposal of explanatory amendments, in his message of December
4, provided for that extension of slavery£l But the Republican
platform stated that "the new dogma that the Constitution, of
its own force, carries slavery into any or all of the Territories
of the United States, is a dangerous pollcital heresy", and
that the "normal condition of all the territory of the United
States is that of freedom".2

Lincoln therefore could not

afford to accept a compromise such as the South demanded.

The

. only support he could immediately count on was that of a united
party.

He could not jeopardize that support by a violation

of his party's platform.
It was a great responsibility that Lincoln assumed in
rejecting this compromise, but those who would condemn him
must prove that such a compromise would have definitely averted
civil war, instead of merely postponing it a few years.
did the South really want a compromise?

But

It must be remembered

that the radical secessionists had been preparing the Southern
mind for years to support secession when the favorable moment
came.

Lincoln's election was not so much the cause, as the

"Sarajevo" of secession and civil war.

1. RIchardson, t.
2.

The radical secessionist,

~., 2£. cit., vol. 5, p. 038.
Greeley, American ConflICt, vol. 1, p. 320.
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Roger Pryor of Virginia; expressed a scorn for compromise in
his speech of April 10 to the people of Charleston.

Said

Pryor:

·

Gentlemen, if Abraham Lincoln and Hannibal Hamlin were
to abdicate their office tomorrow, and were to give me a
blank sheet of paper whereupon to write the conditions of
reannexation to the Union, I would scorn the privilege of
putting the terms on paper. (Cheers) And why? Because our
grievances have not been with reference to the insufficiency
of the guarantees, but the unutterable perfidy of the
guarantors. I thank you especially that you have at least
.annihilated this accursed Union, reeking with corruption
and insolent with excess of tyranny. Not only is it gone l
but gone forever. As sure as tomorrow's sun will rise
upon us, just so sure will old Virginia be a member of the
Southern Confederacy; and I will tell your Governor what will
put her in the Southern Confederacy in less than an hour
by a Shrewsbury clock. Strike a blow! (Tremendous applause)
The very mOPlent that bl:)od is shed l old Virginia will make
common cause with her sisters of the South.~

.

This feeling was not representative of the Southern people l
I

but it was typical of the radical secessionist

"fire-eaters~

Lincoln's policYI both in the election of 1860 and during
the months before inaugurationlwas to maintain prudent silence
on his intended actions.

We have an ample record of Buchanan's

views l but there is a striking dearth of material on those of
Lincoln.

Many were the letters he received soliciting his

views on the compromise efforts of Congress and his own plans
of meeting secession.

Lincoln's most common answer to those

wanting a pre-view of his policy was that given to Truman Smith,
in a reply of November 10 to the latter's complaiht that uncertainty as to his policy had caused a financial depression.
Lincoln told Smith that his views were already known, and to
give them again would be useless.1! tl To press a repetition of
this upon those who have listened is useless; to press it upon
3.

Sandburg, Carl, Abraham Lincoln - The War Years, vol. 1. p. 20U.
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.
'

those who have refused to 11sten. and st1ll refuse, would
be wanting in self-reppect, and would have an appearance ot
sycophancy and t1m1dity which would excite the contempt of
I

{

good men and encourage bad ones to clamor the more loudly"4
•

.~

Lincoln continued, ttl am not insensible to any commercial
or financial depression that may exist, but nothing is to
be gained by fawning around the 'respectable scoundrels' who
.~.

"

.~' .

got it up.

Let them go to work and repair the mischief of

their own making. and then perhaps they.will be less greedy
to do the like again".5

i

l

I

Lincoln's attitude on a compromise such as was being
considered at the time

~n

Congress, was given in many letters

to close party friends and advisers.

To the Hon. William

Kellog, the Illinois Congressman on the Committee of Thirtythree, who had written Lincoln early in December, for instructions
as to the course he should pursue, Lincoln wrote the following:
Entertain no proposition for a compromise in regard to
the extension of slav~ry. The instant you do they have us
under again; all mur labor is lost, and sooner or later
must be done over. Douglas is sure to be again trying to
bring in his "Popular Sovereignty". Have none of it. The
tug has to come, and better now than later. You know I
think the fugitive slave clause of the Constitution ought
to be enforced - t0 put it in its mildest form, ought
not to be resisted. 6

, J

Not only was Lincoln averse to compromise, but the leading
Republicans in the Congress that met in December 1860 also
thought they had no concessions to make.

\

Senator Corwin

wrot~

On December 10,

Lincoln that all the Republican Senators,

except one, had the impression that they had no concessions or

.'

4. Lincoln' Works, ed., Nicolay and Hay, 2 vol.
5.

.
i

6.
,

Ibid.
Nicolay and Hay, 22.

£!i., vol. 3, p. 259.
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compromise to offer, and that it was impolitic even to
discuss making them.

Corwin thought that inactivity and

a kind spirit was all the Republicans could offer until the
4th of March.

Senator Corwin admitted that he never in his

life had seen the country in such a dangerous position, and
although he looked upon it with great alarm, he declared,
flI am resolved not to be paralyzed by dismay.

Our safety

can only be insured by looking the danger full in the face
and acting with calm dignity in such a way that, if possible,
we may ride out the storm".7
It seems that Lincoln and the leading Republicans, such
as W. H. Seward and Salmon P. Chase, did not think that a
dissolution of the Union and civil war were inevitable.

They

were almost as eager, it seemed, as Buchanan had been, to let
things drift, and believed that somehow, after the 4th of
March, some solution for peace and Union could be found.

Chase

wrote to Henry Wilson, December 13, 1860, that the Republicans
could do nothing, in the way of a settlement of the crisiS,
until they assumed control of the Government on March 4.

He

thought that all attempts on their part to do anything, under
existing circumstances, would prove unfortunate. 8 Seward,
the man who, probably more than anyone else, was responsible
for the successful organization of the Republican party, and
the coiner of the phrase "irrepressible conflict", could not
convince himself that the Union was disintegrating.

Both he

Thurlow Weed, his alter ego, were strong advocates of a policy
7.
8.

Association, 1902,
ase, Gov't.
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of conciliation toward the South.

Seward had been chosen

Lincoln's Secretary of state, and he was possessed with
an overweening confidence that as soon as the new administration took over the Government, he would be able to effect
a reconciliation.

Speaking before the New England Society

of New York, December 22, 1860, he expressed his confidence
of secessions's waning in the following words:

\

The cause of secession was as strong on the night of
November 6, when a President and Vice-President were elected
who were unacceptable to the Slave States as it has been at
any time. Fifth days have passedj and I believe that every
day the sun has set since that time, it has set upon
mollified passions and prejudicesj and if you will only wait
the time, sixty more suns Wbll shed a light and illuminate
a more cheerful atmosphere.
Seward had been actively enga,ed, during the winter of
1860-61, incontacting all parties, and had openly proclaimed
that his policy was one of peace and conciliation. lO He held
many conferences with the members of Buchanan's Cabinet, and
at the end of the first week of January, 1861, he wrote his
wife of his efforts, saying, "I

l~ve

assumed a sort of

dictatorship for defense, and am laboring night and day with
the cities and States.
unabated".ll

My hope, rather my confidence, is

Seward's activities and confidence in himself

made him feel as if he were the guiding light of even the
Buchanan administration.

On January 18 he wrote his wife;

"It seems to me if I am absent only eight days, this administration, the Congress, and the District would fall into con-

9. Lothrop, Thornton K, William Henry Seward, p. 223.
American Statesmen Series, Boston and New York, Houghton Mifflin
Co., 1898.
10. congreSSiOnal Globe, Jan. 12, 1861, p. 343, Vol. 3~, Part I.
11. Tar ell, Ida M., The Life of Abraham Lincoln, vol. 2, p. 26.
New York, The Macmillan Co., 1917.
.

157

sternation and despair.

I am the only hopeful, calm, con-

ciliatory person here".12
Lincoln himself had a lingering faith in a conciliatory
solution of the national crisis.

Early in December, in a

conference with Thurlow Weed, David Davis, and Leonard Swett,
Lincoln declared that while there were some loud threats and
much muttering in the cotton States, he hoped that by wisdom
and forbearance the danger of serious trouble might be averted,
as such dangers had been in former tLmes. 13

It was a natural

expectation that Lincoln would repudiate the policy pursued by
Buchanan, and take a !'irm stand against secession, but during
the election and after he gave no sign of such a policy in
any public utterance.

On November 28, Lincoln wrote to Henry

J. Raymond, in regard to a speech made by Senator Trumbull,

Republican, which the opposition had seized upon to inflame
the North with the opinion that Republican ground was to be
abandoned by the incoming administration.

Lincoln wrote to

Raymond:
This is just as I expected, and just what would happen
with any declaration I could make •. These political fiends
are not half sick enough yet. Party malice and not public
good, possesses them entirely. They seek a sign, and no
sign shall be given them. At least such is my present
feeling and purpose.1 4
Although Lincoln had said little or nothing publicly
about his attitude on secession, his priVate correspondence
was not lacking in revealing a determination not to recognize
secession, but to ignore any de facto status in regard to it,

12. Ta»bell, ££. cit., vol. 2, p. 26.
13. Weed, Thur-row, Autobiogralh~, ed. Harriet .A. Weed, p. 605
Boston, Houghton Mifflin Co., 8 3.
14. Lincoln's Works, vol. 1, p. 656.
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and not to treat it with the deference and respect with
which Buchanan had met it.

In a letter to Weed, December 17,

Lincoln wrote:
I believe you can pretend to find but little, if anything,
in my speeches, about secession. But my opinion is, that
no State can in any way lawfully get out of the Union without
the consent of the others; and that it is the duty of the
President and ot~5 Government functionaries to run the
machine as it is.
In a letter to Lincoln of December 17, Congressman Washburne
reported to Lincoln the anxiety of General Scott as to the
President-elect's firmness.

Scott was smarting under the

affront of Buchanan's refusal to follow his recommendations
to reinforce the Federal forts.

Scott said to Washburns

wish to God that Mr. Lincoln was in office.

Is he a firm man?"

I

I do not know him,

but I believe him a true, honest, and conservative man.
Washburn~,

If

Mr.

V/ashburne replied that Lincoln

would discharge his duty, and his whole duty, in t he light of
the furnace seven time's heated.
is not lost".16

General Scott then said, "All

A note of firmness in regard to the question

of the forts was given by Lincoln in his reply to Washburne:
"Please present my respects to the General, and tell him,
confidentially, I slutil be obliged to him to be as well prepared as he can to either hold or retake the forts, as the
case may require, at and after the inauguration rt • 17 Seward
now communicated to Lincoln his views regarding the questions
of the forts and secession.

15.

16.
17.

On January 27, two weeks before

Nicolay and Hay, 2£. cit., vol. 3, p. 253.
Nicolay and Hay, ~. cit., vol. 3, p. 249.
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Lincoln started on his way to Washington for the inaugural
ceremony, Seward advised him thus:
For my own part I think that we must collect the revenues,
regain the forts in the Gulf, and if need be maintain ourselves here; but that every thought that we think ought to
be conciliatory, forbearing, and fraternal, and so open the
way for the rising of a Union party in the seceding States
which will bring them back into the Union. 18
Not a word about Fort Sumter.

Waiting for the rising of a

Union party in the seceded States explains much that is to follow;
it was to be the key of the Lincoln policy for the first few
weeks of the new administration.
Lincoln had drafted his inaugural address and started on
his way to Washington on February 11.

On the way he made

several speeches in the cities through which he passed, and in
these utterances we probably find Lincoln at his worst.

He

could say little of importance without anticipating his prepared inaugural address.

In a speech at Indianapolis, February 11,

he spoke interrogatively, explaining that he was not asserting
anything, but merely raising questions for his hearers to
consider.

Yet he gave some indication of his intentions when

he spoke thus:
The words "coercion" and "invasion" are much used these
days, and often with some temper and ~ot blood. Let us make
sure, if we can, that we do not misunderstand the meaning
of those who use them. • • What then is "Coercion?" What is
"Invasion?" Would the marching of an army into South Carolina,
without the consent of her people, and with a hostile intent
towards them, be invasion? I certainly think it would; and
it would be coercion also ,if the South Carolinians were
forced to submit. But if the United States should merely hold
and retake its own forts and other property, and collect the
duties on foreign importations, or even withhold the mails
from places where they were habitually violated, would any or
all thewe things be "invasion" or "coercion"? Do our professed lovers of the Union, but who spitefully resolve that
they will resist coercion and invasion, understand that such
18.

~,

p. 366.
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things as these on the part of the United States, would be
coercion or invasion of a State? If so, their idea of
means to preserve the object of their affection would seem
exceedingly thin and airy • • • In their view, the Un1on~
as a f~ily relation, would seem to be no regular marriage~
but a sort of -free love" arrangement, to be maintained
only on "passional attraction".I9
It is quite clear that Lincoln, while on the way to assume
control of the Government, intended to hold and retake the
Federal forts and public property.
machine" as it was.

He intended to "run the

In the same speech he also asked: trOn

what rightful principle may a State, being not more than onefiftieth part of the nation, in soil and population, break up
the nation a nd then coerce a proportionally larger subdivision
of itself, 1n the most arb1trary way?

What mysterious right

to play tyrant is conferred on a district of country, with
its people, by merely calling it a State?"20

Here Lincoln

was reversing the South Carolina argument that she was being,
or feared she was to be coerced, and presented a wholly
different view of the matter.

South Carolina was coercing

the Government of the United States.
In the light of all that had happened since November 6,
with seven States by their own action out of the Union, and a
Southern

Confederate government already organized, with many

thinking people even in the North convinced of the inevitability
of a dissolution of the Union, with nearly every Federal fort
in the South in secessionist hands, and the Confederate 'forces
hurling defiance at the United States Government in Charleston
harbor, it is puzzling to consider Lincoln's utterance at

19. Raymond, Henry J., Histo~ of the Administration of
President Lincoln, p. 80. New ork, J. C. Derby and N. C. Miller
Co., 1864.
20.

Ibid, p. 81.
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Columbus, Ohio, when he said:
I have not maintained silence from any want of real anxiety.
It is a good thing that there is no more than anx'lety, for
there is nothing going wrong. It is a consoling circumstance
that when we look out there is nothing that really hurts
anybody. We entertain different views upon political
questions, but nobody is suffering anything. This is a most
consoling circumstance, and from it we may conclude that all
we want is time, patience, and ~lreliance on that God who
has never forsaken this people.
From the above expression it might easily be inferred that
Lincoln did not realize the magnitude of the secession movement
and the earnest resolve of the South to support secession
by force of arms.

No wonder Congressman Edwin R. Reynolds

of New York expressed astonishment at Lincoln's attitude, when
he asked the House of Representatives:
Have not our torts and vessels been seized, our arsenals
invaded, our mints robbed, by men and States in arms? Has
not our flag been fired into, our mails rifled and intercepted, our commerce on the Mississippi bbstructed? Is not
the public mind today, North and South, convulsed as never
before? What else crowds the bursting columns of the daily
and weekly journals wherever published? What other topic
now feeds the thunders of the London Times and attr~§ts
more undivided attention from European Governments.
These speeches of Lincoln on his way to Washington did nothing
to bolster the morale of the Federal troops in Fort Sumter.
They were tired of their confinement and wanted action.

They

expected that Lincoln would now sound an aggressive note
and repUdiate Buchanan's "strictly defensive policy".

We have

the word of one of the men in the fort that these speeches, from
their pacific nature, "produced a depress'ing effect upon the
garrison, who were disappointed in them".23

21.

22.
23.

Sandburg, 2£. cit., vol. 1, p. 47.
Ibid.
erawford, 2£.-2.!.t. p. 295.
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If these mediocre speeches of Lincoln on his way to
j

Washington gave no encouragement to those who hoped for some

~'

J

firm and aggressive policy as to the forts, what would the
Inaugural Address say on the subject?

The day before the

inauguration, March 3, Senator Wigfall of Texas delivered
\

j

his farewell speech, in which he flung defiance in the face
of the North.

Said Wigfall: ffThe Star of the West", flying

your flag, staggered into Charleston Harbor with supplies for
Fort Sumter,

South Carolina struck her between the eyes,

and she staggered back; and now, what do you propose to do
about it?,,22

He sat down, and for a time nobody responded.

Then, the staunch Unionist of Tennessee, Andrew Johnson rose
and exclaimed: "Mr. President, I will tell the Senator from
Texas what I would do about it.

I speak only for myself.

But

if I were President, as James Buchanan today ls, and as
Abraham Lincoln tomorrow will be, I would arrest the Senator
and his friends on the charge of treason; I would have them
tried by a jury of their countrymen, and ., if convicted, by
the eternal God, I would hang theml"23

But Andrew Johnson

was not to be President until after Lincoln hadmet the issue
of Civil War.

What was Lincoln to do about the forts2

Lincoln arrived at Washington February 23, while the
Virginia Peace Convention at Washington was still in session.
Committees from this convention called on the President-elect
to try to get some guarantees from him, on the basis of which

22. Macartney, Clarence Edward, Lincoln and His Cabinet, p. 3

23.
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a compromise could be effected.

On February 23, Stephen T.

Logan of Illinois, a member of the Peace Convention and a
former law partner of Lincoln, rose in the convention and
moved that the President of the convention be instructed to
calIon the President-elect and inform him that the members
;

(

i

of the convention would be pleased to wait upon him in a body.
It was so ordered, and John Tyler, the convention's President,

. I

sent a note to Lincoln, who replied that he would be happy to

j

receive the delegates at nine o'clock that night.

,

II

Many were

the arguments made by the members of the Peace Committee, and
they were ably answered by Lincoln.

William E. Dodge, a

merchant and capitalist of New York, was much concerned about
the financial and commercial ruin which he thought would follow
a conflict.

Dodge said that it was for Lincoln to say whether

the whole nation should be plunged into bankruptcy, and whether
the grass should grow in the streets of the commercial cities.
Lincoln replied: "Then I shall say it shall not.

It if depends

upon me, the grass shall not grow anywhere except in the fields
and the meadows".

"Then", said Dodge, "you will yield to the

just demands of the South.
of slaveryl "24

You will not go to war on account

j/ith all merriment now gone from Lincoln's face,

he answered in words which held no promise of a recognition
of the Southern Confederacy.

i .

Said Lincoln:

I do not know that I understand your meaning, Mr. Dodge.
Nor do I know what my acts or opinions may be in the future,
beyond this. If I shall ever come to the great office of
President of the United States, I shall take an oath. I
shall swear that I will faithfully execute the office of
President of the United States, of all the United States,
24.
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~

,

\

and that I will, to the best of my ability, preserve, protect,
and defend the Constitution of the United states. This is
a great and solemn duty. With the support of the people and
the assistance of the Almighty I shall undertake to perform
it. I have full faith that I shall perform it. It is not
the Constitution as I would like to have~ it, but as it is,
that is to be defended. The Constitution will not be
preserved and defended until it is enforced and obeyed in
every one of the United States. It must be so respected,
obeyed, enforced and defended, let the grass grow where it
may. 25
Lincoln's answer to Dodge indeed sounded a firm note.

The

Southern Confederacy did not legally exist in Lincoln's mind.

,

I

The Constitution must be obeyed in everyone of the States.
Yet William H. Seward was holding out promises of cOnciliation
and peace to the South.

He had promised Charles S. Morehead,

ex-Governor of Kentucky and temporary chairman of the .Virginia
Peace Convention until John Tyler assumed the position of
permanent chairman, that there would be no collision between
the North and South.

According to Morehead's declaration,

Seward pledged his sacred honor that there would be no
collision.

"Nay, Governor Morehead", said Seward, laying

his hand on Morehead's shoulder to make it more emphatic, "let
me once hold the reins of power firmly in my hands, and if I
don't settle this matter to the entire satisfaction of the South
in sixty days, I will give you my head for a football".26
Morehead and a group of men called on Lincoln shortly after
his arrival in Washington, and in this interview Lincoln showed
his great anxiety that the border slave States should be saved
for the Union.

Morehead told Lincoln that he prayed and trusted

to God that he would not resort to coerCion, and if he did,
the history of his administration would be written in blood,
25. Ibid, p. 90.
26. MISSiSSi~Pi valle Historical Review, vol. 28, June, 1941,
p. 66. b. R. arbee an M. t. Boriham, "Notes and Documents: Fort
Sumter Again". pp. 63 - 73.
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and all the waters of the Atlantic Ocean could not wash it
fro~ his hands. 27 Lincoln asked Morehead what he should do,and if he meant by coercion the collecting of the revenue and
the taking back of the forts which belonged to the United
states.

Morehead replied that that was the only mode in which

it was possible under the Constitution to resort to coercion.
Lincoln replied with a characteristic anecdote that tl1at would
be "guvin it up".

Morehead replied that itmight be "guvin it

up", but that it would be better to give it up than to drench
the land with blood and then have to give it up.28
Lincoln replied, "I would like to know .from you what I
am to do with my oath of office?"

Morehead replied, "As to

the forts, that is a matter within your discretion, sir.
can withdraw the troops if you please.

You

You are the commander-

in-chief, and it belongs to you, either to keep them there or
to withdraw them totally, and prevent a collision, and a
consequent deadly and ruinous war.,,29

Lincoln replied with

one of Aesop's fables:
There was a lion once that was desperately in love with
a beautiful lady, and he courted the lady, and the lady
became enamoured of him and agreed to marry him, and the
old people were asked for their consent. They were afraid
of the power of the lion with his long and sharp claws and
his tusks, and they said to him, "We can have no objection
to so respectable a personage as you, but our daughter
is frail and delicate, and we hope that you will submit
to have your claws cut off and your tusks drawn, because
they might do very serious injury to her". The lion submitted, being very much in love. His claws were cut off
and his tusks drawn, and they took clubs and knocked him
on the head. 30

21.

28.
29 •

30.

Ibid,

p.

69.

MISS.

Val. Hist. Review, vol. 28, June 1941, 2£.

lbId, p. 70.
'!bTci'•

£!l. p. 71.
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Then W. C. Rives of Virginia l one of several men who
accompanied Morehead in this interview with Lincoln l warned
that if Lincoln should resort to coercion, Virginia would
leave the Union and join the seceding States •

"Nay, sir",

said Rive s I "old as I am, and dearly as I have 10 ved the Union,
in that event I go with all my heart".

At this l according

to Morehead, Lincoln leaped from his chair, advanced one step
toward where Rives was standing, and cried, flMr. Rives, Mr. Rives,
if Virginia will stay in, I will withdraw the troops from
Fort Sumter".3l

There is quite a bit of evidence that Lincoln

did make an offer to evacuate Fort Sumter.

The Virginia State

Convention had just met to consider passing an ordinance of
secession.

If Virginia should secede, her example would probably

have great weight in determining the action of the remaining
border slave States l which Lincoln, just as Buchanan before
him, was most anxious to keep in the Union.

John Hay reported

in his diary that after the Morehead interview 1 Lincoln spoke
of his offer, saying that a committee of pseudo-Unionists
came to him for guarantees and that he "promised to evacuate
Fort Sumter if they would break up their (Virginia) Convention
without any row or nonsense.

They demurred".32

Rudolph

Schleiden, minister of the Republic of Bremen to the United
States, reported to his Government that when border State men
asked Lincoln to remove the troops from Fort Sumter, the
President-elect replied: "Why not? If you will guarantee to me
31.
32.

tbld, p. 71, Sandburg, 22. £!!. vol. I, p. 97.
Sandburg,~. £!1., vol. 1, p. 98.
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the State of Virginia I shall remove the troops.
for a fort is no bad business.,,33

),

A State

The above proposition

will be discussed later, but it is probable that Lincoln
made the proposal before inauguration.
Although Lincoln's inaugural address had been been
wri tten weeks before his arrival in 1Nashington, it was submitted to Seward and others for suggestions and modifications.
It is not the purpose of this paper to go into a detailed
study of Lincoln's first Inaugural Address, but it might be
observed that its original tone was much more hostile to the
South than the final form.

On February 24, Seward suggested

many changes on the side of conciliation.

He told Lincoln

that he had a common interest and responsibility with him,
and he would say frankly that the second and third paragraphs,
even if modified as he proposed, would give such advantages
to the disunionists in Maryland and Virginia that those
States would secede, and "we shall within ninety, perhaps
sixty days, be obliged to fight the South for this capital,
with a divided North for our reliance, and we shall not have
one loyal magistrate or ministerial officer south of the
Potomac.,,34

As for the forts, Lincoln's original draft

stated:
33. Annual Report - American Historical Association, 1915, p. 211.
Lutz, Raiph Haswell, "Rudolph Schleiden and the VIsit to
Richmond, April 25, 1861."
34. Nicolay and Hay, ~. £!i., vol. 3, pp. 319, 320.
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,
All the power at my disposal will be used to reclaim the
public property and places which have fallen; to hold,
occupy, and possess these and &1 other property and places
belonging to the Government, and to collect the duties and
imposts; but beyond what may be necessarY for these objects,
there will be no invasion of any State. oo
The modified and final form of the above was:
The power confided to me will be used to hold, occupy,
and possess the property and places belonging to the
Government. 36
Thus it was on the suggestion of Seward that he was to follow
Buchanan's policy of giving up the forts already taken by
the South, at least in the inaugural.

But Lincoln's friend

and adviser, O. H. Browning, suggested also that the declaration of the purpose of reclamation, which would be construed
into a threat or menace, and might be irritating even in the
border States, might prudently be omitted.
"The fallen places ought to be reclaimed.

Said Mr. Browning:
But cannot that

be accomplished as well or even better withoug announcing
the purpose in your inaugural?,,37
In still another respect Lincoln inclined to the policy
of Buchanan.

The latter had maintained that it would have

been useless to attempt to supply the Federal offices in South
Carolina by nominating men from other States and to force
them on the people.

On this point Lincoln declared in his

Inaugural:
Where hostility to the United States, in any interior
locality, shall be so great and universal as to prevent
competent resident citizens from holding the Federal
offices, there will be no attempt to force obnoxious
strangers among the people for that object. ~fuile the
35.
36.
37.

!bid, p. 333.
pp. 333, 334.
tbid, p. 334.
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strict legal right may exist in the Government to enforce
the exercise of these offices, the attempt to do so would
be so irritating, and so nearly impracticable withal, that
I deem i~8better to forego for the time the uses of such
offices •
Buchanan, in his

of December 4, denied any

Constitutional right of secession, but admitted a revolution-

,

\

\

~ssage

ary right.

Lincoln's reference to this line of thought was:

'.

This country, with its institutions, belongs to the
people who inhabit it. ~Vhenever they shall grow weary of
the existing Government they can exercise their constitutional right of amending it, gg their revolutionary right
to dismember or overthrow it.
Buchanan had disclaimed any responsibility to effect a
settlement of the secession crisis, saying that it was the
duty of Congress.

Lincoln's statement of that side of the

question was:
The Chief Magistrate derives all his authority from the
people, and they have conferred none upon him to fix terms
for the separation of the States. The people themselves
can do this also if they choose; but the Executive, as
such, has nothing to do with it. His duty is to administer the present Government, as it came to his hands, and
to transmit it, unimpaired by him, to his successor.40
Buchanan had proposed to his Cabinet, a t the first meeting
after the election of Lincoln, that there should be a
national convention of the States to determine the solution
41
of the difficulties.
Since Lincoln made no recommendations
for amendments to the Constitution, and in his original draft
of the inaugural address said that he was "not much impressed
with the belief that the present Constitution can be improved",
must he not have been thinking along the same line as Buchanan,
when in the following paragraph he identified the voice of the
people with the voice of God?

Appealing to both North and

South to avoid disunion, he said:

38.
39.

Nicolay ana ffiiy,...2ll!.£ll: vol. 3, p. 334. 40.
Ibid, p. 340.
41.

Ibid, p. 341
AUCnampaugh,
2£. £i1., p. 131
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vTny should there not be a patient confidence in the
ultimate justice of the people? Is there any better or
equal hope in the world? In our present differences is
either party without faith of being in the, right? If
the Almight Ruler of Nationa, with his eternal truth and
justice, be on your side of the North, or on yours of
the South, that truth and that judgment will surely
prevail by the judgment of this great tribunal of the
American people. 42
Another pOint of comparison.

Buchanan's policy had been

based, among other things, on his anxiety of having the
responsibility of war, if it must come, placed on the South.
The strictly defensive policy in Charleston harbor had been
pursued to dangerous extremes in order that civil war should
not come, and if it came, that there would be no possibility
of the charge that the Government had been the aggressor.
Toward the end of Lincoln's address, after urging his
countrymen, one and all, to think calmly and well "upon this
whole subject", and saying that Itnothing valuable can be lost
by taking time", he said:
In your hands, my dissatisfied fellow-countrymen, and
not in mine, is the momentous issue of civil war. The
Government will not assail you. You can have no conflict,
withoug being yourselves the aggressors. You have no oath
registered in Heaven to destroy the Government, while I
shall have the most solemn one to "preserve, protect, and
defend it". 43
Did this mean that the seceded States, now organized in a
Southern Confederacy, would be let alone?

It seems that

Seward was responsible for much of the generalizing and
ambiguity of the inaugural address. 44
Naturally everyone was anxiously awaiting Lincoln's
address.

42.

43.
44.

People in general expected a definite statement of

NiCOlay and Hay,
Ibid, p. 342.
Ibid, p. 343.

££. £!!.,

vol. 3, p. 341.
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policy, and that policy was also expected to be a radical
departure from that of Buchanan.

In some respects the

policy announced was little different from that of Buchanan.
Nicolay and Hay, prejudiced in Lincoln's favor, have said
that Lincoln announced !fa decided, though not a violent,
change of policy" j that Buchanan's course had been one
professedly of conciliation, but practically of ruinous
concession, while Lincoln announced his purpose of conciliation, and restoration. 45 It is true that all through the
inaugural address Lincoln made it clear that secession was
impossible, but there was no declaration of an intention to
use strong measures to prevent it.

It is quite possible

that Lincoln was doubtful of the support of a united North
in coercive measures.

There was the hope of eventual

conciliation by some mysterious means, and the grave concern
over the border slave States.

Lincoln, in a message to

Congress on July 4, 1861, stated the policy announced in the
inaugural as follows:
The policy chosen looked to the exhaustion of all
peaceful measures before a resort to any stronger ones.
It sought only to hold the public places and property
not already wrested from the Government, and to collect
the revenue, relying for the rest on time, discussion,
and the ballot-box. Of all that which a President might
constitutionally and justifiably do in such a case,
everything was forborne without which it was believed
possible to keep the Government of foot. 46
The conciliatory tone of the address was directed eapecially
to allaying secession sentiment in Virginia, but the Richmond
"Whig", a conservative paper, declared "the policy indicated
Nlco-:[ay and Hay,~ cit., vol. 3, p. 376.
46. Richardson, J. D., QQ. £!i., vol. 6, p. 21.
Session Message, July 4,-r861.

45.

Special
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towards the seceding States will meet the stern and
unqualified resistance of the United sout~!47

The Ridhmond

"no

action of our

~ Enquirer,
~

a secession paper declared that

Convention can now maintain peace".48

The Richmond IIDispatch"

said "every Border State ought to go out of the Union in
twenty-four hours.

Dispatches from Stanton state that the

inaugural was received with universal dissatisfaction.
Resistance to coercion is the feeling of all parties.
inaugural creates intense excitement.
regard it as a declaration of war.

The

The secessionists

The Union men say little,

but evidently are disappointed".49From Goldsboro, North
Carolina, a news dispatch declared, nThe inaugural was received at this place and throughout this section with
indignation. 50

The Baltimore "American" said, "The tone of

the speech is pacific; that is to say, Mr. Lincoln avows his
determination to preserve peace, so far as it may be done,
in the performance of his duty as he understands it.

It is

perfectly evident, from t he whole tenor of his address, that
he does not intend to be the aggressor, if peace may not be
preserved. 51

No truer words could have been written than

those of the last sentence.

The Baltimore "Sun" denounced

the speech as "sectional and mischievous" and added that "if
it means what it says, it is the knell and the requiem of the
Union, and the death of hope".52

The Baltimore "Exchange"

said, "the measures of Mr. Lincoln mean war".53

The Baltimore

4'7. toulsv!lle tlalli Courier, March 7, 1861.
48. IbId.
49. LOUisville Daily Courier, March 7, 1861
50. Ibid.
51. Moore, Frank, Rebellion Record, vol. 1, Documents, p. 105
New York t D. Van Nostrand, 1866.
52. Ibia.
53. !'51."0.' •
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"Patriot" declared that Lincoln meant to avoid aggression,
but added, "In the seceding States intense excitement was
(

created by the reception of the address".54

The St. Louis

"Democrat" remarked, "We can only say this morning that it
meets the highest expectations of the country, both in
point of statesmanship and patriotism, and that its effect
on the public mind cannot be other than salutary in the
highest degree".55
At the inaugural, on the platform with Lincoln, were
Senator Stephen A. Douglas and President James Buchanan, men
who had participated and been principal actors in the slavery
and secession drama which was fast approaching its climax.
r'

\ l,

\Vhen the reporters asked Douglas for his opinion of Lincoln's
address, he at once said that it did not mean coercion.

"He

says nothing about retaking the forts", said Douglas. "He
is all right".56

When Buchanan was asked for his opinion he

replied "with a wretched leer": "I cannot say what he means
until I read his inaugural.

I cannot understand the secret

meaning of the document, which has simply been read in my
presence. tr57 Cautious Buchanan, slow of perception. A study
made by Dr. D. L. Dumond supports the conclusion that at least
the inaugural address was intended to announce the policy of
the administration, and that from that policy, as then outlined,
Lincoln never deviated. 58

54.

Ibid,

55 • I'51'CT.
56. LOUIsville Daily Courier, March 6, 1861.
57. Louisville Daily Courier, March 6, 1861.
58. Dumond, D~ L., The Secession Movement, 1860-1861, pp. 262,263.
New York, The Macmillan Co., 1931.
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From Lincoln's original inaugural it might be concluded
that he thought war inevitable, but that by a conciliatory
tone he might hold off the secession of the border States,
especially Virginia and Maryland, until Washington had
troops to protect it •

. \

I,

1
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CHAPTER VIII
FORT SUMTER - LINCOLN'S PROBLEM
We have reviewed Lincoln's attitude on secession and
the Federal forts, and have seen that he was resolved to
"run the machine" as it was, to defend, preserve and protect
the Constitution as it was, and to hold the Federal forts
and property not already captured by the forces of secession.
We have also observed that in his original draft of the
inaugural address Lincoln had announced his purpose to also
retake the forts lost to the South, but he had omitted such
a declaration in deference to the advice of Seward and
Browning.

We have also seen that before inauguration he had

expressed a willingness to evacuate Fort Sumter in exchange
for a guarantee that Virginia would stay in the Union, so
great was his concern over the border slave States.

It has

also been observed that the inaugural expressed no purpose
of making war on the South, but on the contrary, assured the
South that no war could come without the
aggressor.

~outh

being the

Now it remains to be seen how a policy of peace

and conciliation was frustrated by the course of events.
We have compared some aspects of Lincoln's policy as
announced in his inaugural to the policy of Buchanan, but such
a comparison is really unfair because of the accentuation
of the crisis as a result of Buchanan's policy of inaction.

176
The Southern historian POllard has said, "the separation
had been widened and envenomed by the ambidexterity and
perfidy of President Buchanan.

The revolution in the

meantime had rapidly gathered, not only in moral power,
but in the means of war and the muniments of defense."l
Whatever other results might have followed in the wake of

..

reinforcement of the forts in Charleston harbor in the month
of November, 1860, it is quite certain that such an attempt
would not have met a successful resistance.

Then the South

Carolina authorities had not the slightest military strength,
but since the first report Major Anderson had made to the
War Department after taking command at Fort Moultrie, he had
almost daily reported the military preparations that were
being made by

~outh

Carolina.

After the Confederate Govern-

ment assumed direction of these preparations in February,
Major Anderson continued to report them.

For example, Anderson

reported to the War Department on March 1, 1861:
I have the honor to report that nothing unusual occurred
today, except the arrival from the city of a steamboat,
fully loaded with troops, at Sullivan's Island. The works
around us are being carried on with the same activity as
heretofore. Yesterday some guns were fired from a battery
on Sullivan's Island to the eastward of the Moultrie House. 2
Nothing unusual except a boat fully loaded with Confederate
\

\

reinforcements.

On March 5, Major Anderson reported that

parties were working on the mortar battery at Fort Johnson,
which they were making higher and stronger, and on the Morris
Island batteries, numbers 1, 9, and 10. 3

On March 5, also,

Captain J. G. Foster of the Engineers reported:
1. Pollard, Edward A, The First Year of the War, p. 40.
Richmond, 'Nest and Johnson, l86~.
2. Official Records, vol. 1, p. 188.
3. Ibid, p. 190.
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Yesterday three steamers landed troops and supplies on
Cummings Point, and appearances indicated that preparations
were making for immediate action in case the news from
Washington exhi~ited a coercive policy on the part of the
administration.
The above quotations are not extreme cases, but typical of
the reports that were sent almost daily to the War Department 6
especially after Anderson's occupation of Fort Sumter on
December 26, 1860.
The policy of acting strictly on the defensive and
granting concessions to South Carolina, had enabled the
Confederacy by March 4, 1861, to complete, or have near
completion the following armed positions:
Sullivans Island: Five-gun battery east of Fort Moultrie,
Battery, 2 guns, Mortar Battery No.2, two 10 inch
Mortars, Fort Moultrie,.30 guns, Mortar Battery No.1,
two 10 inch mortars, and Enfilade Battery, four guns,
The Point Battery, one 9 inch Dahlgren and the Floating
Iron-clad Battery, two 42 pounders and two 32 pounders.
The Mount Pleasant Battery, two 10 inch mortars.
Morris Island: Cummings Point Battery, two 42 pounders
and three 10 inch mortars, Stevens Iron-clad Battery,
three 8 inch columbiads, the Trapier Battery, three 10
inch mortars.
James Island: Fort Johnson, battery of 24 pounders;
Upper Battery, two ten-inch mortars; Lower Battery,
two ten-inch mortars, and the Mortar Battery.5
On the 4th of March, shortly before Lincoln announced his
purpose to hold the forts, a communication

from~jor

Anderson

was received, declaring that such a policy, in regard to
Fort Sumter, would be difficult.

\Vhile President Buchanan was

holding his last Cabinet meeting, Secretary Holt arrived very
late, explaining that on that morning he had received
"extraordinary dispatches" from Major Anderson.

Anderson said

4.

Ibid.

5.

Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, vol. 1, p. 81
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without a force of some twenty or thirty thousand men

to capture the batteries which had been erected, he could
not maintain himself at Fort Sumter.

Holt told the President

and Cabinet that he intended to communicate the dispatches
at once to Lincoln. 6 On March 5, Holt, who performed the
duties of the War Department for a day or two because of

..

the illness of Simon Cameron, Lincoln's choice for Secretary
of 'Nar, sent to Lincoln an extensive review of the Fort
Sumter situation.

Holt's summary justified the Buchanan policy

and stated that the failure to reinforce Sumter was in part
because of Anderson's confidence that he could hold his positionj
Anderson had asked that no reinforcements be thrown in, and
therefore the Secretary was taken by surprise tllat Anderson
estimated that so many men would be needed to reinforce him.7
Holt added:
So long, therefore, as he (Anderson) remained silent
upon this point, the Government felt that there was no
ground for apprehension. Still, as the necessity for action
might arise at any moment, an expedition has been quietly
prepared and is ready to sail from New York on a few hours'
notice, for transporting troops and supplies to Fort Sumter.
This step was taken under the supervision of General Scott,
who arranged its details, a nd who regarded the reinforcements
thus provided for as sufficient for the occasion. The
expedition, however, is not upon a scale approaching the
seemingly extravaga.nt estimates of Major Anderson and Captain
Foster, now offered for the first time, and for the disclosures of which the Government was wholly unprepared.
The declaration now made by Major Anderson that he would
not be willing to risk his reputation on an attempt to throw
in reinforcements into Charleston harbor, and with a view
of holding possession of the same, with a force of less than
twenty thousand men, takes the Department by surprise, as
his previous correspondence contained no such intimation. 8
6.

7.
8.

Curtis, ££. cit. vol. 2, p. 497
Curtis, QQ. crt., vol. 2, pp. 498, 499.
l£i£, p.~99;-Official Records, vol. 1, p. 197.
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This must have been a rude shock for Lincoln's pacific policy.
On March 5, Lincoln transmitted the letter from Holt,
with the accompanying documents received from Major Anderson
on March 4, to General Scott, for his consideration and
advice.

On the same day they were returned by Scott, who

gave his opinion on reinforcements.

9

Scott had reached a

rather gloomy conclusion, saying, "Evacuation seems almost
inevitable •• if indeed the worn-out garrison be not assaulted
and carried in the present week tl • 10

Lincoln referred the

papers back to General Scott for a more thorough investigation,
and wrote orders for General Scott which were transmitted over
the signature of the Secretary of War, Simon Cameron.

Scott

was directed by the President"to exercise all possible vigilance for the maintenance of all the places within the military
department of the United States, and to promptly call upon
all the departments of the Government for the means necessary
to that end" .11

On March 9, after having learned verbally

from General Scott that he had given the subject a more
thorough consideration, Lincoln addressed the General three
questio~s,

as follows:

(1)

To what point of time can Major Anderson maintain
his position at Fort Sumter, without fresh supplies
or reinforcements?

(2)

Can you, with all the means now in your control,
supply or reinforce Fort Sumter within that time?

(3)

If not, what amount of means and of what description,
in addition to that already at your control, would
enable you to supply and reinforce that fortress within
the time?12

9. Lincoln's V;orks, vol. 2, p. 9
10. Nicolay and Hay, .2.,E. ill., vol. 3, p. 378.
11. Lincoln's Vrorks, vol. 2, p. 8.
12. l£!£, pp. 9, 10.
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On Saturday night, March 9, Lincoln held his first Cabinet
meeting, and the crisis at StUnter, with the question of
relieving the fort, were for the first time communicated to
his advisers.

The Cabinet members were surprised at the

information.

No decision was reached or asked for at this

meeting.

Lincoln's Attorney-General, Edward Bates, reported

in his diary concerning this Cabinet meeting:
I was astonished to be informed that Fort Sumter, in
Charleston harbor, must be evacuated, a nd that General Scott,
General Totten, and Major Anderson concur in the opinion,
that as the place has but twenty-eight days' provisions, it
must be relieved, if at all, in that time; and that it will
take a force of twenty thousand men at least, and a bloody
battle, to relieve itll3
Even if a relief expedition were successful, Bates thought
it would be certain to begin civil war, and as Charleston
was of little importance as compared to the chief points in
the Gulf, he was willing to evacuate Fort Sumter and strengthen
the forts in the Gulf so as lito look down all opposition.1t1 4
At this time Lincoln did not disclose any purpose of his own.
He followed a policy of asking questions and getting all the
information possible.

To understand Lincoln's position on

the question of evacuating or reinforcing Fort Sumter at
this pOint, we must consider his declaration as he gave it
later, in his message to the special session of Congress,
July 4, 1861.
13.
14.

He then declared:

Nicolay and Hay,
Ibid, p. 381

~. ~.,

vol. 3, p. 380, Bates' Diary.
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In a purely military point of view this reduced the duty
of the Administration in the case to the mere matter of
getting the garrison safely out of the fort. It was believed,
however, that to so abandon that position under the circumstances would be utterly ruinous; that the necessity under
which it was to be done would not be fully understood; that
by many it would be construed as a part of a voluntary policy;
that at home it would discourage the friends of the Union,
embolden its adversaries, and go far to insure to the latter
a recognition abroad; t~t, in fact, it would be our national
destruction consumated.
On March 12, General Scott added to Lincoln 1 s perplexity
by the following discouraging answer to the three questions
put by Lincoln a few days before:
I should need a fleet of war vessels and transports
Which, in the scartered disposition of the Navy (as understood),
could not be collected in less than four months; 5,000
additional regulars and 20,000 volunteers; that is, a force
sufficient to take all the batteries, both in the harbor
(including) Fort N.ou1trie), as well as in the approach or
outer bay. To raise, organize, and discipline such an army
(not to speak of necessary legislation by Congress, not now
in session) would require from six to eight months. As a
practical military question the time for succoring Fort Sumter
with any means at hand had passed away nearly a month ago,
Since then a surrender under aSi~u1t or from starvation has
been merely a question of time.
On the same day that General Scott outlined the huge and
immediately impossible plan to relieve Fort Sumter, Montgomery
Blair, Lincoln 1 s Postmaster-General, telegraphed his bortherin-law, Gustavus V. Fox, to come at once to Washington.

Fox

had already formed a plan to relieve the fort under Buchanan's
administration, but had never had an opportunity to try it.
Blair told Fox that Anderson's fame would be nothing as compared to his if he succeeded.

After explaining to Fox the

situation as it had developed, Blair took him to Lincoln, to
whom he explained his plan of relief. 17 Fox maintained that
15. Richardson, J. D., 2£.
16. Official Records, vol.
17. Smith, William Ernest,
In Politics, vol. 2, p. 11,

cit., vol. 6, p.21
r;-P. 197.
The Francis Preston Blair Family
New York, The Macmillan Co., 1933.
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General Scott exaggerated the force necessary, and that a
naval force propelled by steam, could pass any number of
guns there, because the course was at right angles to the
line of fire, and the distance, thirteen hundred yards, too
great for accurate shooting at night.

Fox declared that the

President agreed to his plan if he could get the consent of
the Secretary of War and General Scott. 18 Fox proposed to
put troops on board a large sea-steamer, and hire two or three
powerful light-draught New York tug-boats, having the necessary
stores on board. These were to be conveyed by the United
States steamer Pawnee, and the revenue cutter Harriet Lane.
At night, two hours before high water, with half the force on
board each tug, within relieving distance of each other, he
was to run in to Fort Sumter. 19
On March 15, Lincoln held a Cabinet meeting and put the
following question to his advisers:
Assuming it to be possible to now prOVision Fort Sumter,
under all the circumstances is it wise to attempt it? Please
give me your opinion in writing on this question. 20
Lincoln was not asking an opinion on sending reinforcements,

\

but. merely on the provisioning of the fort.

The answers were

accordingly given on March 15 and 16 in rather long documents,
that of Seward being the longest. 2l Lincoln's Cabinet included
four former Democrats, Salmon p. Chase, Secretary of Treasury,
Simon Cameron, Secretary of War, Montgomery Blair, PostmasterGeneral, and Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy.

18.
19.
20.
21.

~. £!i. vol. 2, pp. 11, 12.
Official Recoras, vol. 1, pp. 203, 204.
Lincoln's Works, vol. 2, p. 11.
Ibid, pp. 11 - 22.
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ing three were former Wnigs, W. H. Seward, Secretary of State,
Caleb Smith, Secretary of Interior and Edward Bates, AttorneyGeneral. 22 Of these only two answered in the affirmative.
Blair was for it unconditionally, and Chase was for it with
reservations.

Said Blair: "To the connivance of the late

administration, it is due alone that this rebellion has been
enabled to attain its present proportions.

It has from the

beginning, and still is treated practically as a lawful proceeding, and the honest and Union-loving people in those States
must by a continuance of this policy become reconciled to the
new Government, and, though founded in wrong, come to regard
it as a rightful Government".23

Blair said that Mr. Buchanan's

policy had rendered collision almost inevitable, and that a
continuance of that policy would not only bring it about, but
would go far to produce a permanent division of the Union.
Blair believed that Fort SUmter could be provisioned and relieved by Captain Fox with little risk, and he added,"you
should give no thought for the commander and his comrades in
this enterprise.

They willingly take the hazard for the sake

of the country, and the honor which, successful or not, they
will receive from you and the lovers of free Government in all
lands".24

Chase said that the probable political effects of

the measure allowed room for much difference of opinion, and
he had not reached his conclusion without serious difficulty.
Said Chase, "If the proposed enterprise will so influence
civil war as to involve an immediate necessity for the enlist22.
23.
24.

Macartney, ~ cit., p. 14
Crawford, ££. cit. p. 359.
Crawford,~. cit., pp. 359, 360.
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ment of armies and the expenditure of millions, I cannot, in
the existing circumstances of the country, and in the present
condition of the national finances, advise it."

But as he

thought that civil war would not follow an attempt to feed a
starving garrison, in which the Government would be discharging
a plain duty, he said, "I return, therefore, an affirmative
answer to the question submitted to me. n25
Cameron advised no, seeing that no practical benefit
would result to the country, and basing his opinion on that
of the army officers, that an attempt to provision would be
disastrous.
doubts.

Welles advised no, saying that he entertained

Smith advised no, saying that giving up Fort Sumter

would cause surprise and complaint.

but that it could be

explained and understood.

Bates advised no, saying that he
was willing to evacuate Fort Sumter. 26 The opinion of Seward
has been reserved to the last for discussion, because of his
important position and his peace policy of long standing.
Seward had for months been determined on a peaceful settlement
of the crisis.

He was under even greater delusions than

Buchanan had been in his reliance on the saving of the border
slave States for the Union, on the basis of which the seceded
States might be persuaded to come back into the Union. Charles
Francis Adams, whose father was very close to Seward and
shared his views on conciliation and peace toward the South,
has left in his autobiography his estimate of Seward's policy
\i

at this time.

Charles Francis Adams was a frequent visitor at

Seward's home at the period under discussion, and he said of
Seward:

25.

26.

Ibid,

p.

361.

Sandburg, Q£.

£!i., vol. 1, p. 189
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He had been of great service, during the interim period l
holding things together and tiding over dangerous shoals.
This he had done; but he had done it under an entire misapprehl"lnsion of the real facts of the situation and with
an absolutely impossible result in view. As I have said l
he believed in the existence of a strong underlying Union
sentiment in the South; he looked forward with confidence
to a sharp reaction of sentiment there, as soon as the
people of those States realized that no harm was intended
them; and he nourished the delusive belief that a recourse
to force could be avoidedj that, if it was avoided or
postponed, the secession movement would languish, and gradually die out. 27
Seward's abhorrence of civil war led him into other
misapprehensions.

His scheme for

a foreign war to knit the

sections together did not dawn on him suddenly, when on April 1
he included such a scheme in his famous "views for the
~residentts

consideration".

As early as the 26th of

January~

1861, Seward had remarked to the minister from the Republic of
Bremen; IfIr the Lord would only give the United States an
excuse for war with England, France, or Spain; that would be
the best means of reestablishing internal peace".

And in a

conversation with the same minister, Rudolph Schleiden, on
February 10, 1861, Seward had complained that there was no
foreign complication which offered an excuse to break with a
)

foreign power. 28

Seward's confidence in the breakdown of

secession if a collision could be avoided naturally caused him
to oppose the provisioning of Fort Sumter.

In a conversation

with General M. C. Meigs, Seward had said that for his part,
his policy had been all along to give up Sumter as too close
to Washington.

It would give a temptation to Davis to relieve

27. Adams~ Charles Francis, AutobiOgraphy, p. 104
New York, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1916.
.
28. Annual Report, American Historical Association, 1915, p. 210
Lutz, Ralph Haswell, "Rudolph Schleiden and the Visit to Richmond,
April 25, 1861."
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it by an attack upon Washington; that he wished to hold
Fort Pickens, to make the fight there and in Texas, and thus
make the burden of the war fall upon those who by rebellion
provoked it. 29
In answer to Lincoln's question of March 15, Seward was
consistent with his policy of long standing.

Seward said

that if it were possible peacefully to provision Fort Sumter
"it would be both unwise and inhuman not to attempt it".

He

was certain, however, that such an attempt would initiate
civil

w~r,

and was therefore opposed to it.

It might have been

Buchanan's words when Seward said:
"

I have felt that it 1s exceedingly fortunate that to a
great extent the Federal Government occupies thus far not
an aggressive attitude, but practically a defensive one,
while the necessity for action, if civil war is to be
initiated, falls on those who seek to dismember and to
subvert the Union.
Then Seward identified the policy of the Republican party with
that of the Buchanan administration, thus:
Partly by design, partly by chance, this policy has been
hitherto pursued by the late administration • • • and by the
Republican party in its corporate action. It is by this
policy, thus pursued, I think, that the progress of dismemberment has been arrested after the seven Gulf States had
seceded and the border states yet remain, although they do so
uneasily, in the Union.
It is to a perseverance in this policy for a short time
longer, that I l)ok as the only peaceful means of assuring
the continuance of Virgibia, Maryland, North Carolina, Kentucky,
Tennessee, Missouri, and Arkansas, or most of these States,
in the Union. It is through their good and patriotic offices
that I look to see the Union sentiment revived, and brought
once more into activity in the seceding States, and through
this agency, those States themselves returning into the Union.

29.

American Historical Review, XXVI, 1921 1 ~. 300
tlGeneral M. c. Meigs on Conduct of the War." (Diary)
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Suppose the expedition successful. We have then a
garrison in Fort Sumter that can defy assault for six months.
\Vhat is it to do then? Is it to make war by opening its
batteries and attempting to demolish the defenses of the
Carolinians? Can it demolish them if it tries? If it cannot l
what 1s the advantage we shall have gained? If it can l
how will it serve to check or prevent disunion? In either
case, it seems to me that we will have inaugurated civil war
by our own act, without agoadequate object, after which
reunion will be hopeless.
\

It was but natural that such an unfavorable opinion of the

\~

Cabinet, with the Secretary of State so emphatically opposed
to provisioning Fort Sumter, should have caused Lincoln to
doubt its wisdom.

It was certainly the opinion of the Cabinet

that Sumter should be evacuated.

Blair was convinced that

Lincoln had resolved to evacuate the fort.

He was so strong

in his desire to reinforce as well as to provision Fort Sumter
that he wrote out his resignation on March 15.

,

The account

of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy, tells us that Blair
had become aware of an understanding which Seward had had with
the members of Mr. Buchanan's administration, or was suspicious
of it, and observing that the President, with the acquiescence
of the Cabinet, "was about adopting the Seward and Scott policy",
he wrote his resignation, determined not to continue in the
Cabinet if no attempt were made to relieve Fort Sumter. 3l
Said Welles:
30. Crawford,.2ll• .£it. pp. 349, 350, 351, 352, 353.
Lincoln's Works, vol. 2, pp. 11 - 14.
31. Welles, Gideon, Diary of Gideon Welles, voi. 1, p. 13
Boston and New York, Houghton Mifflin Co. ,-1911.
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Before handing in his resignation# a delay was made at the
request of his father# the elder Mr. Blair sought an interview with the President, to whom he entered his protest
against non-action, which he denounced as the offspring of
intrigue. His earnestness and indignation armoused and
electrified the Presidentj and when in his zeal# Blair
warned the President that the abandonment of Sumter would be
considered by the people# by the world, by history, as
treason to the country, he touched a chord that responded to
his invocation. The President decided from that moment that
an attempt should be made to convey supplies to Major Anderson#
and that he would reinforce Sumter. This determination he
communicated to the members of the Cabinet as he saw them#
without a general announcement in Cabinet meeting.32

..,

The story of Francis p. Blair# the father of the PostmasterGeneral# was that Lincoln said the matter had not been fully
determined, but that the Cabinet were almost a unit in favor
!

,

of evacuation, "all except your son"# and that such would
probably be the result.

Blair reminded Lincoln that if he

followed such a course impeachment would probably follow.

The

elder Blair claimed that he persuaded Lincoln to change his
course and relieve Sumter. 33
On February 15, the Confederate Government had appointed
three commissioners to go to Washington to settle all questions
of disagreement between the two Governments, to obtain a
recognition of independence, and especially to obtain the
evacuation of the forts in the South.

These commissioners were

Martin J. Crawford# A. B. Roman, and John Forsyth, who received
their instructions on February 27# 1861.

These commissioners

were accredited to the Buchanan administration, but with
instructions to negotiate with the Government of the United
States.

Thus they were authorized to deal with the Lincoln

32. Ibid.
33. ~rawford,~. ~.# p. 364 (Francis P. Blair to author)
Smith# TN. E.# ~ • .£!i., vol. 2, p. 10, (Blair to Van Buren)
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administration also. 34

Martin J. Crawford was the only

commissioner to reach Washington before the end of Buchanan's
administration, arriving on March 3.

The commissioner reported

that he would not attempt to open negotiations with Buchanan,
as he was lIincapable now of purpose as a child".35

On March 12,

the commissioners sought an unofficial interview with Seward,
making their request through Senator Hunter of Virginia.

The

Secretary of State declined to grant the unofficial interview,
"upon exclusively public consideration".36

It seems that it

was the secret purpose of these commissioners to play for time,
and that they had secret instructions to that effect from the
Confederate Government. 37

In a conversation with John Forsyth,

one of the commissioners, S. W. Crawford was told that the
"

secret instructions from Montgomery were "to play with Seward,
to delay and gain time until the South was ready" .38

Two

Justices of the Supreme Court, Judge Nelson, of New York, and
Judge John A. Campbell, of Alabama, now intervened as interm'diaries for the Confederate commissioners.

The opinion of

the two Judges was that the country would be better satisfied
and the counsels of peace promoted, by the reception of the
commissioners, without any recognition of them as officers of
an organized government, or a recognition of the Confederate
Government itself. 39

34. Crawford, .2P.. cit., pp. 314, 315.
35. Ibid, p. 3IO.
36. Moore, Frank, Reb. Record, vol. 1, Documents, p. 43.
37. Lothrop, 2£. cit. p. 238.
38. Crawford, ££. cit., p. 333.
39. Connor, Henry G., John Archibald Campbell, p. 123.
New York, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1920.
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But Seward was fir.m in his determ1nation not to receive
the commissioners, even unofficially.

When Nelson and Campbell

went to Seward's office on March 15 to urge their views upon
him, Seward said that not a member of the Cabinet would consent.
In the conversation with Judges Nelson and Campbell, Seward
revealed his belief that Fort Sumter would be surrendered.
He evidently believed that Lincoln would follow the opinion
of the Cabinet given on the same day.

Said Seward to Campbell:

"No, if Jefferson Davis had known of the state of things here,
he never would have sent those commissioners.
to deal with one thing at a time.
enough to deal with".40

It is enough

The surrender of Sumter is

Campbell then told Seward that he

was going to write to Jefferson Davis and asked what he should
say on the subject of Sumter.

Seward said: "You may say to

him that before that letter reaches him (How far is it to
Montgomery?)" 'Three days'.

"You may say to him that before

that letter reaches him the telegraph will have informed him
that Sumter will have been evacuated".4l

On the same day

Judge Campbell took this assurance to the commissioners, without
telling them his authority, but asserting that it was an
authorized statement and they must accept his word for it. But,
five days later, General Beauregard, commanding the Confederate
forces at Charleston, reported to the commissioners that there
was no indication that the fortwas to be evacuated, but on the
contrary, Major Anderson was at work on the fortifications.

40.

41.

Connor, H. G.,~. cit., p. 124.
Ibid, (Narrative or-Judge Campbell)
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On March 21, Judges Campbell and Nelson again called on
Seward for an explanation, and Seward, being very occupied,
~

I

assured them that everything was all right, and that he
would see them the following day.

"

On the following day,

March 22, the Judges again saw Seward, who said that "in
reference to the evacuation of Sumter, the resolution had
been passed and its execution committed to the Presidentj
that he did not know why it had not been executed; that
there was nothing in the delay that affected the integrity
\\ 42

of the promise or denoted any intention not to comply.

Judge Campbell continued to act as intermediary between
Seward and the Confederate commissioners throughout March
and the first two weeks of April.

The whole story is a

long and complicated one, but the important fact is that
Seward did give assurances that Fort Sumter would be evacuated,
and he held to this opinion until the very last moment.
Although Francis P.

Blair has claimed that Lincoln had made

a decision to relieve Fort Sumter on March 15, it is clear
that Lincoln was still weighing the matter throughout March.
On March 21, Lincoln sent Captain G. V. Fox to Charleston to
visit Anderson and report on the condition of the garrison. 43
Governor Pickens allowed Fox to visit Fort Sumter, accompanied
by a Captain Hartstene, an old comrade of Fox, a native of
South Carolina, and formerly of the United States Navy, and
now in the service of his State.

Pickens thought the object

of Fox was a peaceful one, and according to the reports of the

42.
43.

~id, pp. 126, 127.
.
fficial Record~, vol. 1, pp. 208, 209
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Confederate commissioners, thought Fox had been sent to
prepare for evacuation.

Fox had a conversation with Major

Anderron, in which Anderson earnestly condemned any proposal
to send him reinforcements.
I'

He asserted that it was too late;

he agreed with General Scott that an entrance by sea was
impossible, and he impressed upon Captain Fox his belief that
any reinforcements coming would at once precipitate a collision
and inaugurate civil war.

To this Anderson declared his

opposition, and dwelt at length upon the political results
44
The visit of Fox was short. A statement
that would follow.
of the provisions on hand was furnished him, and it was understood between Fox and Anderson that unless provisions were
furnished the garrison, it could not hold out beyond the 15th
of April at noon, even if the command were placed on short
rations.

For this Anderson said he would await the orders
of the Government. 45
After the Fox visit, Lincoln authorized his former law
partner and bodyguard, Ward H. Lamon, to make a visit to
Charleston and Fort Sumter.

According to Lamon's account,

Lincoln "believed it possible to effect some accomodation by
dealing directly with the most chivalrous among their leaders;
at all events he thought it his duty to try, and my embassy
to Charleston was one of his experiments in that direction".46
Lamon has stated that it was believed in the South that Mr.
Seward had given assurances, before and after Lincoln's inauguration, that no attempt would be made to reinforce the
Crawford, £2. £!i., pp. 369, 370, 371.
45. Ibid, p. 3'72
46. Lamon, 'Nard H., Recollections of Lincoln, p. 69
Published by editor, Dorothy Lamon Teillard, r,Yashington, D.C., 1911.
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Southern forts, or to resupply
administration.

l~ort

Sumter under a republican

This, said Lamon, made matters embarrassing,

as Mr. Lincoln's administration had, on the contrary, adopted
the policy of maintaining the federal authority at all points.
Mr. Seward opposed Lincoln's sending of Lamon to Charleston,
fearing that he might be killed.

"Mr. Secretary", replied

Lincoln, "I have known Lamon to be in many a close place,
and he has never been in one that he didn't get out of. By
Jingl

I'll risk him.

Go, Lamon, and God bless you.

Bring

back a palmetto, if you can't bring back good news.rt 4 7
Stephen A. Hurlbut, of Illinois, accompanied Lamon on
the trip.

Some writers say that he was sent by Lincoln.

According to Lamon, Hurlbut was anxious to visit a sister at
Charleston, the place of his birth, and asked Lamon's permission to accompany him.

Lamon arrived in Charleston March 25. 48

A chief object of Lamon's mission was to sound out possible Union
sentiment in South Carolina, indicating that Lincoln was considering Seward's policy.

The strange result of the mission,

however, was to give the impression that Port Sumter was to be
evacuated.

Lamon did not have authority to commit the

'Washington Goverrunent, but it is quite certain that he did give
the impression that he had come to arrange evacuation. 49

It

is quite possible that Lamon gave this impression to further
his real mission.

South Carolina authorities controlled all

communication between Charleston and Fort Sumter, and sent

47.

48.
49.

Lamon, £Eo cit.;=pp. 69, 70.
Officiar-Records, vol. 1, p. 221.
Ranaall, ££.
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esc~'ts

,

with those permitted to visit the fort.

A note from

'.

Governor Pickens to Beauregard, March 25, indicated that
Lamon had promised evacuation. 50

Lamon gave Anderson the
51
impression that such was the purpose of his visit.
The account of Nicolay and Hay conflicts with that of

Lamon in regard to the part played by
above mission.

N~.

Hurlbut in the

According to Nicolay and Hay, on March 21

Lincoln called Hurlbut to him, and explaining that Mr. Seward
insisted that there was a strong Union Party in the South, even in South Carolina - , asked him to go personally and
ascertain the facts.

Hurlbut's investigation gave no encourage-

ment to the belief that the Union might still be saved by
virtue of a Union party in the South, especially in South
Carolina.

Hurlbut reported:

By appointment I met Mr. Petigru and had a private conversation with him for more than two hours. I was at liberty
to state to him that my object was to ascertain and report
the actual state of felling in the city and State. Our
conversation was entirely free and confidential
He is now
the only man in the city of Charleston who avowedly adheres
to the Union. From these sources I have no hesitation in
reporting as unquestionable that separate nationality is a
a fixed fact, that there is an unanimity of sentiment which is
to my mind astonishing; . that there is no attachment to the
Union. There is positively nothing to appeal to. 52
Lamonts report to Lincoln was equally discouraging.

From the

Governor of South Carolina he brought the following message
to Lincoln:
Nothing can prevent war except the acquiescence of the
President of the United States in secession • • • Let your
President attempt to reinforce Sumter, and the tocsin of war
will be sounded from every hilltop and valley in the South. 53

50.
51.
52.
53.
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About this time,
.

]~rch

23, the opinion of the correspondent

\

of the London Times in Washington was that "the Southern
leaders are forcing on a solution with decision and energy,
whilst the Government appears to be helplessly drifting
with the current of events, having neither bow nor stern,
neither ,keel nor deck, neither rudder, compass, sails or
steam".54
Soon after March 5, when Secretary Holt had forwarded
to Lincoln his summary of the Fort Sumter situation, accompanied by the recent dispatches from Major Anderson, Lincoln
had called in the acting Secretary of War, and confidentially
asked him if he had any reason to doubt the loyalty of
Major Anderson.

Holt assured him that he had no reason to

doubt Anderson's loyalty.55

On March 10 Lincoln paid a

surprise visit to the wife of Captain Abner Doubleday.
Doubleday was second in command at Fort Suniter, and Lincoln
explained to his wife that he wanted to see her husband's
letters from t he fort, so that he might form a better opinion
as to the condition there, particularly in regard to the
resources. 56 Lincoln evidently had doubts as to the loyalty
or wisdom of Anderson's conduct of the last few weeks.

On

March 25, the Senate had requested the President to communicate
to it the dispatches of Major Anderson to the War Department
since he had been in command of Fort Sumter, "if not incompatible with the public interest".

On March 26, Lincoln informed

54. Russell, Sir William H., :My Diary North and South, p. 26
Boston, T. O. H. P. Burnham Co., 1863.
55. Crawford, ££. £!i., p. 285.
56. Doubleday, Abner, 2£. £!l., p. 130
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the Senate that he had .. "with the highest respect for the
Senate .. come to the conclusion that at the moment the
publication of it would be inexpedient".57
Seward?

But what of

Had he been playing with the Confederate commissioners?

The correspondent of the London Times, who held frequent
interviews with Seward .. referring to an assertion in a New
York paper that orders had been given to evacuate Sumter,
quoted Seward as saying on March 26: "That is a plain lie.
No such orders have been given.

We will give up nothing we

have - abandon nothing that has been intrusted to us.

If

people would only read these statements by the light of the
President's

inau~al ..

they would not be

deceived~58

If

Seward said the like he was not consistent with his true
policy.
To add to the confusion and difficulty of making a
decision, when all the advice was against him .. General Scott
reported an additional opinion on March 28 to Lincoln.
Said General Scott:
It is doubtful .. however, according to recent information
from the South .. whether the voluntary evacuation of Fort
Sumter alone would have a decisive effect upon the States
now wavering between adherence to the Union and secession.
It is known, indeed, that it would be charges to necessity,
and the holding of Fort Pickens would be adduced in support
of that view. Our Southern friends, however .. are clear
that the evacuation of both the forts would instantly soothe
and give confidence to the eight remaining slave-holding
States, and render their cordial adherence to this Union
perpetual. The holding of Forts Jefferson and Taylor on the
ocean keys depends on entirely different principles, and
should never be abandoned; and indeed the giving up of Forts
Sumter and Pickens may be best justified by the hope that
we should thereby recover the States to which they geographically belong by the liberality of the act, besides retaining
the eight doubtful States. 59
57.
58.
59.
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On March 28, the same day Scott delivered his surrender
opinion, Lincoln gave his first State dinner.

Before taking

leave that evening, Lincoln invited the members of his Cabinet
into an adjoining room for a moment's consultation, and informed them of Scott's advice.

Blair charged Scott with

playing politics, and his remarks were understood by those
present to be aimed at Seward's peace policy which he had
freely criticised.

Without a formal vote, there was a unanimous

expression of dissent from Scott's suggestion, and the President
requested the Cabinet to meet in formal council the next day.60
..

,

It seems, however, that Lincoln had almost made up his mind to
provision Fort Sumter, for on that same day, March 28, he had
ordered Captain G. V. Fox to prepare him a short order for
the ships, men and supplies he would need for his expedition. 6l
Fox immediately prepared the following order:

,
,,

Steamers Pocahontas at Norfolk, Pawnee at Washington,
Harriet Lane at New York, to be under sailing orders for sea,
with stores, etc., for one month. Three hundred men to be
kept ready for departure from on board the receiving ships
at New York. Two hundred men to be ready to leave Governor's
Island in New York. Supplies for twelve months for one
hundred men to be put in portable shape, ready for instant
shipping~2 A large steamer and three tugs conditionally
engaged.
It may well be that Lincoln's hesitation to act throughout
March had been because of his belief that the North would not
support him in any war that might follow an attempt to relieve
or supply Fort Sumter.

There had been a rather large section

of public opinion inclined to the policy of Greeley and scott,
to let the "erring sisters" depart in peace.
60.
61.
62.

On March 23,

Nicolay and Hay, ~. £!i., vol. 3, p. 394.
Ibid, p. 433.
OffIcial Records, vol. 1, p. 227.
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H. Russelll correspondent of the London Times l recorded

in his diary that very little was being done by New York
to support or encourage the Gowernment in any decided policy;
that the Journals were more engaged in abusing each other,
and in small party warfare, than in the performance of the
duties of a patriotic press. 63 The radical Republiaans were
now pressing for a firmer policy.

On March 28, Senator

Trumbull offered a resolution declaring it the duty of the
President "to use all means in his power to hold and protect
the public property of the United States1and to enforce the
laws thereof, as well in the States of South Carolina,
Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Florida, Louisiana and Texas
as within the other States of the Union ff • 64 The historian
Rhodes has concluded that at the end of March there was a
manifestation of public sentiment for a firmer policy, which,
coupled with the protests of the radical Republican Senators,
as well as a clearer comprehension of the public duty,
influenced the President and some members of the Cabinet to
adopt a more decided pOlicy.65
After the State dinner guests had departed on the night
of March 28, Lincoln did not sleep for the rest of the night,
so absorbed and perplexed was he as to his course in regard
to Fort Sumter. 66 The next day, I~rch 29, the Cabinet met
as requested the night before, and Lincoln asked the Cabinet
members for their opinions on the sending of an expedition to

63.

Russell, W. H.,.£E. cit., p. 27
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relieve Fort Sumter, peaceably, if possible.

I

,

I

I

Mr. Seward wrote:

The dispatch of an expedition to supply or reinforce
Sumter would provoke an attack, and so involve war at that
pOint. The fact of preparation for such expedition would
inevitably transpire and would therefore precipitate the
war - and probably defeat the object. I do not think it
wise to provoke a civil war beginning at Charleston and
in rescue of an untenable position. S~erefore I advise
against the expedition in every view.
Then Seward went on to put in a word for his own pet scheme

/

I
I

of reinforcing Fort Pickens instead of Sumter.

Said seward:

I would call in Captain M. C. Meigs forthwith. Aided by
his counsel, I would at once, and at every cost, prepare
for a war at Pensacola and Texas, to be taken, however,
only as a consequence of maintaining the possessions and
authority of the United States. I would ~gstruct Major
Anderson to retire from Sumter forthwith.
Chase gave a much more determined answer than he gave on March
15.

Said he:

I am clearly in favor of provisioning Fort Sumter. If that
attempt be resisted by military force, Fort Sumter should,
in my opinion, be reinforced. 69
Smith wrote:
Believing that Fort Sumter cannot be successfully defended,
I regard its evacuation as a necessity, andI advise that
Major Anderson's command shall be unconditionally withdrawn. 70
Blair wrote:
First - As regards General Scott, I have no confidence in
his judgment on the questions of the day. His political
views control his judgment, and his course as remarked on
by the President shows that whilst no one will question his
patriotism, the results are the same as if he was in fact
traitorous.
Second - It is acknowledged to be possible to relieve
Fort Sumter. It ought to be relieved without reference to
Pickens or any other possession. South Carolina is the head
and front of this rebellion, and when that State is safely
delivered from the authority of the United States it will
strike a blow against our authority from which it will take
us years of bloody strife to recover.
Third - For my own part, I am unwilling to share in the
responsibility of such a policy.71
67.
68.
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Wrote Bates:
It is my decided opinion that Fort Pickens and Key west
ought to be reinforced and supplied, so as to look down
all opposition at all hazards - and this whether Fort Sumter
be or be not evacuated. As to Fort Sumter A I think the time
is come either to evacuate or relieve it. 7G
Mr. Welles wrote:

I

i

)

,\1
~\ 1

J ,

I concur in the proposition to send an armed force off
Charleston, with supplies of provisions and reinforcements
for the garrison at Fort Sumter, and of communicating at
the proper time the intentions of the Government to provision the fort, peaceably if unmolested. There is little
probability that this will be permitted, if the opposing
forces can prevent it. An attempt to force in provisions
without reinforcing the garrison at the same time might
not be advisable; but armed resistance to a peaceable attempt to send pro isions to one of our own forts will
justify the Government in using all the power at its command
to reinforce the garrison and furnish the necessary supplies.
Fort Pickens and other places retained should be
strengthened by additional troops, and, if possible, made
impregnable. 73
There is no record of the opinion of the Secretary of uar,
Mr. Cameron.

He was not present at the Cabinet meeti~g.74

Thus the Cabinet now stood two for and three against the
evacuation of Sumter, Bates being "on the fence tt •
After the Cabinet meeting Lincoln brought out the
memorandum written by Captain Pox on the 28th, and on the
bottom of it wrote an order on the Secretary of '!liar:
Sir, I desire that an expedition, to move by sea, be
got ready to sail as early as the 6th of April next, the
whole according to memorandum attached, and that you
cooperate with the Secretary of the Navy for that object. 75
There is diffuculty in determining whether this order was with
reference to Sumter specifically or not.
72.
73.
74.
75.

The facts are not at

Ibid.
Nicolay and Hay, ~. cit., pp. 430, 431.
Sandburg, ££. cit., vcr; I, p. 193.
Official RecorU8; vol. 1, p. 226.
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all clear, but the evidence indicates that Lincoln was at
this time directing the sending of two expeditions, one to
Sumter and another to Pickens.

At least four Cabinet members

wanted to relieve Pickens.
The story of Fort Pickens is intricately bound up with
that of Sumter.

As early as March 5, Lincoln, in his orders

to Scott to "exercise all possible vigilance for the maintenance
of all the places ll , had intended that Pickens should be reinforced.

He made inquiries four days later and, to his surprise,

found that nothing had been done.

Assuming the omission had

occurred through Scott's preoccupation about Sumter, Lincoln
.,

\ I

again on March 12, gave special directions to reinforce
Pickens. 76 For some reason the orders again were not sent,
and on March 30 Seward went to General Scott and told him
that the President now ordered that Fort Pickens be reinforced
and that he should issue the necessary orders.

Scott replied:

"Well, Mr. ;Secretary of State, the great Frederick used to
say that, 'when the king commands, nothing is impossible'.
The President's orders shall be obeyed, sir.fl77

Scott must

have acted at once, for the orders to land the troops held on
board ship, near Fort Pickens, since the Buchanan truce, reached
the commander on March 31. 78
Fearing another failure of the execution of orders as to
Pickens, or believing that the troops held on ship there were
not sufficient, Lincoln and Seward called on Captain M. C. Meigs,
on March 31, to organize another expedition to relieve and

76.
77.
78.

Nicolay and Hay, 2£. cit., vol. 3, p. 393.
Crawford, .Q£. ill., p:-408.
~, p. 403.
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reinforce Fort Pickens.

This expedition was organized and
sent with Lincoln's consent. 79 Because of a desire for

the utmost secrecy, and because the only funds available to
defray the cost were the secret service fund of the State
Department, Seward took charge of the expedition over the
heads and without the knowledge of the Secretaries of War
and Navy.SO

This expedition could not be organized and sent

for several days.

Thus two expeditions were being organized;

the one intended for provisioning Fort Sumter, the other for
the more determined purpose of reinforcing Fort Pickens.
The orders issued by Scott on March 30, and which reached
Captain Vogdes on March 31, were not obeyed.

Captain Vogdes

was in command of the Federal troops on shipboard off Fort
Pickens.

Vogdes asked Captain H. A. Adams, in command of

the fleet, for immediate means to land.

Adans refused,

alleging that it was a violation of the joint order of Holt
and Toucey made in consequence of the Pickens truce between
Buchanan and certain Southern Senators on January 29.

Adams

held that Scott's army order could not supersede Secretary
Toucey's navy order; he therefore sent an officer, April 1,
to solicit the express commands of the Navy Department. 81
Thus the attempt to reinforce Pickens before the Meigs expedition
could sail was frustrated by Captain Adams.

Adams' special

messenger, asking for specific authority from the Navy Department,
did not reach Washington until April 6. 82

79. American

Historic~l Reyiew, XXVI, 1921, pp. 287 - 299.
"General M. C. Meigs on Conduct of the Civil lflartt (Meigs' Diary)
80. Crawford, Q2. cit., p. 411.
81. NicOlay ana-HaY;-££. £!i., vol. 4, p. 7
82. Rhodes, ££. £!!., vol. 3, p. 233.
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Lincoln's difficulty seemed to be in satisfying the more
determined Northern public opinion in favor of upholding the
Government's authority, and at the same time to avoid a conflict at Sumter in order to keep Virginia and the border
slave States in the Union.
improving for the Unionists.

The situation in Virginia was not
On April 3, Stanton wrote to

Buchanan: "The rumors from Hicbmond are very threateningj
secession is rapidly gainino0' strength there.,,83

.";1. H•

P
~1.us·se

11

wrote in his diary: "It is stated, nevertheless, that Virginia
is on the eve of secession, and will certainly go if the
President attempts to use force in relieving and strengthening
the federal forts. H84

It is true that Virginia was more con-

cerned over the Sumter case than that of Pickens.

Although

Lincoln had at last decided to at least attempt to provision
Fort Sumter, he declared in his message to Congress of July
4, 1861, that Sumter might have been evacuated had not the
orders to reinforce Pickens miscarried.

Concerning this

point Lincoln said:
Starvation was not yet upon the garrison, and ere it would
be reached Fort Pickens might be reinforced. This last would
be a clear indication of policy, and would better enable the
country to accept the evacuation of Fort Sumter as a military
necessity. An order was at once directed to be sent for the
landing of troops from the steamship Brooklyn into Fort
Pickens. This order could not go by land, but must take the
longer and slower route by sea. The first return news from
the order was received just one week before the fall of
Fort Sumter. The news itself was that the officer commanding
the Sabine, to which vessel the troops had been transferred
from the Brooklyn, acting upon some quasi armistice of the
late administration (and of the existence of which the present
administration, up to the time the order was dispatched, had
only too vague and uncertain rumors to fix attention), had
83.
84.

Curtis, ~. cit., vol. 2, p. 538.
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refused to land the troops. To now reinforce Fort Pickens
before a crisis would be reached at Fort Sumter was now
impossible, rendered so by the near exhaustion of provisions in the latter-named fort. In precaution against
such a conjuncture the Government had a few days before
commenced preparing an expedition, as well adapted as
might be, to relieve Fort Sumter, which expedition was
intended to be ultimately used or not, according to
circumstances. The strongest anticipated case for using
it was now presented, and it was resolved to send it
forward. 85
The facts of the case tend to prove that Lincoln was
mistaken or confused in the above statement.

It seems from

the evidence that there was no such close connection between
the Pickens and Sumter expeditions.

As we shall see in the

next chapter, on April 4, Lincoln told Fox, when the latter
remarked that he had very little time to get to Sumter before
the garrison would be starved out, that he would best serve
his country by making the attempt.

Lincoln was wrone in his

statement to Congress when he said that it would have been
impossible to relieve Fort Pickens before Sumter would have
been forced to evacuate from lack of supplies.

Major Anderson

had told Fox that he could hold out until the 15th of April,
at noon.

Fort Pickens was actually reinforced on April 12.86

It is the writer's opinion that, notWithstanding Lincoln's
honesty, he made the best possible case for his conciliatory
professions in his message to Congress.

From Lincoln's own

statement it seems that he was determined to attempt to
prOVision Sumtel', independently of Fort Pickens.
thought war was ineVitable, and

if it

He probably

must come Sumter would

furnish the best grounds for forcing the South into firing
the first shot. 87
85. Richardson, J. V., £E. cit., vol. 6, pp. 21, 22
Lincoln to Congress, July 4,~61.
86. Nic olay and Hay, QD., ill., vol. 4, p. 12.
87. Crawford, QD, cit., p. 420. Lincoln to Fox

CI-L-\PTER IX
THE FALL OF FORT SUMTER

CHAPTER IX
THE FALL OF PORT SUMTER

Having reviewed the development of a policy tm';ard the
Southern forts through the month of March, we have seen that,
according to one statement of Lincoln, there was doubt as
to provisioning Sumter to the last moment.

'rhis assertion,

however, does not seem to agree with the facts of the case.
In his message to Congress, July 4, 1861, Lincoln asserted
that the Sumter expedition would not have sailed, and that
Sumter would have been evacuated, if news had not arrived
on April 6 that Pickens r4d not yet been reinforced, and
probably could not be reinforced before the garrison at Sumter
was starved into evacuation.

The writer has charged that

Lincoln must have been wrong in his assertion, because, as will
be shown in the presant chapter, he gave final orders on April
4 for the dispatch of the Sumter expedition, before he received the news on April 6 that Pickens had not been reinforced,
and probably could not be before a forced evacuation of Sumter.
Secretary of the Navy Welles has said that Lincoln told him
and Seward that the Sumter expedition was more important than
that for Pickens,l

which agrees more with the facts than

Lincoln's statement of duly 4, 1861.
1.

VJ e l1es,

It is clear that two

Gideon,...£E!..~' vol. 1, p. 25.
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separate expeditions had been ordered, the one for Sumter
without reference to that for Pickens.

The Cabinet, however,

was stronger for the reinforcement of Pickens than for the
provisioning of Sumter.
There is evidence, however, that Lincoln considered
ordering the evacuation of Sumter just before the relief
expedition sailed, not because of the Pickens situation,
but because of concern over the possible action of the
Virginia Convention.

In the first week of April Lincoln

sent a messenger to Hicbmond, requesting Judge George W.
SUmmers to come to Washington for a conference.
a Unionist member of the Convention"
hfJJ,eJ r03ef -fire CONV'BN-f,'''N

Summers was

ilwcLf/t:Y.tlPlh,:6,At 'l'tY~O/N

ttl dtl/fJVt-NJ

without passing an ordinance of secession.

SlNe

,,'e.)

In exchange,

Lincoln would agree to the evacuation of Fort Sumter. Summers
Consulted with other members of the Convention and selected
for the errand John B. Baldwin. 2

Baldwin's version of the

conference with Lincoln, which took place on April 5, was
that Lincoln complained that he should have come sooner, that
he had had a proposition to make, but that now it was too late. 3
The testimony of John Minor Botts, an anti-secession Unionist
of

Virgin~a,

who had a conversation with Lincoln on April 7,

affirmed that Lincoln told him that he had proposed to Baldwin
that the orders for the sailing of the Fort Sumter expedition
would be recalled if the Virginia Convention would adjourn
sine die, without passing an ordinance of secession. 4 ~nen
Botts asked the President to authorize him to make the same
2.
.QJ2.

3.
4.

Nicolay and Hay,..2l2.!~., vol. 3, p. 424.
cit., vol. 1, p. 195 •
Sandburg, ££. cit., vol. 1, p. 195
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proposition to the Virginia Convention, Lincoln replied
that it was now too late, that the fleet had already sailed.
A special study of the Lincoln-Baldwin conference, made by
,

'
~'Jv.

L. Hall in 1914, confirmed the testimony of

F;

Botts.~

When

Botts asked Lincoln how Baldwin received his proposition,
Lincoln, according to Botts, threw up his hands and said: "Oh,
he wouldn't listen to it at all; scarcely treated me with
civility.fr6
It might have been that Lincoln had been influenced

,,
I

to make such a proposal to the Virginia Convention by the
advice of Seward.

In the "views for the President's con-

sideration "which Seward sent the President on April 1_
Seward urged Lincoln to change the question before the public
from one upon slavery, or about slavery, for one upon union
or disunion.

For such a purpose Seward reiterated his advice

for the evacuation of Fort Sumter in the following language:
The occupation or evacuation of Fort Sumter, although
not in fact a slavery or party question, is so regarded.
Witness the temper manifested by the Republicans in the
free States, and even by the Union men in the South. I
would therefore terminate it as a safe means for changing
the issue, I deem it fortunate that the last Administration
created the necessity.7
On the 30th of March_ 1861, Lincoln sent Captain Fox to
New York with verbal instructions to make ready the expedition_
but not to incur any binding engagements.

On the 2nd of April_

Fox, not having received the written authority which he had
expected from the Government, returned to Washington. 8

Accord-

5. H&ll, 7lilmer L., "The Lincoln Interview With John B. Baldwin,"
South Atlantic Quarterlz, XIII, 1914, p. 269.
6. Nicolay and Hay_ 2£. £!i., vol. 3, p. 425.
7. Ibid, p. 446.
8. '$iiIth~ W. E., .2,E. ill., vol. 2, p. 12. (Correspondence of
G. V. Fox).
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ing to Fox, delays which belonged to "the secret political
history Itof the period, prevented a decision until the
afternoon of the 4th of April, when the President sent for
Fox and told him that he had decided to let the expedition
go.

Lincoln said that a messenger would be sent to the

authorities of Charleston, before Fox could get there, to
notify them that troops would not be put into Sumter, provided
the subsistence for the garrison was allowed to be landed at
the Fort peacefully.

Fox told the President that he would

have but nine days in which to organize the expedition, after
reaching New York, and to reach the destined point six hundred
and thirty-two miles distant.

This time limit was based on

Anderson's report that he would run out of provisions by noon,
April 15.

Lincoln replied: "You will best fulfill your duty

to your country by making the attempt. 1f9
The orders of the Secretary of War to Captain Pox, issued
April 4, were:
It having been decided to succor Fort Sumter you have
been selected for this important duty. Accordingly you
will take charge of the transports in New York having the
troops and supplies on board to the entrance of Charleston
harbor, and endeavor, in the first instance to deliver the
subsistence. If you are opposed in this you are directed
to report the fact to the senior naval officer of the harbor,
who will be instructed by the Secretary of the Navy to use
his entire force to open a passage, when you will, if possible,
effect an entrance and place both troops and supplies in
Port Sumter.lO
On the same date, April 4, the Adjutant-General, L. Thomas,
gave Fox written orders which gave him authority to have any
vessels which he might designate chartered for the expedition,

9.

10.

Ibid, p. 13.
Records, vol. 1, pp. 235, 236.
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at such time and with such supplies as he might indicate. ll
On April 3, an ice schooner, bound from Boston to
Savannah, had mistaken the harbor of Charleston for that of
Savannah and entered, flying the United States flag.

The

Confederate batteries on Morris Island had fired into it,
and Major Anderson, just as in the case of the Star of the
West, had failed to return the fire. 12 On April 4, Anderson
reported to the War Department his reasons for not returning
the fire.

Let Anderson tell the story:

The remarks made to me by Colonel Lamon, taken in connection
with the tenor of newspaper articles, have induced me, as
stated in previous communications, to believe that orders
would soon be issued for my abandoning this work. Vfuen the
firing commenced some of my heaviest guns were concealed from
their view by planking, and by the time the battery was
ready the firing had ceased. I then, acting in strict
accordance with the spirit and wording of the orders of the
War Department, as communicated to me in the 1ett~r from
the Secretary of War dated February 23, 1861, dete'rmined not
to commence firing until I had sent to the vessel and investigatedthe circumstances.
The accompanying report presents them. Invested by a
force so superior that a collision would, in all probability,
terminate in the destruction of our force before relief
could reach us, with only a few days! provisions on hand,
and with a scanty supply of ammunition, as will be seen by a
reference to my letter of February 27, in hourly expectation
of receiving definite instructions from the War Department,
and with orders so explicit and peremptory as those I am
acting under, I deeply regret that I did not feel at liberty
to resent the insult thus offered to the flag of my beloved
country. 13
The above report shows two important things.

Anderson, while

orders were in process of being issued for his relief, believed
that he was to be withdrawn from Fort Sumter, and that he was
still acting under the orders of the Buchanan administration.
It also shows the lack of supplies and fresh orders to guide
11.
12.
13.

Official Records, vol. 1, p. 236.
Ibid.
Ibid, p. 237.
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Anderson.

Major Anderson was so confident that he was to be
withdrawn that he started packing up on March 29. 14
On April 4, the Secretary of War, Cameron, sent a message
to Anderson in answer to the above communication.

Cameron

told Anderson that.his letter had caused some anxiety to
the President.

According to the information of Captain ,Fox,

obtained on the latter's visit of March 21, Cameron stated
that it had been expected that Anderson could hold out until
the 15th of April.

"Hoping still", said Cameron, "that you

will be able to sust8.in yourself till the 11th or 12th instant,

i

!
i

the expedition will go forward, and finding your flag flying,
will attempt to provision you, and in case the effort is
resisted, will endeavor also to reinforce you.

You will there-

fore hold out, if possible, till the arrival of the expedition. 15
In the same letter there was the type of order that Buchanan
sent to Anderson on December 21, 1860, relieving him of the
necessity to defend Fort Moultrie "to the last extremity".
Cameron added:
It is not, however, the intention of the President to
subject your command to any danger or hardship beyong what,
in your judgment, would be usual in military lifej and he
has entire confidence that you will act as becomes a patriot
and soldier, under all circumstances.
Whenever, if at all, in your judgment, to save yourself
and command, a capitulation becomes a necessity, you are
authorized to make it. 16
It is to be observed that in the original memorandum
which Fox wrote at Lincoln's request, on March 28, Fox had
named the steamers Pocahontas, Pawnee, and the Harriet Lane.
14.
15.
16.

Crawford, ££. cit., p. 373.
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He had not asked for the Powhatan.
that he would need the Powhatan.

17

Later Fox decided

The Powhatan had recently

returned to port and gone out of commission, was imrnediately
recommissioned because Fox thought it would be unwise to
put all the sailors and launches on board the Baltic, in
addition to the army detacbment he had requested.

In the

opinion of Fox, "the Powhatan, with her disciplined crew and
large boats, became indispensable to success".18

Accordingly,

the Secretary of the Navy, Gideon Welles, on April 5, ordered
Captain Mercer, commanding the Powhatan, to cooperate with Fox
in the Fort Sumter Expedition. 19 But Seward had other plans
for the Powhatan.

With the knowledge of the President, but

acting over the heads of both the War and Navy Secretaries,

\\

and without their knowledge of it, Seward was busy planning
20
his special expedition to reinforce Fort Pickens.
The
principals in Seward's secret Pickens expedition were M. C.
Meigs, Lieut. David D. Porter, and Lieut. Col. E. VI. Keyes.
Porter urged secrecy on Seward because the former thought
there were many clerks in the Navy Department of secession
sympathies, and if the orders went through the Navy Department,
the news would be communicated

and Fort Pickens would be

taken by the secessionists forthwith.

Porter also suggested

to Seward that the Powhatan be fitted out for this expedition
\1

"by a secret order of the President. 21

17.

Ibftf;

p.

227.

18. Smith, W. E., .2l2. cit. vol. 2, p. 13, (Fox Correspondence)
19. Official Records, VOl. 1, p. 240.
20. Sandburg,.2E,. cit., vol. 1, p. 197, Welles, Gideon, ..Q;2. cit.
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On April 1, Seward, Meigs and Porter had gone to the
President, to whom Porter explained his suspicions of the
clerks in the Navy Department, and told Lincoln if he would
issue the orders, they would be promptly executed to the
letter.

aBut", said Lincoln, "is not this a most irregular

mode of procedure7" "Certainly", said Porter, "but the
necessity of the case justifies it".

Then Seward said: "You

aI'e the commander-in-chief of the army and navy, and this is
a case where it is necessary to issue direct orders without
passing them through intermediaries tt •

V'fuen Lincoln objected,

"But what will Uncle Gideon say?", Seward replied, 1I0h, I
will make it all right with Mr. Welles.,,22

Lincoln signed

the orders detaching the Powhatan from the Fort Sumter
expedition, without reading them.

He told Welles that he

did not have time to read them and if he couldn't trust the
Secretary of State, he knew not whom he could trust. 23
On April 5, between eleven and twelve o'clock at night,
Seward and his son Frederick, the Assistant Secretary of State,
came to Welles' rooms at Willard's with a telegram from
Captain I.ieigs at New York.

The telegram stated that the

movements of the Pickens expedition had been retar'ed by conflicting orders from the secretary of the Navy.

'Nelles asked

for an explanation, for he could not understand the nature of
the telegram or its Object.

After it was made clear that there

were conflicting orders for the disposition of the Powhatan,
it was suggested that they should go see Lincoln.
22.
23.
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over to Lincoln .. Seward .. according to Welles .. remarked that
old as he was, he had learned a lesson from that affair,

I

I

which was that he had better confine his labors to his
own department. To this Welles cordially agreed. 24 Welles r
account of this conference with Lincoln is worthy of
quotation:
The President had not retired when we reached the
Executive Mansion, although it was nearly midnight. On
seeing us he was surprised, and his surprise was not
diminished on learning our errand. He looked first at one
and then the other, and declared there was some mistake ..
but after again hearing the facts stated, and again looking
at the telegram .. he asked if I was not mistaken in regard
to the Powhatan .. - if some other vessel was not the flagship of the Sumter expedition. I assured him there was no
mistake on my part; reminded him that I had read to him
my confidential instructions to Captain Mercer. He said that
he remembered tl~t fact and that he approved of them, but
he could not remember that the Powhatan was the vessel.
Commodore Stringham confirmed my statement, but to make
the matter perfectly clear to the President, I went to the
Navy Department and brought and read to him the instructions.
He then remembered distinctly all the facts, and turning
promptly to Mr. Seward, said the Powhatan must be restored
to Mercer, that on no account must the Sumter expedition
fail or be interfered with. Mr. Seward hesitated .. remonstrated .. asked if the other expedition was not quite as important
and whether that would not be defeated if the Powhatan was
detached. The President said the other had time to wait ..
but no time was to be lost as regarded Sumter, and he directed
Mr. Seward to telegraph and return the Powhatan to Mercer
without delay. Mr. Seward suggested the difficulty of
getting a dispatch through and to the Navy yard at so late an
hour .. but the President was imperative that it should be done.
The President took upon himself the whole blame .. said it
was carelessness, heedlessness on his own part .. he ought
to have been more careful and attentive. 25
So Seward couldnrt make it right with Mr. Welles.
But the Powhatan had sailed on April 6 .. without waiting
for a reply to Meigsr telegram to Seward.

Porterrs orders to

take command of the Powhatan had been Signed by the President,
24.
25.
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and insisted on telegraphing the Secretary of the Navy for
instructions.
ticklish times.

I
I

Foote said to Porter: "Porter, these are
How do I know that you are not going to

•

run off with the ship?
Secretarytr.26
,

I must telegraph immediately to the

The Powhatan had hardly left to go down the

I

~,

harbor, April 6, 1:00 P. M. when a telegram from the
Secretary of State arrived for Lieutenant Porter.

The comman-

dant of the Navy Yard at once dispatched an officer to employ
a fast vessel in New York and go in pursuit.

The POWhatan

was overtaken and Porter was given the brief telegram:
"Deliver up the Powhatan to Captain Mercer. - W. H. Seward.,,27
Porter at once replied: "I have received orders from the
President which I cannot disobey", and proceeded on his course. 28
There had been qUite a delay in the arrival of the telegram.
Seward was ordered by Lincoln to send the telegram on April 5,
at midnight, but it was not sent until the next afternoon.

Was

Seward giving Porter time in which to get away?
After all the assurance Seward had given Judge Campbell
that Fort Sumter would not be reinforced, but evacuated,
C~lpbell

received a different story from Seward on April 1.

On this date Campbell received a note from Seward in writing:
trI am satisfied the Government will not undertake to supply
Sumter without giving notice to Governor

Picken;~29

According

to Judge Campbell, Seward added verbally that the President
might desire to supply Sumter but would not do so, and there
26.
27.
28.
29.

Crawford, £E. cit., p. 412, (Porter to author.)
Crawford, £E. cit., p. 415
Ibid.
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was no design to reinforce.

On April 7# Judge Campbell

addressed a letter to Seward expressing alarm at the
preparations the Government was making and asked him if
his assurances were well or ill founded.

Seward replied

to Campbell: "Faith as to Sumter fully kept.

Wait and see."30

Campbell believed that Seward had been lying all along, that
his "faith as to Sumter fully kept" meant that there would
be no attempt to supply

or~einforce;

but Seward must have

been referring to the promise that Governor Pickens would
be notified in advance of an attempt to supply the fort.
It is true that Lincoln# toward the end of March, told Seward
that he might tell Judge Campbell that no attempt to provision the fort would be made without giving notice to
31
Governor Pickens.
On April 6, Lincoln sent a special messenger, R. S. Chew,
to Governor Pickens with the promised notification.

Chew

arrived in Charleston April 8, sought an interview with
Governor Pickens, and read to him Lincoln's notice of an
attempt to supply Fort Sumter, as follows:
I am directed by the President of the United States to
notify you to expect an attempt will be made to supply
Fort Sumter with provisions only; and that, if such attempt
be not resisted, no effort to throw in men, arms, or
ammunition will be made without further notice, or in case
of an attack upon the fort.32
But Lincoln's special messenger was preceded by a telegram
to Charleston on April 6 from James E. Harvey, Seward's
!

,

protege# who was soon after apPointed minister to Portugal.
30.
31.
32.
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Harvey telegraphed to his friend Judge Magrath:

I.
I

Positively determined not to withdraw Anderson. Supplies
go immediately, supported by naval force under Stringham
if their landing be resisted.33
On April 8, Crawford, one of the Confederate commissioners
at Washington, telegraphed to General Beauregard:
Accounts are uncertain, because of the constant
vacillation of this Government. We were reassured yesterday
that the status of Sumter would not be changed without
previous notice to Governor Pickens, but we have no faith
in them. The war policy prevails in the Cabinet at this
hour. 34
On April 8 also, L. p.

~'lalker,

Confederate Secretary of

~Yar,

telegraphed to Beauregard at Charleston:
Under no circumstances are you to allow provisions to be
sent to Fort Sumter. 35
On the same date, Beauregard telegraphed to Walker:
Anderson's provisions stopped yesterday. No answer from
him. I am calling out balance of contingent troops.:56
April 9, Walker telegraphed to Beauregard:
Major ~i.nderson 1 s mails must be stopped.
be completely isolated.

The fort must

And Beauregard, in answer to t he above, on the same day
telegraphed ·.'ialker:
"The mails have already been stopped".37
The pressure was fast on Major Anderson.

On April 10

Walker, the Confederate SeCl"etary of War, telographed to
Beauregard to demand at once the evacuation of Fort Sumter, and
if that should be refused, to proceed to reduce it.
33.
34.
35.
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replied that the demand would be made on April 11 at 12
o'clock, whereupon Walker telegraphed back that unless there
were special reasons connected with his condition, he should
make the demand at an earlier hour.

Beauregard replied
that his reasons were special for twelve o'clock. 38 Accordingly

Beauregard made the demand on Anderson.

Beauregard sent

three aides, Col. James Chestnut, Captain Stephen D. Lee,
and Lieutenant-Colonel Chisholm, who arrived in a boat flying
a white flag.

As it happened, they were met by Lieutenant

Jefferson C. Davis, who escorted them to the guard-room,
where they met Major Anderson.

In the name of Beauregard

and the Confederate Government they demanded the evacuation
of the fort.

All propor facilities would be afforded for

the removal of the garrison, with company arms and property,
and all private property, to any post in the United States
Anderson might name.

The flag which "you have upheld so long,

and with so much fortitude, under the most trying circumstances,
may be saluted by you on taking it down~39
A council of officers was called by Anderson.

The whole

subject of the position was gone over, and for the first time
the confidential order of Buchanan and Floyd of December 21,
1860, in which Anderson was told not to sacrifice his men by
a useless resistance, wax shown to the officers.

A decision

was reached to refuse the demand to evacuate, which Anderson
handed to Beauregard's aides, reading thus:
38.
39.
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I,

General: I have the honor to acknowled3e the receipt
of your communication demanding the evacuation of this
fort, and to say, in reply thereto~ that it is a demand
with which I regret that my sense of honor, and of my
obligations to my Government, prevent my compliance.
Thanking you for the fair, manly, and courteous terms
40
proposed, and for the high compliment paid me, I am, etc.
As the aides were leaving, Anderson asked if Beauregard would
open his batteries without further notice to him.
Chestnut replied that he would not.
he would await the first

shot~

Colonel

Anderson remarked that

but that he would be starved

out in a few days an~vay.4l
General Beauregard immediately telegraphed Anderson's
answer to Montgomery.

Secretary Nalker replied that it was

not desired to needlessly bombard Fort Sumter.

If Major

Anderson would state the time at which he would evacuate,
and agree that in the meantime he would not use his guns
against

Beauregard~

unless 3eauregard's were turned on

Sumter, the effusion of blood was to be avoided.

But

'~'iaH~er

added, "If this, or its equivalent, be refused, reduce the
fort as your judgment decides to be most practicable~42

The

lack of provisions at Sumter was so acute that when Major
Anderson asked the Assistant Surgeon for his opinion as to
how long they could hold out, the latter replied that the
men could hold out for five days, but for the last three they
would be entirely without food. 43
a second time to demand evacuation.

40.
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he would, if provided with the proper and necessary means
of transportation" evacuate Fort Sumter by noon on the 15th
of April" unless he should receive prior to that time
controlling instructions from the Government or additional
supplies. 44

Beauregard' £" messen8ers considered this reply

as rrmanife s tly futile II and promptly refused it. 45

'rhey

had waited three hours for the answer" and at 3: 30 A. M.,
on the morning of April 12, Colonel Chestnut and Captain Lee
handed Anderson the following notice signed by themselves:
By authority of Brigadier-General Beauregard, commanding
the provisional forces of the Confederate states, we have
the honor to notify you that he will open the fire of his
batteries on Fort Sumter in one hour from this time. 46
The long-postponed action was no" to start at 4 :30 A. M.,
April 12.

But what of the relief expedition under Fox?

The

steam sloop-of-vv'ar Pawnee, with Captain S. C. Rov/an commanding,
wi th ten guns and two hundred me!l, sailed from rv'ashington,
with sealed orders, on the morning of ..:'I.pril 6.
cutter Harriet Lane" Captain J. Faunce

The revenue

commandin~"

with five

guns and ninety-six men, on Saturday, April 6, exchanged her
revenue flag for the flag of the United States Navy flag, and
on llpril 8 sailed suddenly with sealed orders.

The Powhatan,

which Capt. F'ox expected to be the flagship and main reliance,
had eleven guns and two hundred seventy-five men, with most
of the launches.

As we have seen, Fox was deprived of the

service of this ship because of Seward's meddling and the
44.
45.
46.
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refusal of Lieutenant Porter to restore it to Captain Mercer.
The steam transport Atlantic, with 358 troops, sailed on
the morning of April 7.

The Transport Baltic, with 160

troops, sailed on the morning of April 9.

The transport

Illinois, with 300 troops, sailed on the morning of April 9.
There were two steam tugs, the "Yankee" and "Uncle Ben".

The

tlYankee" left New York on the evening of April 8, and the
"LTncle Ben lt left on the night of April 9.

The launches were

carried by the transports Atlantic, 3altic and Illinois. 47
Because of haste and buncling the expedition was poorly
organized, the ships leaving at different times.
also hindered the expedition.

A storm

The Harriet Lane was the first

ship to arrive at Charleston harbor at just about the time
the Confederate batteries opened fire on Sumter.
was next to arrive with Captain Pox on board.

The Baltic

The Pawnee

came in about 6: 00 A. M., and was shortly after boarded by
Captain Ii'ox, who informed its Commander, Rowan, of his
orders from the Secretary of War, and requested him to stand
in for the bar with him.

This Howan declined to do.

He

said that his orders required him to remain IIten miles east
of the light and await the Powhatan, and that he

"

going in there to begin civil war. 48
followed by the Harriet Lane.

ViaS

not

The Baltic want in,

As they approached the land,

the firing of the guns at Sumter was heard, and the smoke
of the batteries was visible.

Corrnnander Rowan, having received

his orders from the Harriet Lane, now came in with his ship,

47. Moore, Prank,
48.
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and asked for a pilot, announcing his intention of running
in and sharing the fate of the garrison.

Captain Fox

went at once on board and explained to Rowan that the
Government did not expect such gallant sacrificej the orders
given did not require it.49

The 12th passed without the

arrival of any other vessels of the fleet.

Fox was still

waiting for the arrival of the Powhatan during the night,
and still ignorant of her change of destination, he returned
in the Baltic and signalled for her all night.

Neither the

Pawnee nor Harriet Lane was furnished with the proper boats
to carry in supplies to the fort.

The Baltic steamed towards

the harbor, ran aground on Rattlesnake Shoals, and was forced
to anchor in deep water, several miles from the ships of war.
The Pocahontas finally arrived at 2 :00 P.

~I:.

on April 12"

and it was only then that Fox learned that the Powhatan had a
destination elsewhere.

Although ?ox had not left New York

on the Baltic until two days after the Powlllitan had been taken
by Porter" he had not been informed of it. 50

The tug

IIUncle Ben" had been driven by a storm into Wilmington, North
Carolina and it had been seized by the rebels.

The storm

had driven the tug nYankee" to the entrance of Savannah. 51
Thus the expedition failed, as almost every element that was
essential to its success was wanting.

The fleet remained

outside the harbor he1pless. 52
Fox felt very bitterly toward Seward for the detachment
of the Powhatan.
49.
50.
51.
52.

It was believed by Fox that the failure

Crawford, ££. £hl." pp. 417" 418.
Ibid, p. 418.
lOIU, p. 419, Statement of Fox.
Smith, W. E., .£.2.. ,ill., vol. 2" p. 14, (Fox Correspondence)

222
of the

Powhatan to appear with the launches and men was

responsible for his failure.

He wrote to his wife of

Seward's meddling:
l'.!r. Seward got up this Pensacola expedition and the
President signed the orders in ignorance and unknown
to the Department. The President offers every apology
possible and will do so in writing. So do the Departments.
I shall get it all straight in justification of myself
and to place the blow on the head of that timid ','I. H.
Seward, he who paralizes (sic) every movement from
abject fear. 53

The Blairs and SecI'etary of the Navy Welles actually charged
that Seward's meddling was a mere continuation of his alleged
complicity with the Confederates. 54

The President apologized

to Fox for his failure to support him properly in his attempt
to relieve Major Anderson, and immediately appointed him
Assistant Secretary of the Navy.55
Vie

have noticed the reluctance of Major Anderson to do

anything which would initiate civil war, his Southern
sympathies, a nd the somewhat strange nature of his communications
and conduct.

We have also noted that Lincoln at one time was

inclined to doubt his loyalty.

He now had notice of the relief

expedition, and also the orders of April 4 which authorized
him to surrender in the face of an impossible situation. 56
In the face of his oVvn feelings, and in the light of his past
treatment at the hands of the Government, itis a confirmation
of his loyalty to his Government that he refused to surrender
without a fight.

On April 10 Anderson reported to the War

Department that his men were in fine spirits, but that the
53. Sandburg, £E. cit., vol. 1, p. 199
54. Smith, VI. E., .2.J2. • .£1l., vol. 2, pp. 14, 15.
55. Ibid, p. 15, quoting Fox Correspondence, Lincoln to FOX,
May 1, 1861.
56. Official Records, vol. 1, p. 249.
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long confinement and excitement were telling on them; none
of them could endure fatiguing labor for any length of
time. 57

Anderson informed the men on the loth of the

expedition of relief, and that he must cooperate with it
to the best of his ability.

The preparations being made

told the men that fighting was about to commence.

According

to one of their officers, the news acted like magic upon
them.

They had previously been drooping and dejected, but

now they "sprung to their work with the greatest alacrity,
laughing, singing, whistling, and full of glee".

They were

overjoyed to learn that their long imprisonment in the fort
would soon be at an end. 58
The firing of the Confederates commenced according
to schedule at 4:30 A. M., April 12.

The first gun was

fired by Edmund Ruffin of Virginia, who has been called the
father of secession, and who, when his cause failed, took
his own life.

The commencement of the bombardment has been

graphically told by Captain Abner Doubleday:
Almost immediately afterward a ball f rom Cummings Point
lodged in the magazine wall, and by the sound seemed to bury
itself in the masonry about a foot from my head, in very
unpleasant proximity to my right ear. This is the one that
probably came with Mr. Ruffin's compliments. In a moment
the firing burst forth in one continuous roar, and large
patches of both the exterior and interior masonry began
to crumble and fall in all directions. Nineteen batteries
were now hammer1ng at us, and the balls and shells from
the ten-inch columbiads, accompanied by shells from the
thirteen-1nch mortars which constantly bombarded us, made
us feel as if the war had commenced in earnest. 59
57.
58.
59.
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It was not until 7:00 A. M. that Fort Sumter opened fire.
Its entire armament consisted of forty-eight available guns
in casemate and barbette, with five 8-inch and 10-inch
Columbiads on the parade, and so mounted as to bear upon
the city of Charleston, Fort

~/!oultrie

and Cummings Point.

The firing continued all day.60
It is not the purpose of this paper to give a detailed
~ccount

of the bombardment of Fort Sumter, as space does not

allow it, but some facts will be briefly noted.

Tr~ee

times

during the first day's bombardment the officers' quarters
were set on fire.

At midnight the making of cartridges was

stopped by Major Anderson, as nearly all the extra clothing
and material from the hospital had been used.
day, every battery around the fort opened fire.

On the second
Major Anderson

forbade any further attempt to control the flames which had
now spread in every direction through the wooden floors and
partitions of the quarters.

Because of the fire all but five

barrels of the powder from the magazine were thrown into
the sea.

The men, almost suffocated as the wind carried

the cloud of hot smoke and cinders into the casemates, threw
themselves on the ground and covered their faces with wet
cloths, or rushed to the embrasures, w here the occasional
draught made it possible to breathe. 6l After the fort had been
reduced to ruin, and the lack of men to man the guns and the
lack of ammunition and supplies making the cause hopeless,

60.

61.
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Major Anderson agreed to terms of evacuation and surrender.
At about 7:00 P. M. of the second day of bombardment,
Beauregard sent his aides, Colonel Chestnut, Colonel Roger
A. Pryor, Colonel William Porcher Miles, and Captain Lee,
followed soon by 3eauregard's Adjutant-General Jones,
ex-Governor Manning, and Colonel Alston, to Major Anderson
under a white flag.

The way had been prepared by the

wholly unauthorized mission of Senator -;agfall, who had
previously gone to the fort when he noticed the flagstaff
shot down, and had arranged a truce with Anderson.

It was

T,Vigfall who waved the white flag under which the authorized
agents came. 62
Beauregard's aides took the following message from
Anderson back to Beauregard:
General: I thank 'you for your kindness in having sent
your aides to me with an offer of assistance upon your
having observed that our flag was down - it being down
a few moments, and merely long enough to enable us to
replace it on another staff. Your aides will inform you
of the circumstance of the visit to my fort by General
Wigfall, who said that he came with a message from yourself.
In the peculiar circumstances in which I am now placed
in consequence of that message, and of my reply thereto, I
will now state that I am willing to evacuate this fort upon
the terms and conditions offered by yourself on the 11th
instant, at any hour you may name tomorrow, or as soon as we
can arrange means of transportation. I will not replace
my flag until the return of your messenger.63
Shortly after the recepit of the above, Beauregard sent to
the following communication:
62.
63.
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Apprised tlmt you desire the privilege of saluting
your flag on retiring, I cheerfully concede it, in
consideration of the gallantry with which you have defended
the place under your charge.
The Catawba steamer will be at the landing of Sumter
tomorrow morning at any hour you may designate for the
purpose of transporting you whither you may desire. 64
Immediately Anderson sent back to Beauregard the following:
I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your
communication of this evening, and to express my gratification at its contents. Should it be convenient, I would
like to have the Catawba here at about nine o'clock
tomorrow morning. 65
Not one fatality had resulted on either side from the
hostilities, four of Anderson's men having been slightly
wounded from fragments of concrete and mortar.

The casualties

resulted from the ceremony of aaluting the flag before
Major Anderson removed his men from the fort.

In this ceremony

two men were killed by an accident, one severely wounded,
and three more slightly wounded.

The actual evacuation took

place at 4:00 P. M., April 14, when the Confederates took
possession of the fort. 66

Because of the accidents only

fifty of the proposed one hundred guns were fired in saluting
the flag.
~~jor

Hook,

On April 18, from the steamship Baltic, off Sandy
Anderson reported to the War Department the fall

of the fort and the result of a long Government policy of
"muddling through".

His report was a mixture of pathos and

pride:
Having defended Fort Sumter for thirty-four hours, until
the quarters were entirely burned, the main gates destroyed
by fire, the gorge walls seriously impaired, the magazine
surrounded by flames, and its door closed from the effects
of the heat, four barrels and three cartridges of powder

64.

65.
66.
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only being available, and no provisions remaining but pork,
I accepted terms of evacuation offered by General Beauregard
(being the same offered by him on the 11th instant, prior
to the commencement ·of hostilities), and marched out of
the fort on Sunday afternoon, the 14th instant, with colors
flying and drums beating, bringing away company and private
property, and saluting my flag with fifty guns. 67
On April 20, the Secretary of War sent Anderson the following
message of approval and thanks:
I am directed by the President of the United States to
communicate to you, and through you to the officers and
the men under your cormnand, at Forts Moultrie and Sumter,
the approbation of the Government of your and their
judicious and gallant conduct there, and to tender to you
and them the tharu{s of the Government for the same. 68
The period of inaction, delay, and conciliation was at
an and.

The firing on the fort by the Confederacy was to

"strike the hornets' nest" of which the Confederate Secretary
of State, Robert Toombs, had warned.

Toombs had said to

Jefferson Davis: "Mr. President, at this time it is suicide,
murder, and you will lose us ever'y friend at the North • • •
it puts us in the wrong; it is fatal".

There has been much

written to affirm that Lincoln had been thinking the same
thoughts as Toombs.

The Southern viewpoint has been that

Lincoln did not expect the Fox expedition to succeed, but
that he sent it in order to force the South into firing
the first shot, thus putting the onus of starting the war on
the South, thereby effecting a solid support of the North in
a war which he thought inevitable.
to support such a theory.

There is much evidence

Avery Craven, in a recent study of

the coming of the Civil War, has stated that Lincoln told
67.
68.
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O. H. Browning, a close friend and adviser, that he himself
conceived the idea of sendine; supplies to Sumter without
an attempt to reinforce.
'rhey attacked Sumter.

Said Lincoln: "The plan succeeded.

It fell, and thus did more service

than it otherwise could".69
The ;Southern historian, Pollard, writing in 1861,
charged Lincoln with a deliberate design to initiate war,
throwing the responsibility on the South.

Said Pollard:

The fact was that the President had long ago calculated
the result and the effect, on the country, of the hostile
movements which he had ordered against the sovereignty of
South Carolina. He had procured the battle of Sumterj he
had no desire or hope to retain the fort. The circumstances
of the battle and the non-participation of his fleet in it,
were sufficient evidence, to every honest and reflecting
mind, that it was not a contest for victory, and that lithe
sending of provisions to a starvins garrison" was an
ingenious artifice to commence the war that the Federal
Government had fully resolved upon. 70
The fact that Lincoln knew that the relief expedition would
initiate hostilities and throw the responsibility on the
South might be inferred from his letter of consolation to
Fox.

On May I, 1861, Lincoln wrote Fox a letter in which

he clearly indicated that some other beneficial result had
accrued from an attempt to supply Sumter.

Said Lincoln to

Fox:
You and I both anticipated that the course of the country
would be advanced by making the attempt to provision
Fort Sumter, even if it should failj and it is no small
consolation now to feel t hat our anticipation is justified
by the result.7l
Nas the result of which Lincoln spoke the forcing of the
69. Craven, Avery, The comin~ of The Civil War, p. 481
Browning1s Diary, vol. 1, p. 75. New York, Charles Scribner's
Sons, 1942.
70. Pollard, ££. £!i., p. 49
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South to

,
}

coro~ence

the war?

It seems that it was, according

to what Lincoln told Browning.
Craven, in his recent study, has declared t hat Lincoln
did not deliberately choose to plunge the nation into such
a war as resulted from his acts.

According to Craven,

Lincoln did not understand the situation, overestimated the
strength of the Union forces in the South, and counted too
heavily on controlling the border States; that he most
certainly felt the pressure of radical Republican opinion
for firm action, but hoped to save his party and escape war.
Craven is probably right in asserting that an excellent case
can be made out, on supportable evidence, for Lincoln either
as an aggressor or as a conciliator, Craven

thi~~s

that

Lincoln suffered heavily from the bad habit of "double talklf
!,

\"

such as appeared in the inaugural. 72

.ii

Southerner, ..&rchibald

Rutledge, in a study made in 1935, charged that Lincoln used
precisely the same policy that Bismarck later employed.
Although making the fatal move himself, Lincoln managed for
the moment to make it appear that the South was the aggressor. 73
But in all the mass of conwent on the real purpose of Lincoln
in sending the Fox expedition, it must not be forgotten that
Lincoln was only seeking to maintain the Federal authority
as he had pledged to do in his inaugural.
On April 13, while Fort Sumter was being bombarded, a
committee of three delegates from the Virginia Convention
waited on Lincoln to learn his policy in regard to the
72. Craven, 2£. cit., p. 480
73. Rutledge, Archibald, "Abraham Lincoln Pights The Battle
of Fort Sumter", South Atlantic Quarterly, XXXIV, Oct. 1935,
p. 370.
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Confederate States.
to this committee.

It might be well to quote his answer
Said Lincoln:

In answer I have to say that, having at the beginning
of my official term expressed my intended policy as plainly
as I was able, it is with deep regret and some mortification
I now learn that there is great and injurious uncertainty
in the public mind as to what that policy is, and what course
I intend to pursue. Not having as yet seen occasion to
change, it is now my purpose to pursue the course marked
out in the inaugural addr~ss. I comnend a careful consideration of the whole document as the best expression of my
purposes.
As I then said, and now repeat: tiThe power confided to
me will be used to hold, occupy and possess the property
and places belonging to the Government, and to collect the
duties and imposts; but beyond what is necessary for these
objects, there will be no invasion, no using of force
against or among the people anywhere". By the words, npro perty and pL>.ces belonging to the Government", I chiefly
allude to the military posts and property which were in the
possession of the Government when it came to my hands. 74
"\~atever

might be said of Lincoln's hidden purposes, his

attempt to supply Sumter certainly was in accord with his
inaugural declaration of an intention to hold and possess
the Federal forts, and the resistance on the part of the
Confederate forces fulfilled his promise that the South could
have no war without being themselves the aggressors.
It is the writer's opinion that Lincoln had come to the
Presidency wit h a much firmer policy than he followed after
the inaugural.

Like Buchanan, he hesitated to use firmness

because of a desire to avoid civil war and to hold the border
slave States in the Union.

His concern over the Virginia

Convention had persuaded him to agree to evacuate Fort Sumter
provided Virginia would not pass an ordinance of secession.

74.
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He was also prevented from taking firm measures for some
time because of a belief that Northern public opinion
would not support him.

As soon, however, as Northern

yublic opinion had been consolidated in his support, as
it had been by March 29, 1861, and when the radical
Republican Senators demanded stronger action, he decided
to send the expeditions to both Sumter and Pickens.

From

Lincoln's own statements, the writer believes that he
had come to view civil war as inevitable if the Union was
to be saved, and his decision to attempt to supply Sumter
was in order to throw the onus of initiating war on the
South.

The South was forced to make the choice.

232

Bibliography
Primary Sources and Documents

Black, C. F., Essays and Speeches of J. S. Black.
New York, D. Appleton Co., 1885.
Buchanan, James, ~. Buchan~ Administr~t~QD on the Eve of
The Bebellion. New York, D. Appleton Co., 1866:- - - - - - - - Annual Report of American Historical Association for Year 1902.
Diary and Correspondence of Salmon P. Chase.
~ashington, D. C., Government Printing Office, 1903.
30

Lincoln's Works, edited by Nicolay and Hay, 2 volumes.
New York, The Century Co., 1894.
Moore, Frank, Rebellion Record, vol. 1,
New York, D. Van Nostrand Co., 1866.
Richardson, James D., A Compilation of the Messages and Papers
of the Presidents. volumes 5 and 6.
Published by authority of Congress, 1899.
U. S. War Department, The War of the Rebellion, Official Records
of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series 1, vol. 1.
Washington D.
Government Printing Office, 1880.

e.,

Welles, Gideon, The Diary of Gideon Welles, vol. 1.
New York, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1911.

General Histories

Brownlow, N. G., Sketches of the Rise, Progress, and .Declin~
of Secession. Philadelphia, George w. Childs Co., 1862.
Burgess, John W., The Civil War and the Constitution, vol. 1
New York, Charle s ,Scribner's Sons, 1901.
Chadvdck, French Ensor, Causes of the Civil -Nar.
New York, liarpers, 1906.
Channing, Edward, A History of the United States, vol. 6.
New York, The Macmillan Co., 1936.
Craven Avery, '11he Coming of the Civil Har.
New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1942.

233
Davis, Jefferson, Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government,
Vol. 1. New York, D. Appleton Co., 1881.
Dumond, Dwight L., The Secession Movement 1860 - 1861.
New York, The :Macmillan Co., 1931.
Greeley, Horace, '.rhe American Conflict; A History of the Great
Rebellion in the United States of Araerica, 1860 - 18644 vol. 1
Hartford, O. D. Case Co., 1864.
Macartney, Clal"ence E., Lincoln and His Cabinet.
New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1931.
Pollard, Edward A., IJ.lhe Pirst Year of the 7!ar.
Richmond, Va., West and johnson, 1862.
Randall, James G., The Civil '.'Jar and Reconstruction.
New York, D. C. Heath and Co., 1937.
Ha-ymond, H. J., History of the Administration of President
Lincoln. New York, The Derby Co., 1864.
Rhodes, James Ford, Histor~ of the United states from the
Compromise of 1850 to the LCKin1ey-Bryan Campaign of 1896, vol. 3
New York, The Macmillan Co., 1920.
Schouler, James, A History of the United States of ;bnerica,
vol. 5 and 6. New York, Dodd Mead and Co., 1891.

Biographies

Connor, Henry Groves, John Archibald Campbell.
New York, Houghton Eifi'lin Co., 1920.
Curtis, George Ticknor, T!le Life of James Buchanan, 2 volumes.
New York, Harper and Brothers, 1883.
Lawton, l:,;ba Anderson, Major Robert Anderson and Fort Sumter, 1861.
New York, The Knickerbocker Press, 1911.
iJothrop, Thornton K., William Henry sewaJ:"S'!. ,American Statesmen
Series. Boston and New York, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1898.
Morse, John T., Abraham Lincoln, 2 volumes.
American Statesmen Series, New York, Houghton 1Tifflin Co., 1893.
Nicolay, John G. and Hay, Jor...n, Abraham Linco1..P4 A His tory,
volumes 2, 3 and 4. New York, The Century Co., 1904.
Sandburg, Carl, ~tbraham Lincoln - The ':Jar Years, volume 1.
New York, Harcol~t Brace and Co., 1939.

234

Smith, '::illiam Ernest, Th.e ?rancis Preston Blair Family In
Politics, 2 volumes, New York, The Macmillan Co., 1933.
Tarbell, Ida ~,:., The Life of Abraham Lincoln, volume 2.
New York, The Macmillan Co., 1917.

Special Studies

Luchampaugh, Philip Gerald, James Buchanan and His Cabinet on
the Eve of Secession.
Private Printing, Lancaster Press, Lancaster, Pa., 1926.
Barbee, D. R., and Bonham, M. L.
Notes and Documents: Fort Sumter Again.
Mississippi Valley Historical Association, Y...I'CVIII, June 1941"
pp. 63 - 73.
Hall, 'N. L., Lincoln's Interview 7Ji th John B. Baldwin.
South Atlantic Quarterly, XIII, July 1914, pp 260 - 293.
Rutledge, Archibald, President Lincoln Fights the Battle of
Fort Sumter.
South Atlantic QUarterly, ;QG'CIV, pp 368 - 383. October 1935.

Personal Narratives and Correspondence

.Adams, Charles Francis, Autobiography.
New York, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1916.
Crawford, Samuel Wylie, The Genesis of the Civil War,
New York, Charles 1,";'ebster Co., 1887.
Doublec1ay , Abner, Reminiscenses of Forts Sumter and Moul trie
in 1860 - 1861. New York, Harper and Brothers, 1875.
Hunt, Gaillard, editor, Narrative and Letter of Yiilliam Henry
Trescot, .American Historical Review, XIII, pp 528 - 556, 1908.
Johnson and 13uel, Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, vol. 1
New York, The Century, 1887.
King, Horatio, Turninf On the Li~ht.
Philadelphia, J. B.,ippincotto., 1895.
Lamon, 'lIard H., Recollections of Lincoln, published by editor
Dorothy Lamon Teillard, Washington, D. C., 1911.

235
Lutz, Ralph Haswell,ftRudolph Schleiden and the Visit to
Richmond, April 25, 1861~
Annual Report American Historical Association, 1915, pp 210 - 215.
l:IcClure, A.. K., Abraham Lincoln and Men of War Times,
Philadelphia, ':ehe Times Publishing Co., 1892.
Meiss, li. e.," General 1'.1. C. Meigs on the Conduct of the Civil 'Vlar,'
(Diary), American Historical Review, XXVI, 1921, pp 286 - 301.
Russell, Sir 'v'filliam Howard, My Diary North and South,
Boston, T. O. H. p. Burnham Co., 1863.
Mag:azine , XV,

"/leed, Thurlow, Autobiography, edited by Harriet A. -deed,
:Soston, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1883.
Blaine, James G. ,Twenty Years of Conf1'ress,
Norwich, Connecticut, The Henry Bill ~ublishing Co., 1886.
Newspapers

.Louisville

~y

Courier.... Louisville, Kentucky, If1:J.rch, 1861.

